Malinga Fernando (@mafernando) header
Malinga Fernando (@mafernando) profile picture

Personal musings. Econ & Energy mostly. Fmr. Real Assets, Infra and Energy PE.

Sri Lanka
Joined February 2007
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lolz. UK should just give up on this - and "Trains will also run at slower speeds than initially planned in a move to reduce costs. They will now go up to 320 kilometers (199 miles) per hour, down from 360 km/hour in previous plans." 🤦🏻‍♂️ £100 billion is roughly the cost of the Int'l Space Station, or the Apollo moon program. Or 10x the recently achieved cost per km of equivalent HSR in Europe.
🚨 NEW: The Government says HS2 is now set to cost up to £102.7bn The first trains from Birmingham to west London are expected between May 2036 and October 2039 Services from Euston to the North West and Scotland are expected between May 2040 and December 2043
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Great essay by @wang_seaver on the boring, low-margin, hard-work necessary to build the industrial base if you really want to domesticate shiny 'electro-tech' primitives like Solar Panels and Batteries. EU, US, India are trying to domesticate electric industries top-down, with VC type funding - which is mismatched for the industry and product. Link below "But the purveyors of this thesis mistakenly assume that upstream inputs—critical minerals, key metal inputs, and chemicals—fall obediently into place in response to demand pull from value-added, feature-rich consumer products. In reality, metals and chemicals production require muscular industrial policy of their own to succeed, yet carry the potential to either constrain or catalyze downstream innovation." and "Part of the answer is that key tests of industrial mastery lie upstream in the ability to commercialize hard tech—including difficult chemical and metallurgical industrial processes—at vast economies of scale. Other countries seeking to rebuild such process knowledge must explicitly define their alternative to China’s model in these sectors. If governments and political elites hope vague prioritization of the “electrotech” technologies themselves can deliver industrial competitiveness, their misdiagnosis may well lead to profound disappointment."
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Essay - The Aluminum Tech Stack: Downstream manufacturing mastery requires upstream scale by Seaver Wang: breakthroughjournal.org/p/th…
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This - carbon emissions - was always going to happen, and is going to be increasingly huge, if not the biggest issue, going forward for hyperscalers & their AI-DC buildout. Right now, US-located DC is about ~40-50GW - of mostly normal cloud - IEA put this at 183TWh/yr(2024) - which would be ~ 65 million T-CO2/yr as current baseline. Most of the Scope 1 & 2 emissions of this existing base have already been largely negated - GOOG, MSFT, AMZN have been exemplary with their carbon and clean-power work last decade. MS has about 90% of the world's carbon removal already contracted. BUT - assuming hyperscalers now add 10GW-15GW per year from 2026--2030 - of higher utilization AI-DC's -> you end up with ~ +70 to +100 million t-CO₂/yr (lifecycle). To put that into context - this additional 70-100 MtCo2/yr is the annual emissions of a medium-sized European country. Or 1% of Shipping or Aviation emissions. In 5 years. Clearly this is not tenable for the hyperscalers and AI-labs. Their highest-value employees are highly sensitive to this. And they have spend last 15 years doing yeoman's work in CDR, CCS and clean-power purchasing (and non-vapourware, credible reliable CDR/CCS does not exist yet). It is not feasible to just terminate all of this at a stroke of a press-release. Something gotta give....
