I am the master of my own Time and Energy #Bitcoin allows this
Antarctica
Joined April 2020
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Getting pretty sick of hearing about cybercab not having a steering wheel and pedals. Autonomous driving is the innovation, not having no steering wheel and pedals, listening to music and watching the city go by is nothing new. Get over it.
The attention to detail Tesla put into the Cybercab is pretty amazing.
It’s around 7:40 in the morning.
I’m sitting here with no steering wheel, no pedals, my feet kicked out, music playing… and the entire cabin is moving with the song.
The light bar across the dash pulses with the beat.
The floor lighting reacts with it too.
It literally feels like I’m having my own little party while the Cybercab drives itself through Austin.
No driver, no one to tell me to turn the music down.
Just me, my music, the lights, and Tesla’s software handling the entire ride.
That’s what makes the Cybercab so much fun.
The Tesla team thought about what it should actually feel like when you no longer have to drive.
You can relax.
Stretch out.
Listen to music.
Watch the city go by.
And apparently have a light show at 7:40 in the morning.
I was sitting there smiling the whole time.
The software, the hardware, the cabin experience… it all works together.
Tesla’s attention to detail is on another level.
FVCK🟩YO🟩FIAT retweeted
I've got someone who claims to be from @OneKeyHQ (a Chinese HWW manufacturer) in my DMs offering to send me free units. No doubt they also have an affiliate marketing program lined up so they can pay me to tell people to buy it.
Everybody that "educates" in this space is paid by the product masters. So, instead I'm going to do the opposite. I'll explain why I have no interest in this product and why nobody should use it.
Let's just assume for the sake of argument, the person in my DMs is who they say they are (no way to actually verify this).
I don't want these companies to get my personal information. Data breaches are the norm these days, the less you associate your PII with cryptocurrency the better. It's not always avoidable but expect sooner or later that data is going to leak, the best you can do is try to minimize the footprint.
Yes I could have them ship it to a PO box. Not worth the trouble because...
The unit they send me could a perfectly impenetrable fortress. That doesn't matter. A single firmware update, a single upstream software dependency change, a single unnoticed bug in there software app or firmware and all users that update get screwed.
It doesn't matter that it's open source. It doesn't matter that it has a screen, it doesn't matter that its air gapped with QR codes, it doesn't matter that the box has tamper proof tabs, it doesn't matter that the physical unit has tamper proof wrapping. It doesn't matter that the unit is shiny and has a biometric scanner. It doesn't matter that they have time boxed paid security audits of their code from 3rd party companies, this all means virtually nothing. None of this would protect you from a bad upstream crypto library or a malicious software update.
Their software dependency chain is massive. There are FOUR secure elements inside the device which are unauditable black boxes. There is no way to prove that the software on the unit they ship me (or anyone else) is actually running the software that they say it is. None of their software is fully & independently reproducible.
Even if you wipe the firmware and install it fresh yourself, you have no way to verify that process actually accomplished what it says it should. The unit can lie to you, you should expect that it does.
Even if the hardware units are perfectly safe, the firmware dependency chain is perfectly safe AND their companion software app is perfectly safe, the unit has to travel through a massive physical custody chain to get to me.
Everybody in that process knows this device is going to be used to store untraceable digital cash. Anybody from the manufacturer, to the distributor, to the customs agents, to the mailman could replace an authentic unit with something malicious.
You cannot use it with Bitcoin Core. It's job is explicitly to replace the wallet portion of Bitcoin Core. You cannot use it directly with bitcoind (Bitcoin Core's backend) you need to add another middle man to bridge Bitcoin Core's backend to their software app.
But most customers won't even need to worry about this because of course they won't be informed. Everything will just automatically connect you to Onekey's backend. Everything about your bitcoin activity will go through Onekey's nodes, all of your balances, wallet history, and broadcasts will first pass through their backend APIs, they will know everything about you, exactly how much crypto you own, and exactly what you do with it.
