Israel’s defence minister says the government is prepared to move Palestinians out of Gaza by sea, air or other routes if it gains sufficient US support. No complete plan has been published, including destinations, legal status and return rights. With most Gazans already internally displaced amid severe destruction and shortages, describing departure as voluntary does not settle whether people could freely choose to remain. The proposal requires clear answers about consent, return and compliance with international humanitarian law. Read the full analysis on The Levantine — link in the first comment.

British, US and Dutch agencies warn that spyware they assess is linked to Iran has targeted journalists, activists and dissidents abroad. Attackers reportedly use deceptive messages and files shared through familiar channels, then seek access to emails, messages and screenshots. The agencies’ attribution is a strong intelligence assessment, not a court finding. For people in exile, a compromised device can also expose sources and relatives inside Iran, extending the risk well beyond the initial target. Read the full analysis on The Levantine — link in the first comment.

Palestinian authorities estimate that more than 8,000 people may remain beneath Gaza’s wreckage, a figure that cannot yet be independently confirmed. Families are still waiting for recovery and identification as demolition and debris removal continue. The rubble may contain human remains, personal records and fragments needed to establish how people died. Safe, documented searches require forensic teams, machinery and protection from unexploded ordnance before clearance erases locations and evidence. Read the full analysis on The Levantine — link in the first comment.

China’s strongest offer to Arab governments is economic: energy trade, ports, railways, digital networks and technology tied to national development plans. Xi Jinping has also proposed a regional security framework that emphasizes local decision-making and the Palestinian question. The United States still provides military capabilities Beijing cannot match. Arab states may gain room to negotiate by working with both powers, but Chinese financing and infrastructure could create new dependencies of their own. Read the full analysis on The Levantine — link in the first comment.

Saudi Arabia says it intercepted a Houthi drone south of Mecca; the Houthis deny sending one toward the city. No public evidence has established the intended target. The disputed incident could become a first test for Saudi Arabia’s defence pact with Türkiye and Pakistan. Before invoking collective defence or considering strikes in Yemen, the members need to establish responsibility and explain whether the pact covers protection of Saudi airspace or operations across the border.

The Saudi–Turkish–Pakistani pact says an attack on one member is an attack on all three. Houthi attacks on Saudi territory are now testing that promise, while Pakistan has emphasized diplomacy and Türkiye has not publicly outlined a military response. Caution has strategic reasons, including Pakistan’s ties with Iran and Türkiye’s reluctance to enter another Yemen war. The pact’s credibility depends on defining activation thresholds, command and forms of assistance before ambiguity becomes an invitation to further attacks. Read the full analysis on The Levantine — link in the first comment.

Iranian assistance helped the Houthis acquire advanced missiles, drones and maritime weapons. Yet the movement also raises revenue through taxation, ports and commerce in the territory it governs and makes political and military choices tied to Yemen. Its gains near Bab al-Mandab give it leverage over shipping and over negotiations about Yemen’s future. Pressure on Tehran alone cannot resolve a threat sustained by the Houthis’ own institutions, finances and territorial ambitions. Read the full analysis on The Levantine — link in the first comment.

Riyadh can seek an accommodation that stops Houthi attacks but may strengthen the movement through expanded trade and revenue. Or it can continue a costly confrontation against an adversary that has survived more than a decade of Saudi military pressure. The imbalance is economic as well as military: Saudi cities, oil exports and Vision 2030 investment need continuous protection, while the Houthis can impose costs through intermittent strikes. Neither path guarantees lasting security. Read the full analysis on The Levantine — link in the first comment.

A planned Oman meeting on Gulf shipping security was postponed before ministers could agree on the terms of talks. The delay comes as Houthi control near Bab el-Mandeb and Iranian pressure around Hormuz increase Tehran’s leverage over both approaches to the Gulf. Washington is encouraging Gulf states to pursue their own talks with Iran. For governments long dependent on US protection of sea lanes, direct negotiation is becoming less a diplomatic preference than a response to changing power at the chokepoints. Read the full analysis on The Levantine — link in the first comment.

Houthi forces now hold Mokha and Perim Island, positions overlooking Bab el-Mandeb. Yemen’s UN envoy has described defending the strait as a matter of international and regional security, yet Washington has avoided direct intervention. The apparent US threshold is the continued flow of most commercial shipping. That approach accepts a stronger Houthi position unless the corridor closes, turning prevention into a bet that the group will not use the leverage it has acquired. Read the full analysis on The Levantine — link in the first comment.