qex

My two (or more) cents about Iran's involvement in recent developments in Southern Israel. In my opinion, two crucial distinctions are required. First, it is necessary to distinguish between Iranian support to Hamas, as well as the ongoing coordination between IRGC, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (the "Resistance Front") and between the initiative, organization, and execution of the Hamas operation. While there is no doubt about the military cooperation between Iran and Hamas and Iran's increasing involvement in the Palestinian arena, including the West Bank, in recent years, I highly doubt whether Iran was significantly involved in Hamas's latest action. This is a Palestinian story. Did Hamas use Iranian aid? Definitely yes. Did Iran have an interest in this action? Yes. Does Hamas need Iranian permission to operate? No. Was there early coordination between Hamas, Iran, and Hezbollah? It's possible. But, in the end, it is an action by Hamas based on it own interests arising from the Palestinian reality. My assessment is also supported by the recent statement of the IDF spokesman who said, "Iran is a significant player, but we cannot say that it planned the operation or trained for it." A second important distinction that is between the involvement of Iran (and Hezbollah) until the Hamas operation and what will happen from now on. In recent years, I shared the assessment that Iran has no interest in expanding the conflict between Israel and Hamas to other arenas through active participation (by itself and mainly through Hezbollah) during the occasional rounds of warfare between Israel and the Palestinians. I still believe that the concept according to which Iran has no interest in involving Hezbollah (which is considered by Tehran as a strategic tool to respond to a potential Israeli attack against Iran's nuclear facilities) is still relevant. However, we have recently witnessed at least three developments that may challenge the validity of this assessment: A. The Hamas operation is a reality-changing event in the Middle East that may oblige Iran to move from the phase of ongoing support and coordination to a more direct involvement, especially if the Israeli response poses a significant challenge to Hamas. B. In recent years, it has become increasingly clear to Iran that, with all due respect to the nuclear issue, a significant part of Israeli activity has been aimed at undermining the regional order and not only Iran's nuclear program. Therefore, Iran has been more committed to increase its involvement around Israeli borders (and even inside Israel) and perhaps is also prepared to pay a higher price for a possible confrontation with Israel, not only in the nuclear context. C. Iran has practically positioned itself on the nuclear threshold and, at this stage, is not concerned with the possibility of Israeli military action except in the scenario (which does not seem likely at this stage) of a decision to break out to nuclear weapon. Therefore, Tehran may assess that using Hezbollah is no longer considered a "waste of capabilities" but a justified way to advance its strategic vision at the most convenient time. And so, in the bottom line, even assuming (as I do) that Iranian involvement in the implementation of the Hamas operation was not significant, I believe that the danger of escalating into an event involving Iran and Hezbollah has increased significantly.