Son muchas las temáticas tratadas en este blog de historia cotidiana del conflicto ucraniano, pero entre los factores subyacentes siempre sale éste: la inequívoca voluntad imperial de la nueva Europa.
slavyangrad.es/2026/10/20/am…
Artículo clave para entender la dinámica de las variables principales que condicionan el marco diplomático de superación de la guerra en el frente oriental europeo. Y en el que Europa teme ante todo una paz que no suponga la total derrota de su enemigo.
slavyangrad.es/2026/10/18/ot…
Quienes en España apoyan la guerra tendrán claro, supongo, que la acción ucraniana hace tiempo que ha desbordado la fase defensiva. Ucrania ha sido parte agresora desde 2014, entonces fundamentalmente en el ámbito interno. Hoy lo es, junto a sus aliados, también en el exterior.
Las acciones defensivas tienen sus límites que, en el caso ucraniano, han sido desbordados desde hace mucho tiempo en su acción en la Federación Rusa. Las distintas partes participan de esa dimensión agresiva. Hay que imponerles que negocien una salida.
Un ejemplo de la dimensión compartida de la acción agresiva.
xitter.cf/AMK_Mapping_/status/21…
Buen artículo sobre los activos rusos que Ucrania busca atraer para financiar su guerra. Un punto muy apoyado, y no sorprende, por una España que impulsa pero sin pagar demasiado. Este apoyo bélico es una de las partes más tristes de la izquierda en España
slavyangrad.es/2026/10/17/uc…
Artículo clave para entender la realidad de un proxy en la guerra: su completa dependencia del suministrador/financiador y, al mismo tiempo, el total compromiso de este último con la dirección de la guerra. Pues es la suya en realidad
slavyangrad.es/2026/10/15/un…
El elemento fundamental: Ucrania no tiene medios propios para mantener esta ofensiva en términos de personal.
The Ukrainian rear guard springs into action. 🇺🇦
There has been talk in recent days of Starlink’s temporary restrictions on Ukrainian forces, which affected the Ukrainians’ communications and logistics for a relatively short period. This recent incident highlights the strategic dependence on a system largely controlled by the US and the vulnerability to political or technical decisions, particularly as, unlike Russia, Ukraine is not developing alternatives in the event of a service blockade.
Drones have been key to maintaining a relative balance on the front lines, preventing the Russians from making major advances as they did in 2024 and 2025; and with the loss of Starlink for the Russians, the Ukrainians have managed to turn the situation around, halting the Russian advance and even going on the offensive.
How has this been possible? The recruitment situation in Ukraine is critical due to a chronic shortage of combat troops, social tensions and reforms aimed at improving incentives and attracting more personnel, both Ukrainian and foreign. Kyrylo Budanov (Head of the Presidential Office) stated in August 2026 that Ukraine cannot mobilise fewer than 30,000 people per month to maintain the current strength of the Armed Forces (estimated at between 880,000 and 1 million personnel). Not all of these forces are deployed on the front line (approximately 250,000–350,000 personnel), whilst the remainder are assigned to logistics, administration, headquarters and the National Guard, Territorial Defence, training, medical recovery or support roles.
In fact, barely a third of those mobilised each month actually reach the front line. Theoretically, this would allow the rotation rate to be maintained and troops to recover over time, although in the long term the situation would generally worsen for the Ukrainian side and, of course, it would not allow them to launch counter-attacks on more than one front.
December 2025 saw a substantial shift in this dynamic, with a higher proportion of troops from the rear being sent to the front lines. With Mykhailo Fedorov as the new minister in January 2026 and Oleksandr Syrskyi as commander-in-chief, it was decided to send part of this reserve of soldiers – who had little experience or combat skills – to the front to overwhelm the Russian forces, which were already stretched thin, through infiltration operations to force their withdrawal, in this way, the experienced units are tasked with clearing the rear and securing the abandoned Russian positions whilst the infiltrations by the reserves continue to force the Russians to focus on them and abandon any counter-attack. The most notable aspect of this strategy is that it has been carried out under a defence minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, who is an advocate of modernisation and the supremacy of drones (followed by next minister Yevhenii Khmara). And even following Syrskyi’s dismissal in July by Mykhailo Drapatyi—who is apparently inclined to minimise casualties—this strategy has not only continued but has been strengthened, alongside greater decentralisation of management, increased autonomy for commanders and the extension of rotation periods (this has led to an increase in the number of reservists at the front over the last two to three months).
The results have been evident on several fronts:
- Dnipropetrovsk and southern Donetsk, where the Ukrainians have managed to reverse many of the Russian advances made in 2025 in the former oblast and have recaptured the town of Komar.
- Stalling Russian offensive capabilities in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka and east of Kramtorsk and Sloviansk, forcing a Russian withdrawal around the waterway (due to Drapatyi’s extensive rotations).
- The repulsion of the Russian offensive in Lyman and the surrounding area (though not Operation Vivaldi, carried out by experienced Ukrainian troops).
- The maintenance of the pockets east of the Oskil and south of Kupiansk.
This new strategy follows two objectives: to contain the Russians until the arrival of autumn, when the rain and mud make it difficult for heavy vehicles to advance, forcing them to use secondary roads and significantly slowing down logistics and operations; and, secondly, to create a propaganda image of victory by portraying infiltration zones as captured territory, which has on other occasions resulted in a fresh surge of external aid to Ukraine to enable it to continue the war. Both objectives seems to have been reached now.
