Conflict Analyst. Senior Advisor @Eurpeace, SGH @YemenPathways, prev IRC Director @USEmbassyYemen, @UNDPYemen, Coral Group. Views personal. E: [email protected]

Washington, DC
Joined February 2011
أبي، وسندي، وعزوتي، وتاج رأسي… في ذمة الله. لا أعرف كيف أكتب نعيك يا أبي، ولا كيف يمكن للكلمات أن تختصر عمرًا كاملًا من الحب والأمان والسند. كنت أظن أن وجودك شيء ثابت في هذه الحياة، وأنني مهما كبرت سأظل أعود إليك فأجد الأب والحضن والطمأنينة. اليوم رحلت، وتركت في القلب فراغًا لا يملؤه أحد. كنت لي أكثر من أب؛ كنت سندي حين أتعب، وقوتي حين أضعف، وأماني حين تضيق بي الدنيا. وما يؤلمني أنني سأكمل الطريق دون أن أسمع صوتك أو أرى وجهك، لكن عزائي أنك تركت في داخلي من حبك وتربيتك وذكراك ما سيبقى معي ما حييت. سامحني يا أبي إن قصّرت يومًا، وارضَ عني. وأشهد الله أنني سأظل أدعو لك ما بقي لي من العمر. اللهم ارحم أبي بقدر ما أحببناه، بل برحمتك التي وسعت كل شيء. اللهم اغفر له، ونوّر قبره، وآنس وحشته، وأكرم نزله، واجعل ما أصابه تكفيرًا ورفعةً له، وافتح له بابًا من الجنة لا يُغلق. رحمك الله يا أبي، يا أول سندٍ لي في هذه الدنيا وأعظم من أحببت. لن أقول وداعًا، بل إلى لقاءٍ بإذن الله في دارٍ أجمل، لا مرض فيها ولا ألم ولا فراق. إنا لله وإنا إليه راجعون والفاتحه الى روح أبي الطاهره.
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Hisham Al-Omeisy هشام العميسي retweeted
إنا لله وإنا إليه راجعون بقلوب مؤمنة بقضاء الله وقدره، ننعى إليكم وفاة صاحب هذا الحساب سائلين الله أن يتغمده بواسع رحمته ويسكنه فسيح جناته. ستُقام صلاة الجنازة يوم الاثنين 19 أكتوبر 2026، بعد صلاة العصر في جامع الملك خالد بأم الحمام، والدفن في مقبرة عرقة.
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Hisham Al-Omeisy هشام العميسي retweeted
How to restrain the Houthis? What are their real ambitions? My one-on-one with Hisham Al-Omeisy, a Yemeni I have known since the late 1990’s. Hisham was kidnapped and tortured by the Houthis, and now is a peace negotiator. He understands the need to humble the Houthis, to get them back to the negotiating table, but doesn’t see a military campaign as the fix. nationalpost.com/news/houthi… @omeisy
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I spent five months in Houthi detention, where I experienced firsthand the brutality and repression of a movement that rules through fear and intimidation. But my understanding of the Houthis and Yemen's war extends well beyond my own imprisonment. I lived in Sana'a most of my life and during the early years of the conflict, witnessing their abuses against civilians, the systematic erosion of freedoms, and the devastating human cost of a war that has torn families apart and pushed millions into desperation. Those experiences left me with no illusions about the nature of the Houthis or the need to confront them. But they also taught me that military force, however necessary, must be guided by a clear political strategy if Yemen is to escape this devastating cycle of conflict. Military action has an important role in countering Houthi advances, degrading their capabilities, and creating leverage for meaningful negotiations. But military gains, however significant, cannot by themselves resolve the underlying political conflict or guarantee lasting stability. My concern is the increasingly entrenched **zero-sum mentality**, where the complete annihilation of one side is seen as the only acceptable outcome. This approach risks exacting an enormous human, political, and economic toll. It is a steep and uncertain road, with no guarantee that even a costly military victory would deliver the political outcomes its advocates envision. Yemen has already paid far too high a price for us to ignore these realities. The question is not whether military force has a role, but what political outcome it is intended to achieve, at what cost, and with what realistic prospect of success. Military pressure and diplomacy must reinforce one another, rather than be treated as competing alternatives. That requires strengthening the unity and effectiveness of Yemen's government, rebuilding state institutions, and offering Yemenis a credible political alternative to Houthi rule. It also demands a careful assessment of direct foreign military intervention, which risks allowing the Houthis to recast their struggle for power as resistance to foreign occupation, potentially mobilizing Yemenis who would otherwise oppose them. The ultimate objective must remain restoring the authority and sovereignty of the Yemeni state and creating the conditions for a just and durable peace. Achieving that will require strategic clarity, difficult compromises, and a willingness to distinguish between what is militarily possible and what is politically sustainable. Yemen needs neither an open-ended military campaign nor diplomacy disconnected from realities on the ground. It needs a coherent strategy that uses military pressure to create political leverage, strengthens the Yemeni state, and ultimately brings an end to a war whose greatest burden continues to fall on ordinary Yemenis. On a personal note, it was a pleasure reconnecting with Donna Kennedy-Glans (@dkennedyglans), who supported me during my years at the University of Calgary (@UCalgary). I'm grateful for her thoughtful National Post (@nationalpost) article on my journey, Yemen's conflict, and the challenges ahead, and for her enduring friendship. Article was published in print copy, you can access it here through e-paper: epaper.nationalpost.com/nati… It's also available on the web version here: nationalpost.com/news/houthi…
