Liking colors, 🩸being my favorite but also a bit into 🧢 with the occasional ☂️ | head of red team at @codewhitesec

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Joined April 2013
Agreed, although attackers still have some margin for error because SOC teams and AI don’t always triage / understand alerts properly.
The Defender's Paradox: When the Attacker is on the Outside, they only need to be right once. Once the Attacker is Inside, they need to be right 100% of the time and now the Defender only needs to be right once to catch them!
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We’re expanding our Cyber Verification Program to give security professionals broader access to our most capable models. Through this program, verified security professionals can access Claude Mythos 5.1, Opus 5.5, and Sonnet 5.5 with safeguards designed for defensive work. We’re also opening up new tiers to allow for authorized offensive work, like penetration testing and red-teaming. anthropic.com/news/cyber-ver…
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niph retweeted
this is quiet bad!! the blast raidus of the bug is huge.
We’ve confirmed a KVM 0day through our Vercel Sandbox bounty program. Affecting the industry’s gold standard solution for Linux virtualization. 2026 is wild! Thankful to Paulos and other researchers helping us make the most secure sandbox for agents. Full writeup coming.
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🥷 Now we can inject a payload into a remote process without using VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory. No need to suspend the target process New technique to evade EDRs: Github: TwoSevenOneT/InjectSetConsole #redteam #pentest #antimalware
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PassTheCert-rs: a cross-platform, pure Rust implementation of Pass the Certificate. Uses Schannel certificate authentication over LDAP/S, enabling AD operations without a password, NT hash, or PKINIT. Includes an interactive LDAP shell plus actions for RBCD, Shadow Credentials, group manipulation, machine accounts, and DCSync-related privilege modification. Github:- github.com/g0h4n/PassTheCert… tool by: @g0h4n_0
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Just as a reminder because it’s easy to get lost in the rhetoric nowadays. The Hugging Face attack required approximately seven hundred parallel agents running for multiple days each running at least 2-3 trillion parameter unreleased closed models to execute, and even then it was stopped. Nobody without a data center could have executed it, the token costs alone to execute it would have been safely in the hundreds of thousands of dollars (or tens of millions of dollars to buy and deploy the hardware), and you would have needed access to the strongest secret model in the world hidden in a secret bunker, and it still was detected and stopped for infinitely less cost. This was not an example of a model being so powerful that it poses an existential risk. This was a lab accidentally throwing an insane amount of tokens at a semi hardened target over multiple days with their most dangerous model and still getting stopped anyway.
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My tweets haven't gone viral in a while now, so I must drop this banger: reburp And yes, it's a game changer in applicative pentest and bug bounty. Following me was worth it. Know how BurpSuite's API does not expose all that burpsuite can do in the UI? and how their MCP isn't better? it lets you read findings but can't do the workflows. reburp is a small burp extension that uses the extension's access to the internal Montoya API object to re-expose it over a localhost OpenAPI REST API to bridge all that a burp extension can do, to your AI agents in seconds ! Your agent can now use burp's: - active scan, stop/start scans, fuzzing, turbo intruder - iterate entire sitemap tree - websockets - use tools like Generate CSRF PoC - use other extensions e.g. Autorize - Create custom Bambda rules and custom scanners My favorite: you can explore burp features you haven't found in the UI even after 10 years using it github.com/forefy/reburp
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BloodHound — but for your AI-agent infrastructure. AgentHound maps attack paths across MCP, A2A, gateways & AI services: recon, credential looting, model exfiltration. See your agents the way an attacker does. Nice work by adithyan-ak. buff.ly/eReaEGZ #AISecurity
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IIS AppPool RCE is not the end of the story. AppPool hits AD CS RPC → Windows promotes it to the machine account → Machine cert → TGT → S4U2Self admin. no Potato required. mannulinux.org/2026/08/Privi… #ADSecurity #ExploitDev #InfoSec
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I got the latest iOS and macOS 27 booting in Qemu (with SPTM!) - Virtual iPhone 17, 16, 15, 14, 13, 12 and every M1-M5 Mac supported - Debug, patch, or modify everything: kernel, SPTM, TXM, launchd, dyld, user programs all modifiable/ GDB-able - Boots directly to root shell in seconds - Run your own programs as root in iOS/ macOS, no jailbreak / kernel patches required - SPTM, TXM, MTE/MIE, genter/ gexit, GXF/SPRR/GL0-2, AMCC, AIC v1-3, Apple timer, many sysregs - Automated setup; get running in just a few minutes - Runs anywhere qemu runs... no ARM CPU required 😉 Try it here: github.com/jprx/darwin-vm
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‼️🇩🇪 BREAKING: Threat actor Rhysida is auctioning 5.79TB it says it stole from German capital Berlin's state agencies, including 46,500 contracts, emails, phone numbers, passwords and files the group calls classified. Bidding opens at 30 BTC. The samples show a file named 'Passwort.docx' with cleartext passwords in them... Berlin refuses to pay. It says election systems were untouched but cannot yet describe what was taken.
