Eduardo 🇨🇴🇻🇪🇺🇲 backs 🇺🇦🇹🇼🇸🇪

Scale of presence (Moody’s) Around 50,000 companies in the EU have a russian ownership stake of ≥ 40%. The vast majority are small and medium-sized businesses. Almost no large strategic assets remain. Bulgaria and Czechia are the absolute leaders (tens of thousands of companies, mostly in real estate and trade). Italy — approximately 4,500 (real estate, tourism, services, construction). Poland — approximately 865 (logistics, trade, construction/real estate, IT, services). Germany — several thousand (trade and services). ◾ Fertilizers EuroChem Antwerp (Belgium) — still operating and delivered one of its best results in 2025. Lifosa (Lithuania) — shut down since 2023. Poland: In 2025 imports from russia remained high (over 1 million tonnes). In 2026 there was a sharp drop due to tariffs + CBAM. What remains is mainly potash fertilizers (hundreds of thousands of tonnes in the first half of the year). The main circumvention routes run through Turkey, Morocco, Egypt, and Kazakhstan. ◾ Metallurgy NLMK (Vladimir Lisin) — its plants in Belgium continue to import russian slabs (a special exemption remains in force until September 2028). Rusal — assets in Ireland and Sweden. Nornickel — the Harjavalta plant in Finland. ◾ Logistics and transport The clearest example of still-functioning circumvention schemes: Vasyl Smetanin (russian-Belarusian businessman). Poland: DSPL, Azonik, BIRC Transport, Rezon Trans, Starprim. Germany: Jenty Internationale Logistik, Advice Logistics. Formally Polish and German companies — in reality, extensions of russian-Belarusian structures. ◾ Real estate France (Côte d’Azur) — some assets have been frozen, others remain under control through complex schemes. Spain — Mallorca, Costa Blanca, Costa Brava (purchases are still ongoing). Italy — Sardinia, Tuscany, Lake Como. Overall conclusion After 2022, the russian presence in Europe did not disappear — it transformed: From large strategic assets → to a dispersed network of small and medium-sized companies. From direct control → to hidden structures, local intermediaries, and third countries. From open exports → to residual flows (potash, slabs) and circumvention schemes. Europe has retained a significant economic “memory” of russian capital. Sanctions hit the major players hard, but they have not completely eliminated the network. Dolce vita...

North Korea is transferring to russia up to 120 ballistic missiles, 6 launchers, and a military unit for deployment in Voronezh region. ________________________ ✍️ ◾Important context: Ukraine warned the West about the growing threat of military cooperation between moscow and Pyongyang as early as November 2024. The response was the usual one: statements of “concern.” Active joint exercises, exchange of experience, and close operational interaction between russia and North Korea became noticeable much later — mainly after 2022–2024. Already in 2019, experts noted significant similarities between North Korean missiles and launchers and russia’s Iskander systems. Current developments confirm the depth of this military partnership and its direct impact on the battlefield in Ukraine. They also highlight a systemic problem — the lack of resolve and accountability among some Western leaders. The crisis of Western civilization largely stems from the infantilism of leaders who feel no real responsibility and have grown accustomed to a comfortable cabinet life between cups of coffee. ◾ The Western “Dolce vita” is sustained by dependence on the russian lobby through the oligarchy that has deeply penetrated business. More than 50,000 companies of russian origin continue to operate in Europe. Where does the “Dolce Vita” come from? See the first comment under my post.