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Has the war against the Houthis already been lost? Absolutely not. But let's not confuse refusing to concede defeat with having a strategy to win. After more than a decade of war, billions spent, and a devastating human toll, Yemen cannot afford another round of failed strategies, political paralysis, and wishful thinking. The Houthis have proven remarkably resilient militarily. But surviving a war is not the same as winning it, much less governing a country or securing lasting peace. Equally, the failures of their opponents do not make a Houthi victory inevitable. The real question is no longer simply whether the Houthis can be defeated, but whether their opponents can overcome the divisions, weak leadership, and institutional failures that have repeatedly handed them the advantage. Yemen's war is not lost. But it will not be won by repeating the very mistakes that brought us here. I joined fellow Yemeni analysts @maysaashujaa and @shehrah_mahmoud in this timely @AmwajMedia debate to examine what went wrong, what remains possible, and where Yemen goes from here. Read our perspectives: amwaj.media/en/debate/debate…
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Hisham Al-Omeisy هشام العميسي retweeted
NEW: Three sharp Yemen experts unpack one of the most complex arenas for confrontation in the region today. Read @maysaashujaa @shehrah_mahmoud @omeisy to understand the true state of play in Yemen, and what can reasonably be deduced about what's next.
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The Houthis have crossed a dangerous new threshold in Yemen's war. By targeting the government's political leadership in Aden, they are escalating beyond the battlefield and striking at the very heart of the Yemeni state. This is not simply another military attack. It is a direct assault on the government's political leadership and an alarming signal of where the conflict may be heading. The latest attack reflects a growing sense of impunity and a willingness to throw whatever remains of the rules of engagement out the window. That should alarm everyone. And let's be clear about what this tells us of their political intentions. This is not a group interested in negotiating with its opponents, but one increasingly demonstrating that it would rather eliminate them altogether. The political message is clear: the Houthis are seeking to dictate Yemen's future through force, not compromise. Years of inadequate international responses, hollow condemnations, and a failure to impose meaningful consequences have only emboldened the Houthis, reinforcing their belief that they can escalate with impunity. The attack also sends an unmistakable warning: Aden is now firmly in their crosshairs, and the Houthis may be preparing to push the conflict further south. Whether through direct military advances or increasingly destructive strikes, they appear determined to expand the battlefield and raise the stakes. Anyone still assuming this escalation can be contained to existing front lines, or that the Houthis can be persuaded to moderate their behavior without meaningful consequences, is making a dangerous miscalculation. I explain more to Erand on @trtworld here.
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Hisham Al-Omeisy هشام العميسي retweeted
It is a serious escalation. But the Houthis attack civilian facilities, airports, & government institutions because they can, & because they face no consequences. The international community’s default response is to call for restraint and move on. Impunity fuels escalation.
The Houthi attack on the Presidential Palace in Aden today, while Yemen’s prime minister and cabinet members were present, is a serious and troubling escalation. And it is not the first time the Houthis have targeted the country's political leadership. The 2020 attack on Aden airport, as the newly formed government arrived, remains a stark reminder of the risks facing Yemen's civilian leadership. Whatever the intended target of today's attack, striking the seat of government carries serious political and security implications, particularly at such a critical juncture in the conflict. Beyond the immediate danger to government officials, such attacks further undermine already fragile state institutions, deepen political divisions, and complicate prospects for a negotiated settlement. Yemen has endured enough instability. Its political differences cannot continue to be settled through missiles and military force.
