As early as next year, Russia could make a new technological leap that would give it an advantage in the war. And China is helping it with this. We see serious signs of cooperation between Chinese companies in the design of Russia’s “Rassvet” network. “Rassvet” is being built specifically for war, even if officially it is presented as a commercial satellite internet system. It is being developed by Moscow-based Bureau 1440, which is part of IKS Holding. The system is being built in low Earth orbit at around 800 km and is intended to provide high-speed, low-latency communications, inter-satellite laser links, 5G NTN, and connectivity with moving platforms. This is exactly the set of capabilities needed by UAVs, maritime drones, military vehicles, and mobile command posts. Russia has already moved from experiments to serial deployment of “Rassvet.” After two experimental groups of satellites in 2023 and 2024, 16 RASSVET-3 or Rassvet Gen1 spacecraft were launched in March 2026. Moscow plans to create a constellation of several hundred spacecraft. China is one of the key sources of technologies without which it would be significantly more difficult for Russia to deploy such a system. The Russian side itself acknowledged this even before the serial “Rassvet” appeared. In January 2023, then-head of Roscosmos Yury Borisov directly stated that after the end of Western supplies, Russia had reached an agreement with China to purchase electronic components for rocket and space technology. He called Russian electronics the industry’s “Achilles’ heel” and said that Chinese partners had “lent a helping hand.” In other words, Chinese technological support for Russia’s space sector is an established fact. Rassvet’s dependence on the Chinese technological environment can already be traced at the level of specific supplies. According to an investigation by the Center for Defense Reforms, in 2025 Bureau 1440 paid about $1.42 million to the company Materik, with almost the entire amount denominated in yuan. Materik imported SMA-D-6 attitude-control reaction wheels manufactured by Shanghai Modern Aerotech from China. Their specifications are very similar to the German Vectronic Aerospace VRW-D-6. Researchers suggest that the Chinese product may be a localized or adapted version of German technology. The scale of contacts between Bureau 1440 and China is also striking. Throughout 2025, Bureau 1440 employees traveled to China practically every month, with around 90 people taking part in these business trips overall. Their destinations included Chinese commercial space centers, satellite manufacturing facilities, and satellite internet companies. It was during this period that Russia made a sharp transition from experimental spacecraft to the new serial generation, RASSVET-3 (Rassvet Gen1). Pavel Luzin, an expert at the Saratoga Foundation, draws attention to the extremely rapid transition from Rassvet-2 to the new flat Rassvet Gen1 and its similarity to China’s Qianfan. The most likely explanation is close cooperation between Bureau 1440 and Shanghai Spacecom Satellite Technology - SSST, which is developing the Chinese Qianfan/SpaceSail constellation. Under this model, Russia could have gained access to a Chinese hardware platform, adapted it to its needs, and added its own software. Zelenskyy’s statement strengthens this version, as Ukraine is now talking about specific Chinese companies rather than simply Russia’s general dependence on Chinese goods. Zelenskyy told the FT that China is working with Russia on technologies that could help create an analogue of Starlink, and that he had asked Donald Trump to impose sanctions on the Russian and Chinese entities involved. According to him, “Rassvet” could begin operating as early as late 2026 or early 2027. No less importantly, China could help Russia obtain satellite communications even without the completion of “Rassvet.” China is already building its own low-Earth-orbit system, Qianfan/SpaceSail - effectively a Chinese analogue of Starlink. Its orbits physically allow it to cover Russian territory. If Beijing provides Moscow with authorized terminals, access to the network, and the necessary ground infrastructure, Russia could theoretically obtain Chinese LEO connectivity earlier than it can independently deploy a fully operational “Rassvet.” If Russia obtains stable satellite communications and installs such terminals on drones, maritime drones, vehicles, and command posts, this could indeed mean a new stage of the war. Russian drones would be able to operate at significantly greater distances, transmit video in real time, receive new commands after launch, and change their routes and targets. This would make Russian strikes more precise. The risk for Europe is particularly serious: the operator could be sitting in Russia while the drone or another platform operates in another country. This could facilitate attacks and sabotage against military factories, airfields, ports, warehouses, energy infrastructure, and other critical infrastructure. For now, “Rassvet” is not ready for this level of use: Russia has only 32 serial satellites, coverage is unstable, and mass production of compact terminals has not been confirmed. It is most realistic to expect a noticeable military effect in 2027, and a more stable system in 2028 or later. But China could significantly accelerate this process if it helps not only with components, but also with terminals, antennas, or access to its Qianfan network. Therefore, 2027 looks like the most dangerous period: this is when Russia could move from individual experiments to the systematic use of satellite communications for the war and for operations against European countries.