Supply chain attacks and OSS sustainability go hand in hand. I've semi-seriously joked for years that OSS upstreams should periodically purposely inject full vulns into their code and let downstreams fuck around and find out. Downstreams can pay to get the non-FAFO version. The not joke part is simply that OSS maintainers aren't a supply chain. OSS maintainers are not responsible for monitoring CVEs (because, they are not a supply chain). OSS maintainers are not at fault when bad shit happens to downstreams, because basically every OSS license (MIT, Apache, GPL, etc.) literally says: the software is provided "as-is, without warranty." You get what you pay for (that is to say: absolutely nothing!) Now, the joke part is that I do believe there is an ethical obligation to try to prevent harm downstream. But "try" is the key word. So, this isn't a serious proposal. But, if you're using OSS code and you're not paying for a license with a contract that promises some kind of warranty, you have no supply chain. You (the downstream user of an OSS lib) ARE the supply chain. To use a metaphor: physical goods have a real supply chain. Car manufacturers, chips, clothes, toys, etc. You have a signed commercial agreement with all your suppliers that promises quantity AND quality and blowback if either are missed. Thats a supply chain. If someone puts some chips on the side of the road with a "FREE" sign, then you integrate those into a product, then find out those chips are hacking customers, its your fault, not the person who dropped them on the side of the road.