These hardware wallet devices try to be all in one solutions. That means they take shortcuts on security to cram in more features & more cryptocurrencies & more applications. It means choosing secp256k1-zkp over secp256k1 and giving up guix attestations so they can offer all of the latest cutting edge tech to their customers.
The problem with this is that its NOT appropriate to accept these tradeoffs in a product that is designed for HIGH SECURITY.
But you will NEVER hear the manufacturer or their paid underlings discuss this tradeoff. They will not mention to you "hey this wallet is cutting edge and contains a lot of features, that means we had to make tradeoffs with how we built the software, that means its not as secure as something like Bitcoin Core and you shouldn't use this to store your life savings"
The entire business model relies on getting people to use this as a one stop shop for everything. But it's wildly inappropriate because it has to constantly undercut the security standard which is Bitcoin Core to cram in a bunch of pointless security theater and extra features.
The vast majority (bitkey is an exception here) of these hardware wallet companies offer the same weak, out-of-the-box opinions on key management. "Here's a little piece of paper, let our little hardware box tell you what your seed phrase is, then write down the 24 words it gives you on this piece of paper. Maybe do a 'passphrase' too idk bro lol"
Their software is not actually open source, even though they love to throw that word around in their marketing. Their software app is source viewable. You may read it and copy it inside your company for reference (debug / interop). You may not freely modify, redistribute, sell, or build a competing product from it.
We have a security gold standard which is self installed Bitcoin Core on generic hardware free from malware. It is actually Open Source and allows people to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and even sell the software. Its entire build chain is auditable, 16 signed guix hash attestations were published alongside Bitcoin 31.1.
These self-custody products primarily rely on undercutting that standard and distracting you with largely meaningless security theater to make up for it. Then they wrap everything in shiny packaging and a comfy user experience and pay influencers $10 to shill it to you. They do this without ever disclosing under what circumstances their product is and is not appropriate and what tradeoffs have been made.
These products are all like this by the way. Your favorite HWW manufacturer is also guilty of everything on this list give or take a few here or there. You could maybe make an argument that these products are fun to play around with, or you could maybe even say they are acceptable for storing your regrettable monkey jpegs and shitcoin bags that are never going to pump.
But if you take anything away from this thread, let it be this:
UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES should you be relying on these products to store your family's life savings!
Fuck cRyPto, #Bitcoin doesnt need clarity, it provides clarity to the disenfranchised masses. Yield on stables and shitcoins will only hurt retail investors. CrYpTo and "blockchain" technologies are the newest tools in the crony capitalist's and wallstreet gangsters toolkit.
FVCK🟩YO🟩FIAT retweeted
Very few people in Bitcoin seem to understand that a sophisticated attacker would not hide security flaws in an apps viewable source code.
They would hide it in the prebuilt crypto binaries (AKA the thing that actually touches your private keys).
These much more difficult to properly audit and its one of the many reasons why Bitcoin Core is the gold standard for the security critical functions of a Bitcoin Wallet (both generating secure keys AND signing).
After "the incident" with coldcard, the overton window has shifted drastically towards entropy, but random enough entropy is only one small piece of what makes cryptography safe.
Those of you that are overly focused on "entropy" and wanting to "roll the dice", are actually rolling dice on a single point of failure.
Bitcoin Core is one of the very few projects that takes this seriously enough to actually pin its entire build toolchain with guix.
This means that dozens of independent contributors can, on their own hardware, run the Guix build and publish their own signed hash attestation that the crypto libraries they ship are exactly what they claim to be.
You simply aren't going to find this assurance in the rest of these projects, even the ones that look like they have a ton of github activity (i.e. open source review and contribution).
They all rely on single points of trust, which is most often, trusting the one single party that built the crypto library isn't going to rug you with a backdoor.
Bad actors will intentionally distract users from this by publishing attestations that prove nothing of substance. End users see a SHA256SUMS file and think verifying it gives them security...