Microsoft Corp. may shelve one of the industry’s most ambitious clean-energy targets as it tries to remove hurdles that could hold it back in the race to power data centers, according to people with knowledge of the matter. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
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Opposite of what ITRI/ERSO did, is what the famed German R&D institutions (Max Planck, Fraunhofer and Helmholtz) are doing. Essay by @JannikReigl on the serious short-falls of the German R&D system: seedsoftime.substack.com/p/h…
Essay on the history of Taiwan's famed ITRI/ERSO - the public-sector R&D institute that spun out UMC, TSMC and Mediatek, by @karthiktadepall . "Most countries would benefit from starting with achievable goals that are close to their existing capabilities, from building up the R&D workforce in private industry, and from aligning the incentives of private firms with their continued R&D activities." asteriskmag.com/issues/13/th…
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Silicon Valley SMR might need to accelerate pretty hard from sizzle reels … Looks like China manufacturers may be on the cusp of an acceleration in productised SMRs…. If they do get thjs right (that’s still a huge if) - 20-100MWe reactors could destroy a lot of deep-tech energy biz models …
Second Chinese Modular Nuclear Reactor ready to go online. The Linglong One (ACP100) is a pressurized water reactor designed for 60 years operation with functional flexibility of electricity generation, desalination, steam supply, household heating & hydrogen production. Capable of 125 MWe (Electrical) & 385 MWt (Thermal), the reactor is estimated to supply 1 billion kWh annually. It features a modular construction, integrated passive safety, water moderator with canned motor pumps to prevent leakages, and eventual remote shutdown. The reactor located in the Southern island of Hainan is now fully assembled and was approved last year by the IAEA*. 🔗 en.cnnc.com.cn/2025-04/11/c_…
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Essay by @chalmermagne on the post-ww2 history of the British nuclear power industry. From the worlds 1st nuclear electric generator (Calder Hall 4x 60MW in 1956) to a world-leading rapid fleet buildout by 1965, and then stasis + massive cost drift.
By 1965, Britain had built more nuclear power stations than the US, USSR, and France combined. But from about 1970, that lead faltered and never returned. In my piece for Issue 23 of @WorksInProgMag, I look at how Britain gave the country’s smartest engineers a blank cheque to deliver a nuclear programme and how it all went wrong. worksinprogress.co/issue/how… - The first wave of British nuclear power stations were approved in months, regularly built in under five years, and operated with an impressive safety record. The process is unrecognisable today. - The conventional decline narrative for British nuclear blames the AGR: a clunky domestic design picked in 1965 for the second wave of British nuclear that doomed everything after. - Some of these were genuine disasters, but the later stations came in roughly on time and on budget. The technology choice didn’t have to be fatal. - The real story is about how the technocrats overreached and burned through public and political trust. - The 1970s and early 1980s began to see growing public concern about nuclear waste, as well as the safety of power stations (especially in the light of the Three Mile Island accident in 1979). - At every turn, the response of the industry was to ignore these concerns and allow them to metastasise. For the inquiry ahead of Sizewell B in the 1980s, the Central Electricity Generating Board didn’t complete crucial safety documentation. - This wasn't happening in isolation. This era saw revolts against motorway schemes through historic London neighbourhoods, a failed third London airport, and the collapse of the new towns programme. The assumption that planners and experts knew best was dying across British public life. - Privatisation in 1989 exposed the rot. The nationalised energy company had been burying nuclear's true costs by cross-subsidising from coal and oil. Auditors tripled the decommissioning bill, investors walked away, and nuclear had to be pulled from the sale. - Once proper managers replaced the scientist-engineers who had run the industry, even the much-maligned AGRs started working well. - British nuclear’s problems don’t just stem from technocratic folly. During the first wave, approvals ultimately sat with the then Minister for Power. The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate – Britain’s first nuclear regulator – sat within the ministry. This aligned them with the delivery of a successful nuclear programme. - Starting in the mid-1970s, nuclear approvals were shifted out of government to an independent regulator. There was no longer an actor in the regulatory process incentivized to say yes. - This more conservative culture was visible in the late 1970s and 1980s, but really began to bite when the government regained interest in nuclear power in the 2000s. - The blank cheque for the technocrats is long gone and has been replaced by the most conservative regulatory culture in the developed world. Financing models pass overruns to billpayers, so developers have no reason to push back. Every successful nuclear programme has had political backing, regulators with a reason to approve, predictable demand, and a supportive public. Britain lost all four between 1965 and 1995. Government has an opportunity to correct this with the Fingleton Review. This story is also a salutary lesson for anyone who believes that the solution to all our problems is just to ‘put some engineers in charge’.
