$SIVB $SIVBP $QQQ $ARKK $RILY The market implications of this situation are far and wide. We have a $210+ billion balance sheet (which was a mere 86 billion 2 years ago) that could well have an unwind. It is not a stretch at all to argue that on a current mark to market basis that equity is negative to the tune of of billions (you can be insolvent but liquid and survive as a bank). The hit to the startup eco-system of an impaired or vanquished $SIVB would be substantial. Beyond the negative duration risk we highlighted (asset side locked at sub 200 bps vs. liability side could increase to 200+), the simple mark to market on the HTM and the $88 billion of HTM and $70 billion of loans is likely far greater than the realized losses on the AFS securities sold at a $1.8 billion loss. The asset growth since 2020 is crazy. Total assets for $SIVB are 50% of $BSC at time of $JPM bid. We do not believe it would be crazy to see $SIVB at $50 or lower per share when this is all done. The negative earnings loop, and associated balance sheet pressure, of higher deposit rates plus potential for fleeing private bank clients is a dark scenario. There are many scenarios where they will need to raise more capital (dilution to existing holders) and this may not have fixed the situation. We have rarely seen a situation where buying a bank when it is down 40% on the day to be a good entry...these things can unwind far quicker than people realize. People with facilities with $SIVB may well call them / draw which would further stress liquidity. Just haircutting by 10% the value of the 21-22 growth of held loans and HTM securities alone would be a $5+ billion hit to book equity (which is ~$20 billion post these transactions). The GA concurrent PIPE we think was the wrong investor. If there was ever a situation to bring in an "Elliot" / "Baupost" / $GS "Prop Desk" it was this one. The balance sheet needs to be seen as credible and diligenced. The earnings and conference call transcripts are farcical; the CEO talks about the VC funding environment and IPO pipeline as opposed to any questions on the balance sheet position. If this plays out adversely, it will be another sad case of a storied franchise that had a great moat..and then woke up during the $ARKK boom and decided to blow it all on a $140+ billion balance sheet growth splurge on a mortgage and loan book yielding a blended ~3.25% with massive correlation risk...which ran right into rising interest rates. Seeing the preferred stock trade down 15% today should be eye opening to many. It is at $16.60. This is distress debt mafia stuff. Par is $25 for reference. Lot of digging to do and all the above could well be wrong. Many / most people far smarter than I am on fins (and other things). The point is we don't think this is over and there are a lot of second and third order implications. $RILY is one. There are more.