...but the only thing it proves is that nobody messed with the app after it got strung together with some spooky crypto library compiled by some anonymous contributor in Ukraine.
FVCK🟩YO🟩FIAT retweeted
During Rug season we have one mission critical objective:
Teach people the importance of using Bitcoin Core & minimizing the amount of code and 3rd parties they put between it and themselves.
That's why I published yeti-2.0, to give people an accessible way to set up a relatively easy to use multisig vault with Bitcoin Core, and to not offload key management tradeoff decisions onto the end user.
If you don't like my guide or the tradeoffs I've made, publish your own opinionated process:
- clearly disclose your tradeoffs
- give your process an appropriate upper bound based on the tradeoffs you've made
If you do this, I will review it.
(I will not proof read your AI vomit, please do not insult me by sending me 30 pages of raw claude output)
github.com/bowlarbear/yeti-2…
When can we start making a distinction between hww's that keep secrets with a secure element and sign txns without entering a seed every time and stateless signers that dont remember shit and therefore have a far lower attack surface? A seedsigner should not be referred to as hww
Huge caveat.
A hardware wallet with a secure element helps if you travel with the device. The seed is on it, and the SE makes extraction hard.
No SE? It doesn’t do much against a physical attack. It just lets you sign txs offline. That’s it.
If you don’t spend and you don’t travel with the keys, you don’t need a hardware wallet at all.
Tha fuck is wrong with this guy. Its time you sit on your omega candle pal
This the shit that makes me think somehow the bippers are right. 3.85MB
Really @MARA ?
3.85 MB space for this ?
People using Slipstream for this.....
mempool.space/block/00000000…
FVCK🟩YO🟩FIAT retweeted
The most common question I am getting right now in the fall out of the news of COLD CARD MK3, MK4, MK5 and Q having compromised entropy, is:
"Rob, what would you do right now if you were in my shoes? Where would you send your bitcoin to be safe?"
I will share with you my list of what I would do, but first, there is AN URGENT SECURITY ADVISORY IN THE BITCOIN ECOSYSTEM.
Below is my personal assessment of the situation.
If you or someone you know:
Uses an MK3, MK4, MK5, or Q in a single signature
OR
A multi signature wallet where the cold card devices can move the funds on their own (Example, 2 cold cards and a Ledger).
Please continue reading. You may be in danger. If this does not apply to you, keep on reading if you like, but you are not impacted by this issue.
If you are still here, there are three identified mitigations that protect you at the moment. They are all different forms in which you may have brought your own entropy.
A: DICE - This is done by either rolling dice from the start, or adding dice rolls to the generated seed phrase. At least 50 dice rolls would be my threshold at 128 bits of entropy.
OR
B: PASSPHRASE - You used a passphrase of sufficient entropy (128 bits).
128 Bits of entropy pass phrase examples include RANDOM combinations of the following:
- 12 BIP 39 seed words.
- 10 common words in the english language
- 25 mixed lower case letters and numbers
- 20 if you use ASCII characters
Note on pass phrases: This does not include the same word 12 times, 10 words in a sentence, etc. This combinations of characters/numbers OR words should never have been seen or spoken before in the total sum of all human knowledge and experiences. It needs to be RANDOM for it to be entropy.
OR
C: EXTERNAL ENTROPY - Your seed phrase was derived entirely outside of the cold card ecosystem. (It was imported into the cold card, not generated on it)
Now, if you are still reading, and you do not have any of these mitigations in place, you need to move your funds. The urgency of circumstances are as follows:
TIER 1: AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
Scenario A: If you are in a signature wallet with an effected device, and did not use any of the mitigations listed above. You need to move funds right now. Find someone to help you, any moment your funds can be stolen.
Scenario B: If you have an N of N (eg 2 of 2, 3 of 3, etc) multisig of just cold card devices that did not have mitigations listed above (dice and/or passphrase).
Attackers will be grinding all of the combinations of compromised keys. They know all your seed phrases. You are compromised. It is just a matter of time for them to assemble the puzzle pieces together and steal your funds.
