Unintended Computations - Nicolas Seriot #HackLu @hack_lu youtu.be/kIKzHU6cU38

What if Jira, Unicode, basic text utilities or even a printer can compute far beyond their intended role? At @hack_lu 2026, I'll present UNINTENDED COMPUTATIONS: from unexpected computers to a security methodology for finding hidden execution surfaces. 2026.hack.lu/agenda/

For the second time in Google Chrome’s history, Google awarded a $250,000 bounty for a full-chain exploit… to @XBOW. Here’s the full story: At an all-hands at the start of 2026 in Malta, I set the team a crazy challenge. A full-chain exploit of Chrome by the annual Black Hat cybersecurity conference in August. I believed there were few better tests of whether @XBOW could move beyond web applications to desktop software, servers and devices. Chrome is one of the most hardened pieces of software on the planet, used by more than half the world’s population. A full-chain exploit lets an attacker take total control of a machine, where they can read every email, password and bank login the user types. You don’t need to download anything or click a phishing link. Visiting the wrong site is enough. So @moyix, Andres Luksenberg, Baul Lee, and Willem Pinckaers took on the challenge along with a fifth teammate: OpenAI's GPT-5.6 Sol. They built a chain they thought would win, but Google told us they already knew one of the bugs. We were already in Las Vegas for Black Hat and DEF CON, and the team didn’t want to go home without the win. So Brendan and the agents built a new exploit in just 6 days. We submitted it to Google and waited. The news came through that we'd done what should’ve been impossible. A full-chain bounty of $250,000, the first awarded under Google’s 2026 rules. It took just 6 days and $40,000 of compute to construct an exploit that affects a billion users of Chrome on Windows. An intelligence-agency veteran told me his team used to spend 6 months on this kind of vulnerability. My takeaway: the cost of finding truly critical vulnerabilities is collapsing, for attackers and defenders alike. Restricting powerful models is not the answer; GPT-5.6 Sol is already public. But defenders have one advantage attackers never will: they can test their own code first. Assume your software is exploitable. Whoever is hunting your bugs has the same building blocks we did. This is cause for urgency but not panic. XBOW is now developing an autonomous product for testing compiled software (desktop applications, servers, embedded devices), and partnering with the world’s top organizations to design that product. If you’d like to be one of them, get in touch. P.S. Restart Chrome whenever the Update button appears!

New "anatomy of a bug" write-up: why CFXMLParser crashes on a 7-byte input? seriot.ch/security/cfxmlpars…

「Unicode標準UTS#35で定義される文字変換ルールは #チューリング完全」との研究報告があった🥸 seriot.ch/computation/uts35/ これにインスパイアされて UTS#35変換ルールだけで「#数独 を解く」実装を作ってみた😎 アルゴリズムは変換ルールだけで実装。 補助的に変換の連続実行と可視化のみPython使用