A good one from the archives.
He managed to bottom tick it again. xitter.cf/Nouriel/status/2071519…
News from Shitcoins Land : Bitcoin’s price is now lower than its 2021 fall peak. So in the last five years the return to Bitcoin has been negative. And 90% of Bitcoin holders bought at a price higher than the current level. So all these shitcoiner suckers have lost their shirt . And losses are much higher in the other top 10 crypto-craps, let alone in 100s of lesser shitcoins that are down down 95% from their peak or worth 0! And even among meme-coins, Fart Coin - down 95% from peak - has done better than crappy Trump coin and Melania coin that have fallen even more. So Trump got to shaft his MAGA meme-loving base too! 🤑🤮💩💩💩🤑🤮
As onchain has heated up again, some essential reading and tools to use in your quest to paper-escape the underlcass:
RH FARMS
- vfat, the OG vfat.tools/robinhood/
- Revert, the OG revert.finance/#/top-positio…
- LPAgent app.lpagent.io/smart-lp
- DELTA deltaliquidity.app/pools
- Beefy app.beefy.finance/?chain=rob…
The attacker is bridging out his GNO via Relay at a 20% discount. Solvers eating well today.
Unfortunately, there is a hack related to @gnosispay and the "delay module".
Please be patient while we try to contain the damage. Rest assured, Gnosis will cover all user losses.
the sato hook is _not_ working as intended.
`totalMintedFair` and `ethCum` are out of sync due to `exp()` and `ln()` using polynomial approximations. Over time, this caused a ~22% slippage between buys and sells
dev should admit it and migrate or just add it to the lore
Dex aggregators who collect positive surplus are financially incentivized to underquote you and skim the difference when they overdeliver tokens.
That's the real issue here, not MEV. Unless you broadcast to the mempool like a caveman.
When an aggregator underquotes, this might be worse!
On the surface, this doesn't sound bad. Underpromise and over-deliver right?
Well... not really.
On venues that don't simulate, these quotes didn't appear competitive so they were rarely chosen. But now that most meta aggregators simulate, you will often see an underquoted option at the top.
However! With naive simulation an aggregator that underquotes will actually magnify your slippage by the underquoted amount. You will be exposed to way more potential MEV than expected.
This can be really bad for your execution quality!
Imagine you set a 5bps slippage tolerance and the aggregator underquotes by 4bps. Your slippage tolerance is essentially now 9bps
Which aggregators are constantly underquoting? @robotevm has the answer. xitter.cf/robotevm/status/204667…
Users should revoke all approvals made on CoW Swap after 14:54 UTC today. Tools like revoke.cash make this easy to do.
An MEV operator backran this trade to make a 4824 ETH profit after bribing Titan Builder with 13087 ETH. Think both entities are reasonable and would return a good chunk of it to the user. See: 0x45388b0f9ff46ffe98a3124c22ab1db2b1764ecb3b61234e29e5c9732b7fd4ab
Earlier today, a user attempted to buy AAVE using $50M USDT through the Aave interface.
Given the unusually large size of the single order, the Aave interface, like most trading interfaces, warned the user about extraordinary slippage and required confirmation via a checkbox. The user confirmed the warning on their mobile device and proceeded with the swap, accepting the high slippage, which ultimately resulted in receiving only 324 AAVE in return.
The transaction could not be moved forward without the user explicitly accepting the risk through the confirmation checkbox.
The CoW Swap routers functioned as intended, and the integration followed standard industry practices. However, while the user was able to proceed with the swap, the final outcome was clearly far from optimal.
Events like this do occur in DeFi, but the scale of this transaction was significantly larger than what is typically seen in the space.
We sympathize with the user and will try to make a contact with the user and we will return $600K in fees collected from the transaction.
The key takeaway is that while DeFi should remain open and permissionless, allowing users to perform transactions freely, there are additional guardrails the industry can build to better protect users. Our team will be investigating ways to improve these safeguards going forward.
I would expect the more sophisticated generalized frontrunners like c0ffebabe to replicate the TX with some conditional branches pruned so they can bypass access control measures. Still, a cool find from jad!
The @yearnfi hacker used hash-based address checks (not direct address comparisons) to prevent their exploit from being front-run or copied by MEV bots or otherplayers. This was a lesson learned from the Balancer hack,whers others observed and replay, their exploit transaction.
