I’m not sure how OpenAI was likely holding off their IPO to 2027. Because they had concerns about a $1T valuation 3 months ago. Then Anthropic investors go and say **** it, lets one-up $SPCX and IPO at $2T next month?

Now that $MU to $SNDK have pulled a major recovery. Good to have a reminder that the memory bottleneck hasn’t changed! Same with CW lasers… substrates… or others. But short term sentiment (depending on prices/macro) often does. I think a lot of demand imbalances get worse than people expect: - There’s some Japanese distributors in Nikkei today saying memory demand deficit has reached 40-60% (67-150% higher than supply). With general prices going up 50% by years end. - $SPCX isn’t included in the $1.3T hyperscaler capex figures (I think Wells Fargo ets. ~$263b AI capex), so total capex figures might be surprising. - $SNDK expects 80% gross margins to continue into 2030… (welcome to S&P 100) - and once again you have long term visibility into 2031 now with companies like Samsung Memory is very really volatile… some of my positions are up 270%+, so I find it a bit easier to hold through volatile periods. But regardless, operating fundamentals doesn’t always align with short term price movements. Same concept can be applied to other sectors.

China reportedly halts some rare earth shipments to US. Not a new blanket ban, or any mention of specific rare earths. But… if I had to guess, Japan is usually a decent indicator of what’s actively important since Japan: - “sources virtually all of its dysprosium and terbium from China.” - gallium, dysprosium, terbium and yttrium from China to Japan all stood at “zero” in June. - Shin-Etsu Chemical has reportedly suspended acceptance of new orders for magnets containing dysprosium. - Global magnet producer Proterial had received no export licenses for Chinese dysprosium as of last month The Reuters piece mentioned yttrium, gallium, terbium, indium phosphide, and tungsten as historical examples (doesn’t say what’s being targeted now). On a side note, $LYC.AX is becoming one of the most important alternatives, as Japan has locked up 75% of Lynas’s medium/heavy rare-earth output. (8 tons of dysprosium + terbium in Q1) Something fun I also read is that Japan’s deep sea resource is enormous (est. at 16 million tons of rare earth rich mud, but commercialization is post-2028) But in the meantime, China seem to be choking off feedstock that would materially affect Japan. Since you’ve already seen the WF6 Japanese industry stressed from tungsten related halts. And indium/others earlier this year that is used to make InP substrates from Sumitomo/JX. But still gradually allowing exports directly eg. $AXTI -> $LITE to allow US/China trade to continue, kinda disrupting that from time to time, then using that as leverage. It’s interesting since Japan has so many different monopolies like ABF, so we’ll see if they do anything back. But if I had to give a prediction, it does look like the US has a countdown timer until China becomes self-sufficient on semiconductors. TLDR: - rare earth disruption to US - China actively targeting Japan for upstream feedstock (which goes to Us supply chains), probably want to focus on that - many many second/third order effects from disruptions - we’ll see what US/Japan wants to do back, but supply chain wars are being fought upstream.

$TSM Vice President of Advanced Packaging: "Foundries can scale up the optical engine, but the real bottlenecks to large scale deployment lie elsewhere... Including lasers, optical fiber, fiber-optic connectors, and test" (UDN) Just some bucket ideas: Lasers: $LITE, $SIVE, $COHR, LandMark (3081), LuxNet, Sumitomo, Furukawa Optical fiber / FAU: Foci, Browave, $GLW, Sumitomo Fiber Optic / CPO Connectors: BizLink, $GLW , Fujikura, Nextronics, COXOC CPO testing: MPI (6223), Advantest, $FORM, Msscorps, $KEYS, Chroma (disclosure: exposure to theme above, individual names not named by TSMC) There are others I like as well, such as ShunSin, which now has explicit TSMC COUPE exposure but probably belongs under a different category like packaging/integration. eg. "Foxconn unit ShunSin confirms TSMC COUPE partnership" I don't think there's anything too new vs. H1, aside from ongoing news (eg. FAU looks like there will have a demand imbalance in 2027, from a report last week). But it's helpful to reiterate overall beneficiaries from time to time...

Imagine Celestial ($MRVL acquisition) was public. The valuation would probably be astronomical in US markets (if I had to guess, $6-10B) Because 2028 revenue projections were $500m (q4 annualized runrate), 2029 revenue projections were $1B. And because Celestial is a core part of hyperscaler CPO programs. Celestial's 2026 Q2 earnings would have been: - Close to $0 revenue (Marvell said "revenue and earnings since the acquisition were not material") - Losing -$12.5M/quarter ($50M/year) Would people who knew what they were talking about looking at qualification cycle players say... 1. based on Celestial's Q2 P/S numbers and because it was losing -$12.5M a quarter... That it's a worthless meme stock? Or 2. with CPO hyperscaler opportunities for 2028, it should be valued at $6-10B? And I think that's a core cultural disagreement between US / EU cultures + markets. If you knew how to evaluate qualification cycle players, which number actually matters? I'd argue overwhelmingly the latter.

