Greg Gorman (@gregorygorman) header
Greg Gorman (@gregorygorman) profile picture

Volunteer VP of IT for https://xitter.cf/t.co/jz3kc1bLp1. Dadx4 & Eagle Scout. INCOSE ESEP & FRC mentor. Kansas City born & raised! Tweets my own.

DFW, the Republic of Texas
Joined September 2018
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Greg Gorman retweeted
When thousands of rooted Android phones lose Google Wallet access at the exact same minute, Google did not push a secret OS update. Google added a single serial number to a server-side revocation list and killed a leaked factory Keybox. Every certified Android phone leaves the factory with a cryptographic identity locked inside its silicon. Rooting communities spend months hunting for leaked copies of these keys to spoof Google's hardware checks, and Google's telemetry servers burn them in days. 1. The anatomy of an Attestation Keybox An Android Keybox (keybox.xml) is a factory-provisioned cryptographic bundle containing four items: an ECDSA P-256 private key with its X.509 certificate chain, and an RSA-2048 private key with its matching certificate chain. Both chains trace back to the Google Hardware Attestation Root CA. When a banking app calls the Play Integrity API, your phone has to prove that its bootloader is locked and its operating system is unmodified. Google's server sends a random nonce to the phone. Inside the chip's isolated security processor, the KeyMint Trusted Application generates a brand-new key pair, builds an X.509 leaf certificate containing that nonce alongside the bootloader's verified boot status, and signs that new certificate using the private key inside the factory Keybox. Google checks the signature chain against its root CA. If the chain is valid and the hardware flags say the bootloader is locked, the phone passes MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY. (Note: Video resolution relies on a separate 128-byte Widevine DRM Keybox managed by the Widevine Trusted Application, not the Play Integrity attestation keybox.) 2. Where it lives in silicon The Keybox never enters standard Android memory. The Linux kernel and all user apps run in Arm Normal World at Exception Levels 0 and 1 (EL0 and EL1). The Keybox is decrypted only inside Arm Secure World (Secure EL1), run by a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) like Qualcomm QTEE, Samsung TEEgris, or Google Trusty, or inside a dedicated StrongBox security chip like the Titan M2. During factory manufacturing on the SMT line, the OEM writes the encrypted Keybox to persistent flash storage (such as the /mnt/vendor/persist partition or Replay Protected Memory Block on the UFS chip). The key required to decrypt that blob is derived from a hardware Unique Device Key (UDK) blown directly into one-time-programmable eFuses inside the SoC die. Even with full kernel root (su or KernelSU) and an unlocked bootloader, the main OS cannot decrypt the Keybox. When the KeyMint service needs to sign an attestation certificate, the hardware memory controller blocks Normal World from reading Secure World RAM. 3. How Keyboxes actually leak Because root access in Normal World cannot read Secure World keys, valid Keyboxes leak into the wild through four routes: * OEM factory leaks: Subcontractors on the assembly line leak the unencrypted factory provisioning files or SMT flashing tools containing batches of raw keybox.xml files meant for budget phones or Android TV boxes. This is where most public keys come from. * Misconfigured vendor firmware: Some smaller OEMs accidentally store unencrypted keyboxes in readable NVRAM partitions during early firmware builds instead of wrapping them with the hardware eFuse key. * TrustZone TA vulnerabilities: Trusted Applications talk to the main Android kernel through shared memory buffers and Secure Monitor Calls (SMC). If a researcher finds a buffer overflow inside a signed Trusted Application, they can use kernel root to corrupt Secure World memory, gain arbitrary code execution inside S-EL1, and ask the hardware crypto engine to decrypt the Keybox into a readable buffer. * BootROM exploits and voltage glitching: Before TrustZone loads, the chip runs immutable BootROM code. By exploiting a USB download flaw (like older Qualcomm EDL or MediaTek BROM bugs) or dropping the VDD_CORE voltage rail for a few nanoseconds to skip a signature check during boot, hardware researchers can load a patched TEE kernel that dumps the decrypted keys over UART. 4. Why leaked Keyboxes die in 72 hours Once a valid keybox.xml hits a public Telegram group or a root spoofing module like TrickyStore, thousands of users load it onto their phones at once. Google does not need to patch the vulnerability on the device. Google watches the incoming attestation traffic on its servers. Every attestation certificate chain carries the serial number of the Keybox intermediate certificate that signed it. When Google's backend sees 15,000 phones across 40 countries submitting the exact same Keybox serial number within an hour, while reporting mismatched device models and IP addresses, an automated rule flags the key. Google adds that certificate serial number to its public Certificate Revocation List (CRL). The next time any of those 15,000 phones requests a Play Integrity check, Google's verifier matches the serial against the revocation list and drops the device straight to MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY.
