We partially repeat each other's points. The lack of a social-revolutionary dimension in the Ukrainian struggle doesn't just limit the international appeal of the Ukrainian cause. I wrote about this back in 2022: if the struggle remains national-particularistic instead of social-universalist, it will only be used to legitimate Western elites, without gaining any substantial progressive solidarity from below and in the Global South. And, of course, it has only become only more ethnonationalist, comprador, and particularistic since then, so we're seeing the predictable outcomes. But the destabilizing outcomes of Ukraine's "maidan" deficient revolutions, rather than social revolutions, also mean diminished domestic legitimacy for the Ukrainian state, and a weaker rather than stronger mobilizing capacity. This has everything to do with why this war started at all and with its looming outcome. It isn't just a matter of nuances in international perception. Ukrainian nationalism has a fundamental, material, structural difference from national-liberation and antifascist struggles.