Today marks another step in a long, difficult process of India and the Maldives resetting their relationship. This is a painful adjustment for both sides: For regional power India, this means learning to live (coexist, compete, or conflict) with an increasingly influential China in its periphery. Across the Himalayas, China is now an Indian Ocean power. For small state Maldives, this means learning that India's red lines and geographic proximity continue to matter. The Chinese have a proverb for this: “Distant water cannot put out a nearby fire.” Democratic and electoral politics add huge risks and will inevitably lead to repetitions of the 2023-24 crisis: more Maldivian candidates will embrace "India out" campaigns to mobilize support, get elected, balance against and then settle with India. (This political cycle of J-curves in India-Maldives relations is not new, only more intense and frequent than in the past. Bless those who believe in the mythology of an era when India was supposedly loved and embraced by its smaller neighbor countries!). The only thing that Delhi can continue to do more of -- as apparent in today's deliverables -- is to invest in all forms of connectivity, especially in economic interdependence. Whenever useful or necessary, it can do so in consultation and coordination with partner countries that share Indian interests (currently: everyone except China). That will mitigate political risks and smooth the sharp J-curves ahead. The long-term and strategic objective, of course, remains: to make India the only indispensable partner for Maldivian prosperity and security.