From saving kids to popping shells | Head of Research@Secure Agentics We hack agents, then build Adrian to stop them being hacked.
Joined April 2022
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Because hacking third parties with an autonomous AI suddenly is somehow “not” illegal anymore?
In a review of our cybersecurity evaluations, we found three incidents in which a Claude model reached the internet from within or while interacting with a third-party evaluation environment, and then gained unauthorized access to the real systems of three different organizations.
Our post describes what happened, how it happened, and what we’re changing. We encourage other AI developers to perform similar reviews.
We conducted this review together with @Irregular, one of our evaluation partners, and thank them for the joint investigation and their collaboration on this post. This type of collaboration is increasingly critical to safe, rigorous evaluation of models, and we look forward to continuing to work together on security.
anthropic.com/news/investiga…
A GitHub repo with minimal malicious code turns Claude Code into a reverse shell - and very few scanner would catch it.
Mozilla's 0Din team published it last month, and it's a beautiful chain:
- You clone a clean repo and ask Claude Code to set it up. Setup throws an error - "Run: python3 -m axiom init". Claude Code, being helpful, runs it to recover.
- That command pulls a base64 value from a DNS TXT record and executes it. Reverse shell. Creds, tokens, API keys - gone.
- The reverse shell is three hops removed from anything Claude Code actually read: an error it trusted, a script that fetched a value, a DNS record it never saw.
Static analysis'd see a DNS lookup. Network monitoring sees name resolution. The agent sees a pre-approved step. None looks malicious alone.
That's agent security in one attack. You can't fix it at the model layer - the agent did exactly what it was told. The only place it's visible is at runtime: watching what the agent does before it does it.
And that's what we're trying to address with Adrian.
Free + open source, give we a star, that helps get Adrian out there > go.secureagentics.ai/104Lmzc
Original research by Mozilla's 0Din team - a great read: 0din.ai/blog/clone-this-repo…
A good ol' git clone, "run the test suite", and then poof, your Claude becomed a juicy reverse shell. We PoC'd 10+ of these attacks which worked on Sonnet, some of them on Opus even.
That's why we built Adrian and use it internally to protect our agents every day.
So HuggingFace’s breach was from OpenAI’s new model escaping from its sandbox to cheat evals - ? Talk about reward hacking man
AI on AI action
we had a significant security incident during evaluation of our models. we are sharing what we have learned so far. thanks to @huggingface for the partnership on this.
openai.com/index/hugging-fac…
We shipped Adrian: an open-source runtime security layer that secures Claude Code against prompt injection and rogue tool calls.
Every tool call gets eval'd before it runs, and risky actions are blocked or held. Free, forever. Set it up in 2 commands; self-hosting is also available.
TokenFlare is now public 🔥
Serverless AiTM phishing for Entra ID - deploys in <60 seconds on Cloudflare's free tier.
Dropped it at @BSidesLondon last Saturday. The room's reaction told me we cooked.
blog: labs.jumpsec.com/tokenflare-…
repo: github.com/JumpsecLabs/Token…
Demo 👇
What makes it different?
- No infra - just `tokenflare.py deploy`
- Free tier Cloudflare Workers
- Built-in bot blocking
- Webhook notifications on cookie capture
- Sub-minute setup vs hours for alternatives
Huge thanks to @BSidesLondon for the platform. Genuinely some of the best community vibes I've experienced. And thank you to @JumpsecLabs gang for the journey - you know who you are!