Pres. NARCO / Prof. Fordham Univ. / Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Alum (Personal opinions expressed do not reflect those of Fordham Univ.)
Joined February 2011
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.@USAmbUN continues to showcase his impressive mastery of the Sarahwi file.
.@USAmbUN is deeply committed to the wellbeing of the Western Saharians in Tanduff.
I mean, Pres. Trump IS going to #Salina (Kansas) on Sunday.
That should be some consolation.
One thing to note about the recent 🇩🇿#Algeria's recent announcement to deploy forces to 🇳🇪#Niger:
Algeria always acts in its own interest first and foremost (every nation does.)
However, the second order benefits are enormous.
Not least for the 🇺🇸 #USA.
DC has been flying blind in the Sahel. @USAfricaCommand has said as much in congressional hearings.
An Algerian presence in Niger will yield actionable intelligence.
And the US has been asking Algeria for precisely this kind of engagement in the Sahel for the last 5-6 years (if not longer.)
🇩🇿 Algeria is now in a position to help the 🇺🇸 US. If it chooses to. And if the US asks.
Get in touch if you want to know what's going on.
I sure as sugar not saying anything on this wasteland.
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This has to be the first time in the history of LinkedIn that "Open to Work" actually worked.
And a "minister" at that!
While we're on the subject.
One year ago Monday....
#Algeria #Algerie #WesternSahara #Morocco #Maroc
Schenker 3rd from the right.
Cosplaying in the drâa in Dakhla.
Ah, yes, an informed opinion by the expert David Schenker who during a recent discussion about #Algeria didn't even know the Algerian president's name.
The bar for opining and experting in DC is so low.
Ah, yes, an informed opinion by the expert David Schenker who during a recent discussion about #Algeria didn't even know the Algerian president's name.
The bar for opining and experting in DC is so low.
Western Sahara embraces Morocco. Why does Algeria try to impose independence on the region? asks David Schenker
on.wsj.com/4B8wmhH
My post was about the AAGP.
The TSGP whataboutism is silly. It's the equivalent of the school yard taunt - "I know you are but what am I."
But I'll bite.
1. TransMed is NOT operating at capacity. Algeria wishes it was. It really does. But Algeria doesn't have the extra gas. TransMed is at about 65-70% capacity
2. Medgaz is not at capacity either. It still has 1bcm of spare capacity
3. Algeria's domestic gas consumption is increasing, leaving less for export, which means there will be even more spare capacity in Transmed and Medgaz in the future
4. Even assuming that Medgaz and TransMed are at or would be at capacity in the near future, the GALSI pipeline from Algeria to Sardinia *could* be pursued. Adjusting for inflation and the new market environment, it would cost roughly US$5 billion and take 5-6 years to build.
In short, there isn't a bottleneck at Hassi R'mel and the amount of spare capacity in Algeria's distribution network is going to grow.
Thanks!
Puisque vous vous improvisez expert en rentabilité des gazoducs, parlez-nous un peu du projet Nigéria-Algérie (TSGP).
Un détail technique fondamental y est systématiquement passé sous silence : que fait-on du gaz une fois arrivé à Hassi R'Mel ?
Toute la communication officielle vend le tracé saharien jusqu'au hub de Hassi R'Mel. Mais le véritable goulot d'étranglement commence juste après :
1. Infrastructures vers l'Europe déjà saturées
Le TransMed (Enrico Mattei) vers l'Italie dispose d'une capacité nominale de 30 Mds m³/an, exploitée au maximum pour honorer les contrats algériens actuels.
De son côté, le Medgaz vers l'Espagne est plafonné à 10,5 Mds m³/an et tourne déjà à plein régime.
2. L'impasse des 30 milliards m³ nigérians
Si 20 à 30 milliards m³ de gaz supplémentaires arrivent à Hassi R'Mel, l'Algérie n'a aucune capacité résiduelle en tuyau pour leur faire traverser la Méditerranée vers les acheteurs européens.
3. Un CAPEX colossal camouflé
Pour écouler ce surplus, il faudrait construire de nouveaux gazoducs sous-marins ultra-profonds en Méditerranée. Ce surcoût financier gigantesque, opportunément ignoré dans les discours publics, détruit complètement la viabilité économique du projet.
Promettre d'acheminer le gaz nigérian vers l'Europe sans avoir les capacités sous-marines pour le faire sortir de Hassi R'Mel, c'est vendre une autoroute qui se termine sur un cul-de-sac.