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The Houthi attack on the Presidential Palace in Aden today, while Yemen’s prime minister and cabinet members were present, is a serious and troubling escalation. And it is not the first time the Houthis have targeted the country's political leadership. The 2020 attack on Aden airport, as the newly formed government arrived, remains a stark reminder of the risks facing Yemen's civilian leadership. Whatever the intended target of today's attack, striking the seat of government carries serious political and security implications, particularly at such a critical juncture in the conflict. Beyond the immediate danger to government officials, such attacks further undermine already fragile state institutions, deepen political divisions, and complicate prospects for a negotiated settlement. Yemen has endured enough instability. Its political differences cannot continue to be settled through missiles and military force.
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The battle for Taiz could become Yemen’s next humanitarian catastrophe, and the world is dangerously unprepared. As the Houthis tighten their grip around the city, the stakes go far beyond another military victory or defeat. Taiz is home to millions who have already endured years of siege, shelling, hunger and displacement. A full-scale assault could uproot hundreds of thousands more, overwhelm an already collapsing humanitarian response, and leave countless civilians trapped in the crossfire. But Taiz is not just another city on Yemen’s military map. It is the political and symbolic heart of resistance to Houthi rule, a city with a proud history of civic activism, political pluralism, and defiance against authoritarianism. For over a decade, its people have resisted Houthi attempts to subjugate them, often at an enormous human cost. Its fall would not merely redraw frontlines; it would strike a devastating blow to the republican cause, undermine confidence in the internationally recognized government, and hand the Houthis an enormous political and psychological victory. There is also a bigger strategic picture. Losing Taiz would dramatically shift Yemen’s balance of power, embolden the Houthis, and potentially open the door to further advances southward. With Saudi Arabia already under attack and international shipping threatened, the conflict risks drawing regional and international powers into a much wider confrontation. And let's be clear: Yemen simply cannot absorb another displacement crisis of this magnitude. Aid agencies are overstretched, funding is drying up, and millions are already struggling to survive. Hundreds of thousands could be forced to flee with nowhere safe to go. My greatest fear is that we are once again measuring this war in territory gained and lost while ignoring what is really at stake: the lives of civilians, the survival of Yemen's republican institutions, and the possibility of a future beyond militia rule. Taiz does not have to fall for a catastrophe to unfold. A prolonged siege alone could devastate its population. And if Taiz falls, the Houthis won't just have captured a city; they will have dealt a profound blow to one of the last major symbols of Yemen's resistance to their rule. I explain to John @trtworld here.
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The Houthis have achieved something few insurgent movements ever manage: transforming battlefield survival into strategic relevance far beyond their actual military and economic weight. But their meteoric rise also exposes a dangerous paradox: the more militarily sophisticated they become, the less predictable and potentially more destructive the conflict becomes. What concerns me is not simply their expanding missile and drone arsenal, but their growing ability to combine relatively inexpensive weapons, intelligence, and asymmetric tactics to overwhelm far costlier defense systems. They've effectively learned how to impose disproportionate costs on much stronger adversaries. And this changes the calculus for Washington. Direct U.S. intervention might degrade Houthi capabilities, but it could also internationalize the conflict further, give the Houthis a larger confrontation to exploit politically, and create opportunities for other Iranian-aligned armed groups in Iraq and Lebanon to activate additional pressure points. There's also an economic dimension we shouldn't underestimate. Oil markets don't need a complete shutdown of Hormuz or Bab al-Mandab to panic. Sustained uncertainty, higher insurance premiums, and doubts about the reliability of alternative export routes can be enough to keep prices elevated. Perhaps the most overlooked development is that the Houthis are no longer merely beneficiaries of Iran's regional strategy. They have become an increasingly consequential player within it, with their own calculations, ambitions, and capacity to influence the decisions of much larger powers. The strategic question now is whether the Houthis' growing military reach is translating into lasting political power, or whether their escalating ambitions will ultimately expose the limits of what military coercion can achieve. I explain here to Rosemary @CNN
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Hisham Al-Omeisy هشام العميسي retweeted
A useful, detailed discussion of recent developments and the issues they raise
“This is an orchestrated strategy by Iran and the Axis of Resistance.” Former UK Ambassador to Yemen Edmund Fitton-Brown analyzes the Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and the strategic importance of its energy routes. @EFittonBrown
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The Houthis are taking the war beyond Yemen’s borders to, among many objectives, raise the cost for Saudi Arabia and pressure Riyadh into concessions that consolidate Houthi power. But the real stakes are who governs Yemen, who controls its institutions and weapons, and on what terms. Any discussion of a Saudi-Houthi deal that sidesteps these questions risks turning a temporary de-escalation into a permanent imbalance of power—entrenching the very conditions for renewed conflict. My comments to Xinhua in excellent article by @MuradAbdo22: english.news.cn/20261012/e89…
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Hisham Al-Omeisy هشام العميسي retweeted
#اليمن العرب والمسلمين في الغرب لم يقصروا؛ فقد كرسوا جهوداً غير معتادة للدفاع عن الحوثيين، وبحماس لافت يكاد يتفوق على تفاعلهم خلال أيام غزة_تباد !
