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Had a great time hanging out and chatting with Kevin...a true gentleman, scholar and trader!
MH43 - Special Summer Episode: Going Long with David Bezic
@PatrickCeresna and @kevinmuir take a summer week off our regular Market Huddle programming. Instead we are proud to present Kevin’s interview with macro strategist David Bezic @junkbond2000
youtu.be/ejxXKucTq5g
David Bezic retweeted
NEW ODD LOTS:
@tracyalloway and I speak with Talking Heads frontman David Byrne open.spotify.com/episode/593…
With links…for those willing to put in the time and (most likely) have their eyes opened
Very sad news. Great thinker and great teacher. Perry Mehrling's Money and Banking course remains one of the best courses available online, well worth studying: archive.org/details/academic…
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David Bezic retweeted
Terrible news. I loved getting to talk to Perry over the years. Someone with incredible range, depth and clarity. A major influence on my own thought, for sure. RIP.
We are deeply saddened to share the news that Perry Mehrling passed away this morning at the age of 67.
Perry was the father of the Young Scholars Initiative. He believed profoundly in young scholars, in their ideas, and in the importance of creating a community in which they could learn from one another and find their own voices.
Perry, you leave an enormous hole in our midst. Our hearts are aching, and we will miss you dearly.
The YSI community will carry your legacy forward. Your ideas, your generosity, and your commitment to generations of young scholars will remain with us.
Thank you for everything, Perry.
One of the best. Too soon too sad
Perry Mehrling, RIP.
According to the History of Economics Society, Perry Mehrling died "Monday night from injury sustained in a fall several days earlier." He was Professor of International Political Economy at Boston University and, previously, longtime Professor of Economics at Barnard College. He was a highly esteemed historian of economics.
Here is his homepage:
sites.bu.edu/perry/
His last book: "Money and Empire: Charles P. Kindleberger and the Dollar System"
amzn.to/47RVhJ2
"Charles Kindleberger ranks as one of the twentieth century's best known and most influential international economists. This book traces the evolution of his thinking in the context of a 'key-currency' approach to the rise of the dollar system, here revealed as the indispensable framework for global economic development since World War II. Unlike most of his colleagues, Kindleberger was deeply interested in history, and his economics brimmed with real people and institutional details. His research at the New York Fed and BIS during the Great Depression, his wartime intelligence work, and his role in administering the Marshall Plan gave him deep insight into how the international financial system really operated. A biography of both the dollar and a man, this book is also the story of the development of ideas about how money works. It throws revealing light on the underlying economic forces and political obstacles shaping our globalized world."
Charles Goodhart: "The discipline of economics is balanced, somewhat unsteadily, between two legs, with the skill of the historian on one side and of the mathematical modeler on the other. In the second half of the 20th century, the tide flowed strongly to elevate the second leg and to diminish the first. In this delightful biography of Charlie Kindleberger, a charming and loveable man, Perry Mehrling shows how Charlie, in his chosen role, as an international monetary economist, fought against that tide, often unsuccessfully. Perry writes so beautifully that one would only need a smattering of economics to enjoy the tale; while if one is interested in the history of economic thought in international monetary economics, then this book is, of course, a must read.'
amzn.to/47RVhJ2
David Bezic retweeted
This is the guy whose work had been flagged by central banks decades ago as being useful for them - to hide how they actually run monetary policy & to tie economists down in useless debates about how many angels can fit on the tip of a pin, while having nothing to do with reality
Some call it a bible, others are puzzled by the diminished role of monetary aggregates. And certainly, it is worth reading. A thought-provoking book by a Nobel Prize winner!
"Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy" by Michael Woodford.
amzn.to/47P5sho
"Interest and Prices seeks to provide theoretical foundations for a rule-based approach to monetary policy suitable for a world of instant communications and ever more efficient financial markets. In such a world, effective monetary policy requires that central banks construct a conscious and articulate account of what they are doing. Michael Woodford reexamines the foundations of monetary economics, and shows how interest-rate policy can be used to achieve an inflation target in the absence of either commodity backing or control of a monetary aggregate. The book further shows how the tools of modern macroeconomic theory can be used to design an optimal inflation-targeting regime--one that balances stabilization goals with the pursuit of price stability in a way that is grounded in an explicit welfare analysis, and that takes account of the "New Classical" critique of traditional policy evaluation exercises. It thus argues that rule-based policymaking need not mean adherence to a rigid framework unrelated to stabilization objectives for the sake of credibility, while at the same time showing the advantages of rule-based over purely discretionary policymaking."