If this scenario is you, I will have more below on how to mitigate risk when broadcasting your transaction.
TIER 2: URGENTLY
If you are in a single signature wallet with an effected device, and you used either less than 50 dice rolls OR a pass phrase less secure than what I shared above. The entire security of your bitcoin is reliant on how much of Dice AND Passphrases you applied to your wallet.
Attackers know your seed phrase. Your entropy from dice or pass phrase is the only thing protecting you. Did you add a pass phrase of 'bitcoin'? You are basically in tier 1. Did you use 6 words? You are not at tier 1, but you aren't safe. You need to make plans to move funds quickly.
TIER 3 SOON, BUT IMPORTANT CONTEXT:
You have a multi signature wallet where the compromised devices have sufficient ability to move the funds. An example is a 2 of 3 multisig where you have 2 cold cards and another signer.
The issue with Tier 3 is that an attacker may have already figured out your insecure seed phrases. This means when you broadcast your bitcoin transaction, an attacker in theory can then steal your funds.
NOTE: IF YOU ARE IN THIS SITUATION, AND YOU HAVE REUSED ADDRESSES, ALL REUSED ADDRESSES PUT YOU RIGHT BACK AT THE TIER 1 MOVE RIGHT AWAY YOUR FUNDS ARE AT RISK AT THIS VERY MOMENT
You should look into finding a way to use the @MARAFoundation_ slipstream service, which uses a private mempool. This means that by the time an attacker could see your attempted recovery, it is already in a block and not possible for them to steal funds.
TIER 4: KEY ROTATION. This is where you have an insecure cold card(s) in your multisig quorum, and you know that the other keys in your quorum are not impacted by this bug.
If there is a MK3,MK4,MK5 or Q in the quorum, BUT they either: 1. Rolled sufficient dice (50 min) 2. Have a strong pass phrase (as defined above). 3. Used entropy not sourced from the device, they are not impacted by this bug in the Cold Card (see notes earlier on mitigations).
You are in a position where a minority of your keys are compromised. Funds are safe, but you are at reduced security. Make plans when you are able to remove the compromised device from your wallet.
Now. With that security advisory out of the way, back to the question, what would I do in this situation?
Below is just my opinion, but you should not rely on only my opinion, you will have to make your own choices based on what you feel is best for you.
I want to be clear, if you are not on this list. It is not that I think your product/business is bad, insecure or at risk, I am directly answering the question of what I would do. This is my personal judgement given my decade of experience in bitcoin.
First, a disclaimer:
My bitcoin is at my company @AnchorWatch. I have full skin in the game in that if I'm offering a custody solution, there will never be another place I store large amounts of bitcoin long term for myself or my family, and it will be this way as long as I am here.
I was the first bitcoin that went on our Trident Vault platform. If the day ever comes, I will be the last bitcoin to leave the platform.
The years of what we built at AnchorWatch were for exactly moments like this. Avoiding catastrophic risk of ruin scenarios.
We offer 2 products:
1. Our Flagship Product where you as the customer can hold 1 or 3 keys, and we act as a cosigner. We leverage bitcoin native smart contracts which allow for your bitcoin to have different ways it can be spent across time.
2. Multi Institution Custody, where we let you distribute your keys across 3 institutions of ourselves, @bitgo and @CoinCorner. 2 of the 3 institutions must sign off on the transaction, and you have to present a Yubikey signature before withdrawing to mitigate deepfake and compromised accounts.
For both products as, since we are a cosigner, we are able to enforce rules like whitelisted addresses, and velocity controls (how much bitcoin can you send how often). You can even disable the send button on the platform if you so choose!
We also offer 1:1 insurance backed by Lloyd's of London.
If you want to learn more about what we do, hit up @_joerodgers or @BeccaAmilee to learn more, or check out our website.
