40 technologies. AI, biomedicine, solar. Beijing is tightening its grip on what know-how leaves the PRC. Pre-export registration is already in force. Our June commentary flagged AI, biopharma, and other advantage industries as likely targets for closer oversight, four months ahead of this proposal. link to our commentaries: buff.ly/C2LkaQU, buff.ly/6j6XI0w source: buff.ly/1PNsQNG

Wide income gaps constrain demand, argues Jiang Xiaojuan 江小涓. Local tax breaks for high earners pull against common prosperity. Her case for inclusive reform is worth reading. A veteran policymaker and economist, she is a voice we track closely. Read our context note and summary: buff.ly/JbRxXDT original article: buff.ly/zptAcOD #JiangXiaojuan #PRCEconomy #EconomicReform #CommonProsperity #IncomeDistribution #Consumption

Protected farmland can still lose its yield. The PRC’s new laws put soil quality and upkeep alongside controls on land loss. Upgrades bring jobs and spending. The test is what they leave in the fields. Our analysis: putting farmland quality into law link to brief: buff.ly/oKMgBoo #China #Agriculture #FoodSecurity #Farmland #RuralDevelopment

Days after EU–China talks on hybrid trade and EV prices, Beijing cut NEV export VAT rebates from 13 to 9 percent from April 2027. The cut is also a domestic industrial-policy lever, making it harder for carmakers to carry thin-margin price wars into overseas markets. Cui Dongshu 崔东树 China Passenger Car Association, expects low-margin exporters to face the greatest pressure, while the change could also ease trade friction. Our August brief on Beijing’s trade surplus identified export tax rebates as the leading candidate for adjustment. The NEV cut follows that logic, using tax policy to curb thin-margin competition while fine-tuning the surplus. link: buff.ly/NxYpldB

The PBOC says it sets no exchange rate target and intervenes mainly to prevent sharp short-term swings. It rejects claims that the PRC's trade surplus proves RMB undervaluation, arguing that capital flows and financial markets also drive exchange rates. Around 30% of trade is settled in RMB. Beijing links greater currency flexibility to stronger domestic demand and the 15th 5-year plan. source: buff.ly/drl0GPR #RMB #ExchangeRate #PBC #MonetaryPolicy #ChinaEconomy #CurrencyValuation #GlobalTrade #TradeImbalances #DomesticDemand #15thFiveYearPlan

A 2026 hiring study found PRC graduates with mid-ranked US master’s degrees were 16.2% less likely to get callbacks than domestically qualified peers. Beijing is narrowing privileges for haigui (graduates returning from overseas study) to elite graduates and priority skills. Most returnees now compete on equal footing. With 535,600 students returning in 2025, the overseas degree is losing its scarcity premium. Full brief: buff.ly/TYcuWEQ #RMB #ExchangeRate #PBC #MonetaryPolicy #ChinaEconomy #CurrencyPolicy #TradeImbalances #GlobalTrade #15thFiveYearPlan

New quality productive forces (NQPF) has been Beijing’s shorthand for growth beyond property since 2023. The new document defines the term, making total factor productivity the core benchmark. Traditional industry counts. Duplicate local investment does not. Blind investment gets accountability. source: buff.ly/u0U9ILO

September in the PRC: investment shrank, local governments ran short, and more of the cost of propping up growth fell on Beijing. Month in Focus: the centre takes the strain. link: buff.ly/u6SVX4Y

Beijing's new mortgage subsidy cuts borrowing costs by 1 percentage point for eligible first-time buyers, with strict price and size caps. Its impact will vary across cities, with stronger demand expected in second- and third-tier markets. As our recent analysis noted, Beijing is recasting housing as a durable consumer good, with less reliance on leverage and capital gains. The subsidy supports owner-occupation, with limited capacity to revive the wider market. source: buff.ly/zu8S6Uh brief: chinapolicy.substack.com/p/w…

