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China energy analysis & advisory: solar, wind, coal, nuclear, markets. 14yr migrant, currently SH. Rural development enthusiast. @HopkinsNanjing @LantauGroup
Shanghai
Joined January 2012
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Hi! I often tweet long threads about China's energy sector, mostly grid, renewables, and nuclear.
This is a master collection of my favorites, from oldest to newest.
I will add more as they are created and remove oudated ones.
Chinese households have spent decades allocating more income away from consumption, even as incomes continue to rise.
Why?
Part 1 of my new essay explores the complex relationship between property, balance sheets, confidence, and consumption in China.
feelingthestones.com/p/the-c…
A long time ago, my Chinese professor suggested I learn this song for a talent show hosted by the Chinese consulate in Houston. It's still a go-to for “need to sing a Chinese song at KTV” for like half the foreigners here because it's so popular and easy to learn.
Imagine my anxiety after I accidentally tried to learn the 陶喆 R&B version, which was not simple for my Chinese level at the time!
Fortunately my professor got me the right version after asking about progress and being confused when I said I had trouble with the rapped parts...
This framework for viewing the Chinese cleantech sector has broader implications for understanding the health of many sectors across the Chinese economy - and their investability.
When the political economy has been optimized around delivering consumer benefits at the expense of producer margins and their market power, the typical metrics of producer performance like stock prices or market caps become less valuable indicators of productivity or competitiveness.
China has multiple companies that, judged on tech, scale, market position, and strategic importance, would enjoy massively higher valuations in a different political economy. Their valuations are held down by the (correct) expectation that much of the value they create will ultimately accrue to buyers rather than shareholders.
If you assume the objective function of the system is shareholder value maximization, then a system that compresses producer returns by design is (understandably) going to be pretty unattractive. You don't have to play. But also resist the urge to evaluate the system's performance according to a metric it's not optimizing for.
Our full article 'The Machine' from me and @KaiserKuo is now available sans paywall on The Break—Down's website with a free registration.
It's a lengthy dive into the politico-economic-techno-industry complex that underpins China's clean energy sector.
Teaser/intro below: 🧵
Our full article 'The Machine' from me and @KaiserKuo is now available sans paywall on The Break—Down's website with a free registration.
It's a lengthy dive into the politico-economic-techno-industry complex that underpins China's clean energy sector.
Teaser/intro below: 🧵
If the energy transition looks at first blush like a technology problem, then that scene in Beijing shows that more than anything else it is a problem of political economy.
🌫️ ’The Machine’ by KAISER KUO and DAVID FISHMAN for our Issue #4: CHINA is available on our website!
These various Chinese systems and mechanisms that keep cleantech input costs low and cleantech producer market power minimized are what we call "The Machine" in our essay.
It's a machine that was already productive and efficient and innovative, even when it was not being specifically optimized for consumer surpluses.
It's a machine with a theoretical economic basis for why minimizing producer margins is proper, and a robust climate science basis for why maximizing cleantech consumer surplus is also proper.
And it's a machine operated by technocrat policymakers and industry actors who now know exactly which policy tool lubricants make it hum.
Although sometimes it needs recalibration. Like now.
But we'd better hope they recalibrate it well. Because if we're going to decarbonize the global economy on any kind of reasonable timeline, it seems we're going to be awfully reliant on the machine that China built.
It's not good for all things, all the time, and it's certainly not good for competitive producers abroad, but right now it's very effective at producing the things we need to implement the energy transition, at the prices we need them to be at.
And no one seems to have a better plan. But if you have one, I'm happy to hear it.
As we conclude in the piece:
"Meeting the challenge of decarbonization now hinges on a machine that Western policymakers and political economists find uncomfortable. The onus is ultimately on those experiencing this discomfort to build something else that will deliver."
If you found this teaser interesting, please do give the full piece a read. Featuring quotes from @kyleichan, @jerometenk, @mazzocco_ilaria, @adam_tooze and more.
(warning: 6500 words).
break-down.org/the-machine/
Do not follow this advice, unless you want to be wrong.
Chinese officials concurrently hold positions within both the Party and the PRC government. If you don't know the difference, you aren't qualified to comment.
Xi's proper top title within the Party is the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. There is no "Chairman of the Communist Party" (this role was abolished in the 1980s). In Chinese, it would be 习总书记, i.e. "General Secretary Xi" although you'd typically only see this used in readouts or summaries of Party affairs specifically.
If we're being precise, Xi could be correctly referred to as "Chairman" in his capacity as leader of either the Central Military Commission or National Military Commissions (i.e., the Party one or the State one; he is Chairman of both) but we know that is not the intention here.
Because Chinese leaders almost always travel abroad in their capacity as PRC state leaders, and not Party officials, it's correct on his visit to the US to refer to him by his state leader title, which is President of the PRC, 国家主席 or just President Xi.
Typically the only time he would travel abroad with his title of General Secretary (and not just as the PRC President) is for explicit Party business, for example party-to-party exchanges in Vietnam.
If you wanna be a pedantic twit, don't half-ass it. You'd think a former diplomat would be more sensitive to the precision of diplomatic protocol.
This quoted post is unavailable.
Ningde: the Dawn of China's NOAK Nuclear Era
NOAK means "Nth-of-a-Kind". In nuclear lingo, it means a design standardized for mass production.
One plant in China that perfectly captures this concept is Ningde Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).
I visited it last weekend. 🧵
After this, we walked through the small exhibition center on the hilltop, which had some basic information about the plant and a model of the CPR-1000 steam supply system. It was a pretty quick little exhibition and then we were done.
We then spent the rest of the afternoon in Fuding city drinking tea and chatting about northern Anhui history and domestic Chinese travel destinations. Xiaolong is a major Tea Knower and Tea Appreciator so we were sampling all kinds of tea that I didn't quite know how to enjoy, but did my best nonetheless.
Then he brought me to the Fuding train station, loaded me up with mooncakes (of course lmao, tis the season) and sent me on my way to Ningde. A real prince of a guy, who didn't have to do any of that, because receiving me to tour the plant on a Saturday was really just a favor to friend of a friend of a colleague. But much appreciation to all involved.
So...if you get a chance, go visit Ningde NPP in Fuding. CGN has registrations on their mini-app. Check out the industrial scenery...and the natural scenery too. I'd like to go back to visit the mountain at least. Ah well, next time...
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