Now with that out of the way, places where I'd leave my bitcoin (besides @AnchorWatch) in no particular order:
Custodian:
I'd trust my life savings at @River under a duress situation. This is one of those times. @Leishman and the entire team at River are elite operators. It is my favorite bitcoin services business in the market today outside of my own.
They own their own custody infrastructure, and at times like this, you want those who have extreme ownership and control over how their customer's money is being managed.
@River does monthly proof of reserves, and you can turn on the force field feature which will freeze withdrawals of bitcoin. They have a world class custody team as well, and are making improvements regularly with a larger upgrade that has been planned for a long time, happening later this year.
Collaborative Custody:
1. The @Bitkey is an incredible product with an elite team of engineers supported by the @BlockEng organization. They have exceptional bitcoin developers across @spiral_xyz and @CashApp teams who deeply understand Bitcoin.
@jack has been a long time believer in bitcoin who has built an organization that has no peer in the resources they have not just understanding bitcoin, but building on bitcoin.
You can pick it up a Bitkey at best buy today!
I do want to add a disclaimer that all keys are managed within the Bitkey ecosystem. The Bitkey team has gone to great lengths to keep things secure, but in light of recent events, I want to call that out. At the moment, the Bitkey is my only exception to a purist ideal of multi vendor multisig (more below).
2. @CasaHODL - @Nneuman and @lopp have been on top of this incidence response, and have built a very clean user experience to let people be safe. You can either use a 2 of 3 or 3 of 5 multisig with a great mobile app. Casa is the best UX for soverign collaborative multisig that exists in the market today.
3. @uncahined - Unchained pioneered the collaborative custody model and the multi institution custody model. They have been working around the clock trying to support customers and have even been able to use slip stream going the extra mile on short notice to keep customers bitcoin safe.
Self Custody:
I have spent close to $5k on LLM tokens over the past 24 hours scanning over a hundred bitcoin related repositories. As of now, I have seen no vulnerability that has me concerned about any hardware device outside of the Cold Cards.
Even so, you can't be sure. So I would follow the @mflaxman "Bitcoin 10x security guide". Its how I held my bitcoin before I founded @AnchorWatch, and even though the guide is 6 years old, the principles are timeless. I would remove his suggestion of using the cold card and replace it with any other hardware wallet. I would replace the cold card with a @Ledger at this time if it were my decision. You can pick up a Ledger up at Best Buy in the US.
Michael pioneered multi vendor multisig as a concept, and if you want a fully sovereign solution, as of today there is no better mental model on how to think through this, he has advanced tabs to further increase the security. For his cold card guide he fairly calls out the added benefit of rolling dice, which would have saved you today.
I think the future is combining the tech we use at @AnchorWatch to move beyond the single signature/ multi signature paradigm of custody, with the principles of @mflaxman's 10x security guide and the support of collaborative custody.
More on that later, but I would check out @lianabitcoin from @Wizardsardine as well, they offer a fully open source wallet that enables these more advanced smart contracts and are security researchers in the bitcoin ecosystem.
With that, I'm going to get back to work. I will post a followup reply if I have additional information or any corrections or clarifications to make.
FVCK🟩YO🟩FIAT retweeted
IMPORTANT UPDATE: We just had our first confirmed loss of a Mk3 + 2 Word Passphrase.
Drained at 2pm Aug 2nd Australia Time - Roughly 17hrs ago.
I severely underestimated how not cypherpunk the majority of bitcoiners are today. Im not cypherpunk, i got no idea which way is up, but damn, people really thought having bitcoin safe in cold storage meant trusting a companies device to create your seed? DYOR, dont trust, verify
FVCK🟩YO🟩FIAT retweeted
"Ten31 (...) proud investors in Coinkite. The only external investor in Coinkite. ColdCard has a dice roll feature. When you create a new seed, you can choose (...). If you choose the dice roll feature, that's like for advanced users only, don't (...) just don't do that" - Odell.
FVCK🟩YO🟩FIAT retweeted
Can everyone listen to Parman now?
Guides...
armantheparman.com