amzn.to/47P5sho
David Bezic retweeted
Replying to @amlivemon
Self employment was down. What kind of “analysis” you running over there? At least get the signs right! 😂
Great suggestions/follows
Identifying and listening to proven experts with an actual track record….what a concept! Easiest alpha in the macro research game
May I suggest inviting someone with expertise in bond markets and/or Treasury debt management? Any of the following would be outstanding @amar_reganti @wbmosler @mark_dow
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David Bezic retweeted
I was taught the loanable funds model of reserve banking and the crowding out theory of public finance in my principals of macro class.
People just made shit up.
Wash rinse and repeat.
Replying to @EconstratPB
My wife majored in econ at UVA her conclusion was that 90% is completely just made up and not worth remembering. Either that or the alcohol, but I’ll give her credit 😂
David Bezic retweeted
🎙️ Zlatko Dalić on the penalty awarded to Portugal:
"Look at the four or five fouls on Budimir in that match. Their centre-back was holding him in exactly the same way, but the referee didn't even give a foul.
Then VAR intervenes for this penalty. Vlašić didn't pull him; he only shielded him with his arms. There wasn't enough contact for a penalty.
I'm convinced that if the situation had been the other way around, they wouldn't even have reviewed it." [Americana]
David Bezic retweeted
Most people miss an important thing in the automation debate, whether it is robots or AI agents.
These machines make things. They do not buy them. And consumption is what turns a productivity gain into actual growth.
The argument can be heard in two different places.
One is the AI gospel, loudest in the US, preaching that AI will take most of the jobs. The widely praised @citrini memo gave it a name: an "Intelligence Displacement Spiral". AI displaces workers, those workers spend less, firms under margin pressure buy more AI, which displaces more workers.
The output still shows up in the national accounts. It just stops circulating through the real economy. Citrini calls that "Ghost GDP". But as @timoreilly puts it, you cannot sustain trillion-dollar valuations on a customer base that is going broke.
The other place is China, making spectacular inroads in robotics, partly because it is about to fall off a demographic cliff. It installed more industrial robots last year than the rest of the world combined.
So let's ask the question that everyone skips. What happens if the productivity gains from robots and AI never turn into extra consumption?
The sequence goes as follows. Output rises. The wage share does not keep up. Demand lags supply. Capacity sits idle, or debt piles up behind it. At that point a country has two exits: sell the surplus abroad, or correct at home through falling output and lost jobs.
China takes the first exit. It runs household consumption at around 40% of GDP, against 60 to 70% almost everywhere else, the legacy of years of repression that move income from savers to industry.
China cannot buy what it builds, so it exports the gap. That lets it appear as a manufacturing powerhouse rather than a consumption laggard. But the export surplus is camouflage. It holds up the growth figures while hiding the demand problem underneath.
The US sits in a different spot. Wages there stopped tracking productivity decades ago, but consumption kept going, propped up by household debt and rising asset prices. The political scientist Colin Crouched once called it privatised Keynesianism: borrowing does the work that pay cheques used to.
America can run this longer than anyone because it issues the reserve currency, so steady demand for dollars lets Washington carry deficits no one else could. It works until the borrowing does not.
Europe is slightly better placed, but keeps trying to make itself worse. Germany is the model everyone wants to copy. The Hartz reforms of 2003 to 2005 held wages down while GDP kept growing, so the household share fell and business profits surged. Lower domestic consumption, larger export surplus. The trouble is that not everyone can be Germany at once. When the whole continent represses wages to defend "cost competitiveness", the South ends up stuck below potential on weak demand, whilst the North ends up repressing domestic consumption, which fuels discontent and harms economic growth.
As stated by @michaelxpettis, a country that externalises its internal imbalances forces the adjustment onto its trading partners. They absorb it as higher debt or higher unemployment, and either way they lose manufacturing, whether they like it or not.
Left alone, this ends in one place, which is well known because America already ran the experiment once.
Through the 1920s, output per manufacturing worker rose 43% while wages barely moved. The income that never reached workers funded overbuilt capacity, speculation, and finally the market bubble. By 1928 sales lagged and factories cut output. The crash turned a distribution problem into a decade-long depression.
What broke the loop was FDR's Second New Deal: the Wagner Act, Social Security, and a deliberate move to align wages with productivity. For the first time the income captured through the 1920s flowed back to households. Demand recovered. The imbalance resolved.
