For those seeking a deeper analysis this message would hold importance. While the Ukrainian army has faced criticism, including my own, it is important to recognize that criticism alone can be counterproductive. My goal is to highlight issues that need attention, without criticizing any particular political or military leader. To provide a better understanding, I will be quoting and using the analysis of Lt. Colonel Glen Gran, a defense and reform expert who has provided advisory services to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. PART 1 Key issues and takeaways from the assessment: - We need clear ownership and responsibilities of every piece of ground on the frontline and behind to avoid casualties due to a lack of boundary clarity. This requires every area to have a designated commander, and all personnel entering that area to be under their command. Geographical boundaries must not constrain the unit's ability to maneuver and attack the enemy from the sides or change positions. - Numerous independent units operate in opposition to each other. This creates pockets of units with varying levels of training and equipment, resulting in different divisions of quality. The absence of a unified military concept leads to organizational arrogance, with certain units perceived as superior and treated accordingly. A new policy should ensure that all personnel are trained, equipped, and commanded to the same basic quality - SOF are supposed to be (and were trained by the US to be) the deep attack organization working behind the lines to disrupt and destroy. Instead, they are often being used as light infantry wasting years of expensive US training - The policy should be that those commanders who can get results with limited loss of troops must be promoted to more serious command roles. - Effective battle management requires senior commanders to delegate and listen to the concerns of junior commanders who are leading the fight, rather than trying to second-guess them or impose orders that do not fit with how the battle commander sees the problem. - Commanders are responsible for training their troops at all levels and for the quality of that training. Those who do not have the knowledge and ability to conduct training of subordinates should not be commanders. - Law 8271, signed recently, increases the responsibility of servicemen found guilty of refusing to carry out orders. The law resembles Soviet-era legislation that may demand actions leading to death. It may raise questions about trust in Ukrainian society. - To counter evolving tactics used by Russia and Wagner, troops require resources such as drones, radios and internet, night sights, 60mm mortars, grenades and grenade launchers for platoons, a full 81/82mm mortar company for each battalion, short-range missiles, AFAKs, uniform and safety equipment for every soldier. It is essential to prioritize discussions about these "enablers" in Ramstein meetings, not just larger equipment. - Policy changes are necessary to modernize the military system, which still relies on outdated Soviet-style rules, and regulations. For example, drones purchased abroad needed a signature for release from MOD to the unit that purchased them. This was not done for 4 weeks. This delay means that soldiers die from a lack of drones. Activities like this should have a turnaround time of 12 hours maximum - A new policy of creating mobile training teams near the front to update units out of battle with the latest lessons learned should be considered. It's wise to use those who have been injured in the war and cannot fight. The end of Part I. In conclusion of Part I, it is important to acknowledge that ignoring systematic issues in the Ukrainian military worsens the human cost of the war and risks more lives. If you prefer not to wait for the next part or would like to read a full analysis by Glen Grant in the full version, here is the link: maidan.org.ua/en/2023/02/gle…