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I can’t believe the @NFL decided commanders v giants here in Dallas when the game that should be on is @ChicagoBears v @packers unless I spend $$$$$$$. Oh wait of course you want that.
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Man that was a lifetime ago. Life lessons well taught.
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It sended! Gloria!
Modern Family meets Senior IT, Pt. 7! 😂 Gloria needs tech support for one very important question: Can you unsend something that’s already been “sended?” #SeniorIT #ModernFamily #GloriaPritchett
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This one really blew up on FB! Over 1.5M views in less than a week.
Modern Family meets Senior IT, Pt. 5! 📱😂 Haley’s confidence with technology is unmatched. Her qualifications might be another story. #SeniorIT #ModernFamily #HaleyDunphy
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We can help demystify tech!
Modern Family meets Senior IT, Pt. 4! 📱 Alex questions why Senior IT even exists... then remembers what her family is like. 😂 #SeniorIT #ModernFamily #AlexDunphy
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Luke! Oh my …
Modern Family meets Senior IT, Pt. 3! 😂 Luke understands the technology. What he plans to do with it is the concerning part. #SeniorIT #ModernFamily #LukeDunphy
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We’re having a lot of fun with modern family this week! We’d have to background check Phil pretty closely though! #smarthome #seniors
Modern Family meets Senior IT — Part 2! 😂 Phil isn’t looking for tech help—he’s looking for a job. If you can attend a graduation as an iPad robot, you’re basically qualified, right? #SeniorIT #ModernFamily
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Hedwig visits my house!
Gotta keep an eye out for Selener! 🦉👀 At Senior IT, we help you get more out of the everyday technology around your home—because you never know who might stop by. Even if they’re a little… owlish. #SeniorIT #DFW #TechnologyMadeSimple #SmartHome
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Some weekend fun from your friends at @SeniorITDFW and big thanks to our favorite show!
What if Modern Family met Senior IT? Part 1!📱😂 From tech experts to “I can do it myself,” here’s how we think the family would handle Senior IT. Follow us to see the rest of the cast! #SeniorIT #ModernFamily #TechMadeSimple
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Shopping for a batch of "cheap" USB drives to put a sponsor rotating PPT on several smart TVs at our event. There are no such things....RAM prices make even the 16Gb version ridiculous.
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One lamp made a big difference to my wife. That one lamp started a company.
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Starting a new local business serving seniors, families and those who are intimidated by tech to make their homes smarter and their lives easier! Please share! #DFW #smallbusiness #aginginplace #smarthome
Technology should make life easier, not more complicated. We help older adults live comfortably, confidently, and independently at home, and help everyday users get the most from today’s smart tech. It began with our own family. Now open to serve DFW. srit-dfw.com
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Hey @FedExHelp your driver keeps lying about us not being home, the photo of the alleged door tag shows no context and is blurry on purpose. Two days in a row he doesn't show yet says nobody is home. I have video proof he never showed.
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And then ... a scammer (FedExQuickResponse) reaches out too. Using FedEx logos they ask for a WhatsApp number. Good grief can you get more obvious? Blocked and reported. @FedExHelp you have big problems.
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Watching a car being stolen in broad daylight @SavPolice right in front of Noodles
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Just had a visitor!
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