That is the lesson for the robot and AI age. Productivity makes growth possible, but consumption is what actually delivers it (cc @CarlotaPrzPerez). The task now is to get the gains to households, through wages that track output and institutions that give people the security to spend, or through newer ideas like handing displaced workers an equity claim on the machines that replace them (cc @izakaminska).
Automate all you like. Someone still has to be able to buy the output.
Financial Times: "Beijing now sees AI-enabled machines as a way out of the demographic trap. Last year the country installed more industrial robots than the rest of the world put together."
This very interesting FT article claims that because its aging population "is China’s biggest economic headwind" (I am a little skeptical about this claim), and that because its declining population makes a bad debt problem even worse (I agree), Beijing wants to increase worker productivity by investing heavily in automation and robot technology.
This sets off at least three, perhaps unrelated, points. First and most obviously, mainstream economists have long argued that manufacturing jobs are no better than service jobs, and because the former are declining anyway, we should avoid a manufacturing "fetish".
But this might only show just how poorly they understand the economy. It is precisely because manufacturing productivity can rise so rapidly (which also explains most of the decline in manufacturing employment) that countries like the US and the EU should do all they can do encourage domestic manufacturing.
Second, China has among the lowest unit labor costs in the world, i.e. wages are lower relative to productivity than they are in most of its trade partners. It also has a very high underemployment as gig work absorbs a huge number of workers who would otherwise be unemployed. With such low labor costs, you would expect Chinese growth to be very labor intensive at this stage.
But it is instead very capital-intensive, as demonstrated by the extraordinarily high investment share of GDP, and illustrated by the huge push into the labor-saving automation described in this article. This is pretty strong evidence than in China labor may be cheap, but capital is even cheaper.
Third, many analysts worry that automation and robot technology will lead to a rise in unemployment. This is only true, however, if overall demand fails to keep pace with overall supply, in which case production facilities would have to close down and workers fired.
But this may be a misplaced concern. In an economy in which investment growth depends on growth in consumption, overall demand will fail to keep pace with overall supply only if household income fails to keep pace with productivity growth.
This returns us to China's original problem. while Chinese productivity has been rising, especially until the late 2000s and early 2010s, wages haven't kept pace with productivity growth.
So what really matters to overall Chinese and global growth, at least in the medium term, is not the rate at which China automates and expands robot technology, but whether or not wage growth is able to keep pace with the resulting increases in productivity.
Given the extent of unemployment and underemployment in the economy, however, this seems pretty unlikely, at least in the next few years, in which case the impact of automation in Chinese manufacturing is likely to be even bigger domestic imbalances and trade surpluses.
The key, as I see it, is whether China can continue to subsidize the cost of capital to such an extent that, even with very low labor costs Chinese businesses still prefer capital-intensive growth over labor-intensive growth. This in turn probably depends on how much longer Chinese debt can grow faster than China's real debt-servicing capacity. With debt so high and rising so rapidly, I suspect we will only get a few more years of this at best.
ft.com/content/c8731833-10ca…
David Bezic retweeted
QUALIFIED! Croatia are heading back to the biggest stage. 🏆
#FIFAWorldCup
Thanks for the karma boost and series turning point!!
@AaronLevine_
👊
Well, if you're going to hit ANYONE with a fastball... #Mariners
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David Bezic retweeted
What an idiotic thing to say! Loser shit right here.
Well, if you're going to hit ANYONE with a fastball... #Mariners
David Bezic retweeted
Bell Centre is really the best arena in hockey to play in. What an electric atmosphere tonight for the #GoHabsGo
Two of the best...
Very grateful to @DavidBeckworth for having me as a frequent guest on his podcast.
This episode was probably best showing yet. Please check it out!
And more framework content forthcoming. Stay tuned
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David Bezic retweeted
Tell me you don’t understand the transmission mechanism monetary policy without telling me you don’t understand the transmission mechanism monetary policy. Fed’s been letting the balance sheet runoff for almost 3 years now. And it’s not primary liquidity from a market or credit standpoint. It’s only primary liquidity from a settlement standpoint.
David Bezic retweeted
JP Koning worth listening to!
I've spent the last decade thinking and writing about financial privacy. My views have evolved a lot over that time. Here's a look back at how and why.
👉 jpkoning.blogspot.com/2024/1…
