If I had to be critical of $SIVE earnings: 1. Management underweighted the two disclosures that matter most. -> 6 pluggable engagements -> Foundry capacity (during an industry bottleneck) That's the most important part of the call and should have been the focus to provide economic scale of them. But we got 2-3 sentences about it. And it shouldn't take an Anime avatar on X to talk most about the implications of those. 2. CFO needs retraining or bring on a new one. The lawyer like answers were infuriating to listen to as a shareholder. Even I got pissed off with this statement: "we will evaluate the timing and decide whether the conditions are right to move forward at that particular time." It should be a 100% given by now they file for dual listing to escape hostile Swedish markets. Shareholders didn't fund a future growth type company to hear lawyer-like answers. Again, this was probably one of the worst answers the CFO could have gave and there needs to be firm commitment along with faster timelines. 3. $70M should have gone toward M&A and dual listing. -> Brutally honestly speaking, it's a waste of capital to focus on hybrid manufacturing at this stage and I was disappointed to hear this during this timeframe. It's eventually needed but with 2 foundry suppliers -> You have a ton of new capital and large marketcap. Use it to pull $AVGO style acquisitions of Cloud Light style IP for pluggables or optical engines. Lumilens went from 0 -> $5.5B in 2 years and now with hyperscaler engagements. Sivers should expand out of the laser chokepoint as fast as possible and not stay just a component vendor. And most of all, who cares about competing with customers? If a customer says: "if you do pluggables, we'll go with other players for lasers" who?? $LITE / $COHR / $AAOI reroutes their lasers to internal usage. Lot of your Asian players already allocated. Abuse the current bottleneck as much as possible because there's almost no qualified choices left. And I'm certain all the partners are trying to vertically integrate upward toward the laser level too and compete. If there was a new OE/pluggable accusation attempted during the Q2 time frame, things would have been a lot different. _ TLDR: $SIVE should aim to be the next $LITE and blitzscale like a Silicon Valley company. Use that $70m capital to move faster H2, and at the bare minimum finish readiness then. And expect NASDAQ listing to be finished H1 2027. Not "evaluation" at that timeframe. And use the capital + equity to expand downward into optical engines/ELS/optical transceivers using your equity valuation, and buy a Celestial/Ayar/Cloud Lite type startup. As for the wording of the call, markets care about economic value of the foundry allocation + 6 pluggable players, not other business segments. $SIVE has been extremely conservative to date, but they need to speed up and communicate to forward looking US/Int shareholders. Not geared toward local Swedish audiences who care about Q2/TTM revenue. Otherwise they'll be treated like an Asian component supplier and eventually be valued like an EU one.

Missed this mention earlier but IC design insiders reveal that OSAT providers have already warned clients: "traditional packaging capacity could face a deficit exceeding 20% by 2027" (eg. $AMKR, ethereum:0x041ff0e49f6f774e7dc7bd10ee4a14c00b1d80b2, Powertech as potential beneficaries) With: "wire bonding equipment" emerging as the primary bottleneck (ASMPT, $KLIC) -> influx of AI server shipments has triggered a spike in demand for mature chips -> existing mature packaging capacity at OSATs is being rapidly absorbed -> securing early access to traditional packaging capacity is now becoming a challenge Cascading bottleneck patterns are occurring across memory (eg. DDR2, DDR3) and now packaging capacity I guess.

Yes. I genuinely don't have a clue why $SIVE still focuses on local Swedish markets for communication/private fundraising. Over the US. The questions you get from Swedish heavy audiences include: - Leading questions like how would you "stop the bleeding" - "Why can't you disclosure your private customers" - Why focus on transceivers (it's obvious) - Implications for non-photonics orders So 1/3rd of the time, the CEO needs to be defending leading/accusatory questions around what "opportunity pipeline means" US analysts would have pressed: - Economic implications from 2 foundry allocations during a bottleneck + ASP hike/operating leverage - Around much capacity revenue would those allocations lead to (half of AOI calls are around those from US analysts) - $GFS NPO/CPO/pluggable scale implications and downstream end customers opportunities - Ayar / CPO player 2028 ramp (that happened to raise $500m+) or other products like ELS production with O-net and TAM opportunities there. - How big those 6 new pluggable players were, rather than asking "why can't you disclosure them" - Clarifying CFO legalposts around listing timeline and M&A TAM expansion opportunities So investors can get a sense of future growth for 2027-2028. Instead, the way leading questions are framed/answers, the entire calls were focused around current financials (which US investors don't care about), non-photonic implications, or skepticism of wording. Rather than exciting US investors about economic implications from their time in a CW laser bottleneck. The more time $SIVE spends in Swedish markets, the more they will be valued as such.

Just some random ideas from Elon’s post: $AAON - Chillers / liquid cooling $NVT - Cooling $MOD - Chillers / Cooling $IESC - Wiring $MTRS - chillers $JCI - chillers $HPS.A - Transformers (disclosure I own positions in this) $PRY.MI - networking/wiring(fiber) $CRDO / $AAOI (same) / $LITE / $COHR - networking Since Elon Musk cited: - transformers - wiring - liquid cooling - massive chillers + complex networking As the point of failure for AI compute buildout. Which is “harder than finding power”

Okay just to simplify this: There is a guy who eats a lot called $NVDA. Nvidia only wants to buy high-priced potatos off the farmers. A potato farmer $MU, that was selling carrots... now shifted farmland to potatos. Nvidia caused a great potato famine cause they can eat a lot. So everyone else who farmed carrots like SK Hynix and Samsung moved their farmland capacity to grow potato. But... people still need to eat. And carrots are a healthy part of their everyday diet.. Now there's no more carrots aside from a player like "ESMT", the legacy carrot farmer. So now, because everyone buys carrots off ESMT, there's a shortage and the price goes up. So ESMT needs more carrot seeds (from PSMC). But PSMC is running low on carrot seeds to grow the carrots. So PSMC charges ESMT more for the seeds. But the price ESMT sells the carrots at are much higher than what PSMC hikes the carrod seed price. now... ESMT is making enough from selling carrots that it traded 1.9x P/E off July's earnings. Can ESMT keep selling these carrots through 2027? All the other farmers thinks so since it's both hard + low incentive to migrate their valuable potato farms back to carrot farms.

uhh, pretty sure $GFS is a 2027-2028 type optical rerating story... fyi they're like 11.5 fwd p/e ending 2028 and 7.5x longer term, so idk about betting on a 1 1/2 month timeframe in 2026.