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Nice essay by @oliverwkim on Singapore's famous HDB public housing political economy. SG has boxed itself into a corner, is now trapped by the success of the creature it created. This is the problem in any country once you decide to separate the service housing provides (accommodation), and instead boost it as a financial public investment asset (housing as an investment class). The benefits are great for the first 1-2 generations - after that the unwind is political and economically costly, and traps countries in sub-optimal economic/financial allocation: "Ultimately, Chua argues, the PAP’s loyalties lie with the HDB homeowners who form the foundation of their voting base, rather than with younger, new entrants. It simply cannot allow housing prices to fall significantly. Having tied people’s welfare to the performance of the market, the PAP is now beholden to the political consequences."
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Link to author's thread: xitter.cf/oliverwkim/status/2048…
🚨 New 🌐 Global Developments blog 🚨 Singapore's HDB public housing system has become a model for the world—so why is it in trouble? Link in reply.
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nplusone essay on the US's jekyll & Hide constant Sinophobia and China-envy. In short - stop projecting, stop moralizing, acknowledge that China’s rise is real and structurally entangled with the US, and then do the hard work of politics, and re-building, at home, in a world where the uni-polar American moment is over. nplusonemag.com/issue-52/the…
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Assuming this robot can work 80% of the day - and 600W panels, then you can install ~1GW of panel *per day*. One critical advantage of Solar that is not talked alot about : the 'time-to-energise' - from 'shovel in the ground' to 'switch on' - is the lowest of all the major bulk power generation methods.
80 panels per hour or one every 45 seconds. 1,920 per day. I love it. This is something we should scale up massively: affordable energy, which is necessary for everyone.
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Essay on the history of Taiwan's famed ITRI/ERSO - the public-sector R&D institute that spun out UMC, TSMC and Mediatek, by @karthiktadepall . "Most countries would benefit from starting with achievable goals that are close to their existing capabilities, from building up the R&D workforce in private industry, and from aligning the incentives of private firms with their continued R&D activities." asteriskmag.com/issues/13/th…
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Taiwan's Industrial Technology Research Institute might be the most underrated research lab in history. It spun out TSMC and made Taiwan the world's chipmaker. Coming out in Asterisk today – how did Taiwan implement one of the most successful industrial policies of all time? 🧵
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I never understood the hoopla over AJR's paper & book: 1. Do "good" institutions lead to development? Or does development lead to good instit's? 2. How do you build "good institutions"? Good essay by @karthiktadepall on the tautology part of the paper:
After a long break, I'm back to devposting! I argue that the development econ focus on "institutions" was a mistake – not (just) because the evidence was bad, but because the concept of "good institutions" is tautological and uninformative for policy.
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Short essay by Nithin Coca on how Jakarta transformed itself from one of the worst metropolis' wrt to modern public-transit - effectively none, to several MRT, LRT and BRT lines in under 10 years from 2015 - thanks to push from the top and Japanese/JICA assistance. indevelopmentmag.com/jakarta… You can find the author on the other site at nithincoca.com
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Once the initial tipping point of 5-8% of new sales is tripped - the S-curve accelerator begins. We will see charts like increasingly across Asia and Africa now given the helpful push from high fuel prices this year:
This is truly mind-blowing: Norway has gone from near-zero sales of non‑emitting battery electric vehicles to now close to 100% of all new passenger car sales - achieved in about 13 years. More in my next substack newsletter. Sign up here: substack.com/@janrosenow
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Sodium-Ion batteries - Massive 60GWh supply order for CATL. If CATL can produce SiBs at scale - both LFP and SiB competition will push down the cost curve for the lower-end of BEV's and especially for stationary BESS applications. Great news for customers, integrators and IPPs.
CATL secures world’s largest sodium-ion battery order with Hyperstrong: The two companies announced a 60 GWh supply agreement on Monday, marking a pivotal step in the commercialization of sodium-ion battery… dlvr.it/TSG3lT #Photovoltaics #EnergyStorage #RenewableEnergy
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