New books are here! Ski, Climb, Fight from @OUPress is now available at @Longleafserv or the bookseller of your choice. @SMH_Historians @SWWresearch @SWWResearchNA

Learning to be edited, to check the ego, hold back the pride, is one of the most important things any writer do. (I'm still learning for what it's worth!)

“The Generals of the Valley Are Not the Generals of the Hills: Coalition Mountain Warfare in Italy, 1944,” was my recent presentation at the Eisenhower Library @IkeLibrary thanks to the Flint Hills Military History Symposium @FlintHillsMil Paraphrasing Ethan Allan, I argued that Harold Alexander, Allied Forces Italy, and Mark Clark, Fifth Army, were “valley generals,” who viewed mountains as an obstacle to maneuver. But Alphonse Juin, Corps Expéditionnaire Français, was a “general of the hills,” able to see mountains as a way to maneuver. This difference in vision was due to differing experiences, doctrines, and available forces. Alexander had served on the Northwest Frontier in 1935, but this proved unapplicable to Europe. His available mountain doctrine focused on weaponeering or posited the availability of specifically trained mountain units. But the only the British mountain unit, 52nd Lowland Division (Mountain) was unavailable, dedicated to the D-Day deception. Clark had no experience but may have participated in staff college mountain warfare map exercises at Leavenworth in 1936. US doctrine insisted that mountain operations were possible if troops were equipped, clothed, and trained. However, US mountain troops were an experimental force from November 1941 until November 1944. Juin, in contrast, saw service in the Army of Africa including the Rif War (1925) in the Atlas Mountains. He and his staff had a mature doctrine, the Instruction sur les Opérations en Montagne (1938). And, in the Corps Expéditionnaire Français, he had the 4th Division de Montagne Marocaine, combined with the division (-) sized Goums Mixtes Marocains into a Corps de montagne which ultimately broke the Gustav Line and opened the way to Rome in a mountain operation. (See my 5 May 2026 post on this.) As Ian Gooderson noted, “Skilled mountain troops could achieve much in Italy, but there were never enough of them. Had the Allies possessed them in great numbers and the knowledge of how best to use them at the beginning of 1944, the Italian Campaign would have been a very different story.” #mountainwarfare @SMH_Historians @SWWResearchNA

As the first chance of snow in the high country is upon us, did you know our ski stoke, the adventure-travel film filmed while skiing has antecedents in the 10th Mtn Div experience? John C. Jay IV (1915-2000) attended Williams College in Massachusetts in the 1930s and traveled to Woodstock, Vermont to ski. During these trips he began taking the family camera with him and filming his ski adventures, which included the Inferno Race down the headwall of Tuckerman’s Ravine. Jay produced the 1939 movie Skis over Skoki, the first American film to capture backcountry powder skiing for the Canadian Pacific Railway and then in 1940 Ski the Americas North and South, the first adventure-travel themed ski film from a trip to the Farallones in the Andes Mountain range near Santiago, Chile. Warren Miller said that with Ski the Americas North and South John Jay had, "virtually invented the ski film in its modern form,” as over 50,000 viewers attended the screenings on the film’s initial 50-stop tour. Jay was drafted in 1940 and was assigned to record the ski patrols in Idaho, and Washington and to record the training sessions being taught by famous skier Otto Lang, which resulted in The Basic Principles of Skiing (1941). He joined the 87th Mountain Infantry on Rainer in 1942, then the Mountain Training Center at Camp Hale, which gave him the material for Ski Patrol (1943), which served as a promotional film for the mountain troops, drawing over 75,000 viewers on a coast-to-coast trip, with recruiting flyers being handed out at the end of each showing. Jay was too old to go overseas in his rank in 1944, so ended up in DC where he wrote the History of the Mountain Training Center, which we rely upon to this day. After the war was over, Jay used leave pay from the Army to finance his next two films: 1945’s Hickory Holiday and the 1946 film Skis in the Sky which captured the unofficial opening of the first single chairlift at Aspen in November 1946. Warren Miller, who was ski bumming at Sun Valley, Idaho, likely saw Skis in the Sky and the rest is history.

While the mountain skills of a unit are important, what seems historically critical for mountain warfare is the ability of a unit staff to account for the terrain in their plans. Ideally this would come about from extensive personal and unit time in mountainous terrain, but what to do if that is not possible? One solution, found in NATO ATP-3.2.1.3 Conduct of Land Tactical Operations in Mountainous Environment (April 2024), is the Mountain Cell, "part of the command post and/or HQ.” The general tasks of the mountain cell are to: (a) assess and evaluate the environmental situation in the area of responsibility and in the area of interest with regard to risk management; (b) advise the commander with regard to the environmental risk and the options to mitigate them; (c) develop the Mountain Situation Plan, provide it as an Annex (Overlay) to the operation plan, and keep it up to date. The ATP states “The mountain cell must be run by experts.” It defines “Subject Matter Experts for Mountain Warfare (MW SME) are individuals with mountaineering skills and knowledge at expert level, together with a deep understanding of the processes and procedures which impact tactical activities in mountainous terrain in positive and negative ways. They have completed a formal training and education which is certificated by a national and/or international qualification or licence, such as Military Mountain Guide, Mountain Leader or similarly valuated qualifications.” But it does foresee having Mountain Cell MW SMEs with forward units: “The expert on the frontline gives advice to the tactical commander on the front line, and also provides the mountain cell in the rearward area with information and data from the spot.” What the ATP does not have is any suggestion of how to organize the Mountain Cell. Should this be a separate attachment (with all the challenges of integrating enablers)? Or better to train and employ SMEs from the unit (understanding the time and effort it will take to create and maintain them)? Or, as the MWCOE asked “Is the decisive value of a Mountain Cell its formal structure, or its ability to influence commander decisions?” #mountainwarfare @mw_coe