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This is a solid read for all Entra admins. Microsoft does deserve credit for monitoring and alerting customers. The didn't need to but they are. Here's example #1 of the alert Also note deprecation of legacy, insecure modules like MSOL
I always look forward to when we, CISA’s red team, gets to publish our reports, and today is one of those days! “A Tale of Two SOCs” - a story where we targeted two different orgs, with the same tradecraft, and very different responses. Read it! - cisa.gov/news-events/cyberse…
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Releasing a new mini-project: a pywintrace-based consumer of Threat-Intelligence ETW events. It allows you to filter the telemetry generated by a target process. Useful for both forward engineering implants and reverse engineering captured malware. github.com/winterknife/EVENS…
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releasing Atlas, basically netexec, but built on top of Titanis, shout out to @codewhisperer84 for the amazing lib still more protocols to come, atlas evolves as Titanis evolves github.com/portbuster1337/At…
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🚨 Recently, I did some research in an under-explored domain of T4 and identified two new 𝐋𝐎𝐋𝐁𝐢𝐧𝐬 (there are four in total): 🔴 𝒕4.𝒆𝒙𝒆 🔴 𝒎𝒔𝒃𝒖𝒊𝒍𝒅.𝒆𝒙𝒆 (new from the perspective of T4). 🎙️ T4 .𝒕𝒕 files are intended for code and text generation. Threat actors can create or modify a .𝒕𝒕 file to abuse legitimate developer tooling (LOLBins) to execute code in the context of a trusted process. If you are interested in learning more about .tt files and how to weaponize them and detect them 𝐏𝐥𝐚𝐲𝐛𝐨𝐨𝐤 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐃𝐞𝐭𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐆𝐮𝐢𝐝𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞: ✒️ ipurple.team/2026/08/24/text…
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Want to run an entire Tailscale daemon from memory inside a C2 implant with zero disk artifacts, no kernel drivers, traffic indistinguishable from HTTPS to a CDN, and relay connections from the victim network back through the tailnet. Now you can. Enjoy! netspi.com/blog/technical-bl…
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We identified a cluster of WHQL-signed Windows kernel drivers that all contain the same Authenticode metadata reference: SpcSpOpusInfo=Autel Intelligent Technology Corp., Ltd. Taken together, the drivers provide a surprisingly complete set of ring0 primitives: arbitrary process and kernel memory access, manual kernel PE loading, DKOM-based hiding, pointer hooks, keyboard and mouse injection, WFP/NDIS traffic interception, browser traffic manipulation and physical-memory access. Some samples go further, with self-deletion, covert userland-to-kernel communication, embedded shellcode and explicit security-product targeting. Several appear purpose-built for privileged control and concealment. We published the full sample list, SHA-256 hashes, family grouping and per-driver analysis notes in our IOC repository: github.com/NextronSystems/io…
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Microsoft has failed to properly patch RoguePlanet (CVE-2026-50656), ShieldBreak, a PoC that demonstrates a full bypass to the previous patch is now public. github.com/MSNightmare/Shiel… The PoC works with the latest August 2026 patch
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