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Hisham Al-Omeisy هشام العميسي retweeted
يحمل البراء أخته من ذوي الإعاقة على ظهره ويذهب بها إلى المدرسة كل يوم. برغم شعوره بالتعب، فهو يدرك أنها بحاجة إلى مساعدته. يقول البراء: "أختي من ذوي الإعاقة، لذا أحملها على ظهري من المنزل إلى المدرسة، ثم أعيدها إلى المنزل". #اليوم_العالمي_للفتاة لكل_طفل #حياة #تعليم #سعادة
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Hisham Al-Omeisy هشام العميسي retweeted
White westerners in the West fawning over IRGC affiliated terrorists groups while Arabs and Iranians in the region want to be free of these terrorist militias and the Iranian regime.
Much like Hamas, Hezbollah and the IRA - mainstream news only begin covering the story at the point when the Yemeni resistance fight back against their oppressors.
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Hisham Al-Omeisy هشام العميسي retweeted
And there will still be those who regard this as "resistance". Within the region, it is seen more widely as destabilising and criminal. That sentiment isn't coupled with support for Israeli regional paramountcy any more than it is for Iranian axis of centrality. Just wrong.
Yemen's Ansar Allah Houthis have issued a new warning for airlines, workers and travellers to avoid Saudi airports after an attack on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport killed 12 people and injured more than 300. Al Jazeera’s Yousef Mawry reports.
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Hisham Al-Omeisy هشام العميسي retweeted
It would be a mistake to view the #Houthis as merely a #Yemen or Saudi problem. The longer they remain entrenched, the farther their reach will extend and the greater the threat they will pose to regional and global security.
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Hisham Al-Omeisy هشام العميسي retweeted
In my latest piece published by @lawfare, I discuss what Washington got wrong about the #Houthis & what it must for now.
The Yemeni insurgent group is more than just an Iranian proxy. @Ndawsari explains how the group threatens the Middle East and what the United States should do.
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Hisham Al-Omeisy هشام العميسي retweeted
Pay attention to this
AFRICOM warns growing cooperation between Yemen’s Houthis and Somalia’s al-Shabaab could threaten U.S. forces and shipping around the Gulf of Aden. Officials are concerned about potential weapons transfers, UAS proliferation and expanded militant operations.
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The Houthis have now renewed their attacks on Saudi airports, once again targeting civilian infrastructure. And once again, we need to get our framing of the Houthis right. They are not a state actor, not an armed resistance movement, and certainly not a legitimate government. They are a radical, extremist militia that hijacked the Yemeni state by force and has behaved accordingly ever since. Once you understand who they are and how they operate, their actions should hardly come as a surprise. Kidnapping, torturing and killing civilians, besieging entire cities, planting millions of landmines, forcibly recruiting children, disappearing humanitarian workers, sinking commercial ships, and bombing civilian airports are not isolated excesses. They are part of a consistent pattern of coercion, intimidation, and violence. The Houthis have never needed much of a pretext to commit atrocities. What changes is the justification they offer, the enemy they invoke, and the political circumstances they exploit. What remains constant is their willingness to make civilians pay the price. And this is precisely why treating the Houthis as just another political actor with legitimate grievances fundamentally misreads the problem. It rewards their use of violence as a negotiating tool and encourages the belief that escalating attacks will eventually translate into political concessions. There is also a dangerous tendency to view Houthi aggression exclusively through the Saudi-Iranian rivalry or the wider regional confrontation. That framing overlooks the most important fact: Yemenis were the Houthis' first victims, and they continue to bear the heaviest burden of their rule. The latest attacks on Saudi airports are not some sudden departure from Houthi behavior. They are a continuation of it, only with a wider target list. The international community needs to stop treating every new Houthi escalation as an isolated crisis and start confronting the underlying problem. Geography may change, targets may change, and political slogans certainly change. But the nature of the militia, and the threat it poses to Yemen and beyond, does not. I explain in latest interview on @AJEnglish here
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