Insightful article by an experienced practicioner and a knowlegable scholar--worth the time to read. A reminder that operating in the high north takes dedicated infrastructure, prepositioned logistics, capable units, and trained personnel. thearcticinstitute.org/cold-…

NATO Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence (MW COE) participated in Exercise Cold Response 2026 (CORE26) in March with a two-person team. Their report included points about the Norwegian bn-level Avalanche Cell as a model for a Mountain Cell, “the practical importance of Norwegian liaison and advisory support attached to foreign units,” UAS and C-UAS as mountain and cold weather issues, and a consideration of what should mountain soldiers and know if they may have to fight in Arctic conditions, and which cold-weather concepts would transfer back to Mountain Warfare (more perhaps on these in later posts). Of greatest interest right now is that the MW COE divided the forces involved in CORE26 into three types: Dedicated Cold Weather Units, Mountain Units, and General Non-Mountain Units: The Norwegians, Swedes, and Finns were cold weather competent, with a combination of suitable equipment, practical habits, and a command culture in which environmental risk is reported upward rather than hidden. Recurring themes included movement as a dominant planning issue, avalanche risk, icing on lenses and sensors, embedded Arctic competence rather than a separate niche identity, and the value of train-the-trainer. German and Spanish deployments showed that mountain units arrive with a stronger base for operating in this environment than general land units, but not with full equivalence to dedicated Arctic units. The Spanish had mountain competence distributed across the unit even without a formal battalion Mountain Cell, while the Germans highlighted the continuing need for military mountain guide competence in planning and the need for local guides. The USMC V26 was the general non-mountain unit, but with structured mountain training, to include references structured mountain training at MWTC, the absence of a dedicated mountain cell, reliance on advisors (likely the Basic Cold Weather Advisors MWTC has been training) and specialist trainers (such as Mountain Leaders). So, winter mountain training is a way to prepare general non-mountain units for cold weather operations in the high north. #mountainwarfare

The Importance of History for Contemporary Warfare mwcoe.org/the-importance-of-…

The value of armored vehicles, tanks, in mountain operations is one of the interesting things I learned while working on my mountain warfare in the Second World War project. Whether operating on supporting axes to mountain troops, such as the German panzers in Greece in 1941 or 1st Armored Division M4s in Italy in 1945, or in direct support such as the Franco-American armored group with the Corps de montagne in 1944 or tank destroyers with the 10th Mountain Division in 1945 or the French light tank regiment in the Alps the same year, mobile, protected, firepower is crucial in the mountains. So, it is not unsurprising that the Indian Army is testing an indigenously designed and produced light tank, the Zorawar (named for the Sikh general who conquered Ladakh and Tibet in 1841), with a high power-to-weight ratio and the ability to operate at high altitudes. The Zorawar is in likely response to the Chinese PLA’s T15 light tank, again designed to operate at high altitude and fielded since 2015. To paraphrase Saint Oddball, in mountain warfare a “tank can give you an . . . edge.” #mountainwarfare

The British 52 (Lowland) Mountain Division during the Second World War is an example of a non-alpine nation creating a mountain warfare capability. Initial British mountain training took place in occupied Iceland in 1940 and 1941. Prime Minister Winston Churchill considered such ‘alpine’ training “a vital factor” for his desired return invasion of Norway. From 1942 a Mountain & Snow Warfare Training Centre was established at Braemar in the Scottish Highlands and in November 52 Div was ordered to reequip, reorg, and retrain as a Mountain Division. The kit was in layers of wool and windproofs with overwhites. Training was in mountain walking, rock climbing, and skiing along with cold weather survival. The initial crucial mule companies were supplied by the Indian Army. At least 50 Norwegian officers were attached to the division and the Free Norwegian Brigade trained with the division. The divisional recon regiment, the Lovat Scouts, received extra training in Jasper National Park in the Canadian Rockies, conducted by members of the Canadian Alpine Club with American observers from Camp Hale, during the winter of 1944. The division carried out a series of GOLIATH mountain exercises in 1942, 1943, and 1944. However, 52 Div became trapped in the D-Day deception campaign, paired with a fictitious US 55th Mountain Division preparing in Iceland, as a mountain corps to attack Narvik. Thus, when Commander, Allied Forces in Italy in May 1944, requested the deployment of 52 Div (Mtn) to replace the departing French North African mountain troops, he was denied. The 52 Div reorganized as an airlanding division after D-Day, then as a standard infantry division, and finished the war fighting below sea level in the Netherlands in 1944 and 1945. @SWWResearchNA @SMH_Historians #mountainwarfare