How can Beijing build a global financial hub while keeping its capital account largely closed? Pudong’s latest 5-year plan calls offshore finance the ‘breakthrough point’ for Shanghai, with targets through 2035. The aim: fund PRC firms abroad, expand RMB use and recycle offshore RMB into investment. But fragmented accounts and regulatory gaps leave the model unfinished. Our latest brief examines Beijing’s emerging approach to offshore finance. link: buff.ly/IQLZM9i

PRC gold imports exceeded 1,000 tonnes in January–August 2026, against 886 tonnes in all of 2025. Central bank buying and private investment both support demand. Domestic prices above international benchmarks give traders scope to profit from imports. Wan Zhe 万喆 sees gold helping hedge dollar risk and supporting wider global use of RMB by providing physical asset backing. source: buff.ly/fOIjklc #GoldImports #GoldReserves #GoldMarket #RMBInternationalisation #ReserveDiversification

Beijing’s central SOEs will no longer be judged mainly on size. A new 5-year plan, outlined on 28 September, scores them on value added and plays down revenue, with strategic emerging industries to lift their share of value added another 5 percentage points by 2030. SASAC says the firms have spent years cutting low-margin trade to squeeze the ‘water’ out of revenue, and lists correcting ‘involution-style’ competition by some central SOEs among its next tasks. source: buff.ly/QgleuXI #China #ChineseEconomy #StateOwnedEnterprises #SOEs #SASAC #ChinaPolicy #15thFiveYearPlan #ChinaEconomicPolicy #StrategicEmergingIndustries #EconomicGrowth #IndustrialPolicy #ChinaInvestment #CentralSOEs #ChinaInfrastructure #EconomicReform #Beijing #China2026

Every No. 1 Central Document since 2004 has been devoted to sannong: agriculture, rural areas and farmers. Its promoters now want the policy term turned into a discipline, taught in PRC universities and debated abroad. Sannongology treats the three as one object of study, with the state balancing food security, growth and social protection. Its architect, Zhu Xinkai 朱信凯, convenes the body that reviews the discipline. Wei Houkai 魏后凯 at CASS is building a rival field, and Ye Jingzhong 叶敬忠 questions whether sannong means anything precise at all. our brief: buff.ly/8z28ZtV

PRC economists keep building the case that the trade surplus is less serious than it looks. Liu Yuanchun 刘元春, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics president, spoke at a Tsinghua forum in Beijing on 19 September. We looked closely into this line of thinking in our trade surplus analysis last month (see link below). Liu urged peers not to be swayed by foreign politicians on ‘global imbalance’. Counting its services deficit, the PRC’s current account surplus is near 3.7 percent of GDP, he says, less than half its 2007 peak. He blames pandemic demand, reindustrialisation abroad, US spending on AI and a widening US deficit. The IMF counts it differently: a record US$735bn in 2025, driven by weak investment and saving at home. Every cause Liu names sits outside the PRC. If Beijing agrees, measures to shrink the surplus look less likely. link to source: buff.ly/NrQONxg link to our surplus piece on substack: buff.ly/9ZKKfRL #China #ChinaEconomy #PRC #TradeSurplus #GlobalImbalances #CurrentAccount #ChinaTrade #ChineseEconomy #LiuYuanchun #USChina #GlobalTrade #InternationalEconomics #EconomicPolicy #TradePolicy #Macroeconomics #ChinaPolicy #GlobalEconomy #EconomicAnalysis #ChinaResearch #Beijing

Evergrande founder Xu Jiayin 许家印 got a life sentence on 20 August. Eight days later, Beijing dropped the rulebook for what replaces the system he built. Presales survive, but mortgages now wait for completion. Bank loans get judged project by project, not developer scale. Fixed asset investment is down 7.2 percent this year and property investment down 19.9 percent, so Beijing still needs property to work: just smaller, safer and more selective. Three property economists give their verdicts on what’s next: buff.ly/MsWmRzv