However, the problem lies in the limitations and costs of this new strategy in the long term. The deployment of these reserve troops alleviates the existing problem of understaffed brigades, helps to hold positions, strengthen defences and reduce the strain on existing units, whilst also dispelling the narrative of a shortage of Ukrainian troops that has been repeated for months.
However, the accelerated deployment of troops with little or no experience ultimately loses its saturation effect once there are sufficient numbers of troops on the defending side. This substantially increases the attackers’ casualties (this year the Ukrainians have suffered heavy losses in these local counter-offensives) and leaves a gap in the rear ranks of personnel who are key to resupplying the troops at the front; consequently, in the long term, the overall situation at the front would not only fail to improve but would actually worsen, especially given that this year the Russians have managed to establish drone supremacy across much of the front lines.
And the impact is not only military, but also social, as there are currently reservists on the front line who were forcibly conscripted; consequently, a rise in casualties amongst these inexperienced troops – deployed to achieve political and media objectives (without this guaranteeing progress towards a victory, as Zelenskyy seeks) – will have a negative effect by increasing draft evasion and fuelling further social unrest on the streets of Ukraine. 🇺🇦🇷🇺
La acción de un Estado autoritario, neofranquista
I can now confirm that yesterday I was notified of my expulsion from Latvia where I lived for 12 years. This, I believe, is a long-brewing revenge by far right politicians for my investigation into their links to Russian neo-Nazis who found refuge in Kyiv and who circulated the manifesto of Christchurch shooter in 2019. It is also a punishment for my commentary on the Russian aggression in Ukraine and for Pavel Sheremet investigation.
The notification doesn’t point to any specific misdemeanours or statements which prompted the decision. I was declared persona non grata, a status designed for diplomats who enjoy immunity from prosecution, not for ordinary people. This was done - as far right politicians who spearheaded the decision openly admit - in order to deny me justice in the Latvian court system: PNG status cannot be appealed in courts. This makes me conclude that I am facing political persecution.
For me it is a huge personal tragedy. I am being evicted from my only beloved home, deprived of my circle of friendship and support. I love Latvia, the land of my ethnic Latvian ancestors, and have no sense of revenge. I will always remain pro-Latvian. It makes me immensely sad that high positions in the Latvian government have been captured by forces whose closest political relation is Putin and who are using Putin’s aggression in Ukraine as a pretext for eroding the rule of law and democracy in the European Union.
My stance on the war in Ukraine remains unchanged. I condemn the Russian aggression and support Ukraine’s sovereignty over occupied territories. Ukraine is a wound in my heart, not a source of political gain as it is for my persecutors. But I’ll continue to criticise Western countries for mishandling this conflict and not acting in the best interests of the Ukrainian people. I shall not be gagged.
Shame on those who understand what is happening but look away or buy into smear campaign waged against me by the pro-war lobby and far right info dumps. One day, they’ll come for you, too.
Attn @RSF_inter @ECPMF
La antidemocrática Letonia y el caso Ragozin
Como puede verse en este artículo, la "Justicia" actúa siempre, en última instancia, a favor del Estado que le da sentido. Siempre le queda a su ceguera justiciera un rescoldo por el que observar esos intereses del Estado, ya sea propio o ajeno
slavyangrad.es/2026/10/14/la…
En esta aproximación al contexto diplomático me quedo con la pertinaz decisión europea de aumentar cada día su apuesta: o cesión rusa o guerra cada vez más dura. Caiga quien caiga.
slavyangrad.es/2026/10/13/ac…
El enfado surcoreano con Zelensky llama la atención, reflejando sobre todo el autoritarismo sin límites del líder ucraniano
slavyangrad.es/2026/10/10/la…
Muy relevante artículo para entender lo que pasa con la guerra del diésel.
slavyangrad.es/2026/10/11/un…
Una guerra cruel en Europa que nadie quiere parar. Inquebrantables en su opción antirrusa, casi todos nuestros políticos ven la guerra como si se tratara de Juego de Tronos. Un juego macabro.
slavyangrad.es/2026/10/09/35…
Molin olvida una cosa: EEUU puede forzar a Ucrania a parar mientras lo considere necesario. Para eso la Ucrania de Zelensky es lo que es, un proxy que no podría financiar autónomamente su guerra más de unos pocos días.
Donald Trump 🇺🇸 souhaite acheter du diesel à la Russie 🇷🇺 pour faire face à la pénurie, ce qui soulève plusieurs points :
▫️Il y a eu 98 frappes 🇺🇦 sur des raffineries russes depuis le début de l'année
▫️Un grand nombre de moyens de stockage et d'export ont été endommagés/détruits
▫️Une partie des 32 raffineries (dont certaines sont les principales de Russie) ont stoppé une partie ou l'ensemble de leurs opérations
1⃣ La Russie ne dispose pas des capacités de production de diesel pour pouvoir en exporter autant
2⃣ La Russie manque de capacités et de sécurité de stockage et d'export après les frappes ukrainiennes
3⃣ La Russie fait déjà face à une grave pénurie de diesel, accepter ce 'deal', c'est l'accentuer.







