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In-depth documentation for nearly all modules is now available at networkradius.com/doc/3.0.7/…
freeradius retweeted
Un ancien physicien canadien contrôle l'authentification de 100 millions d'utilisateurs quotidiens. Alan DeKok maintient seul FreeRADIUS depuis 1999 — la moitié des connexions internet mondiales passent par son code.
da.van.ac/un-physicien-nucle…
There is a lot of misleading security advice out there. e.g. many sites copy the same tired myths about PAP vs CHAP.
This is wrong: baeldung.com/cs/authenticati…
The truth: inkbridgenetworks.com/blog/b…
Don't use CHAP. PAP is better.
@michal_aibin
The RADIUS conference went very well. We have agreement from operators and impementers on how to fix long-standing issues with the protocol. radiusconference.org/
Klass Weirenga is speaking at the RADIUS conference in March. radiusconference.org/speaker… @eduroam
freeradius retweeted
Meet @AlanDekok, creator of FreeRADIUS and the person who made your network actually work (you're welcome).
Join him at RADIUS Conference 2025 for some free, real talk on auth infrastructure:
Online: March 13
Register: radiusconference.org
#InfoSec #NetworkInfrastructure
The RADIUS experts at dinner. @RadiatorAAA , radsecproxy, FreeRADIUS, and the author of the upcoming RADIUS/TLS RFC.
Apparently some vendors are still having issues with BlastRADIUS fixes. Not sure why. Message-Authenticator has been defined for 25+ years. i.e. longer than the IT career of most engineers working on the fixes.
There are still some cloud identity providers who claim that PAP is insecure. If you read the BlastRADIUS paper, the cryptographers say otherwise.
Who should you believe? Crypto experts, or a random marketing person?
You can keep using PAP. It's fine.
There are still some cloud identity providers recommending RADIUS/UDP and MS-CHAP. If you do this, then consider all your passwords to be compromised.
Don't use MS-CHAP, or MS-CHAPv2.
There is a LOT of misinformation about the BlastRADIUS issue.
If you're using RADIUS for administrator authentication to devices: upgrade. Don't switch to TACACS+. Just upgrade your RADIUS server and / or RADIUS client. You will be fine.
There is a LOT of misinformation about the BlastRADIUS issue.
If you're using RADIUS for administrator authentication to devices: upgrade. Don't switch to TACACS+. Don't believe anyone who says it's a viable option: they're incompetent.
There is a LOT of misinformation about the BlastRADIUS issue.
TACACS+ can't replace RADIUS. TACACS+ is used only for administrator authentication and authorization. It cannot control network access for devices.
There is a LOT of misinformation about the BlastRADIUS issue.
TACACS+ can't replace RADIUS. It has an unauthenticated mode, where all passwords are sent in clear-text across the wire. So it has MUCH worse security.
There is a LOT of misinformation about the BlastRADIUS issue.
TACACS+ can't replace RADIUS. It uses almost the same MD5-based constructs as RADIUS, so it doesn't increase security.
There is a LOT of misinformation about the BlastRADIUS issue.
Diameter isn't an option. Most common uses of Diameter have LESS security than RADIUS. And Diameter is being replaced with HTTPS3 (JSON over QUIC)
There is a LOT of misinformation about the BlastRADIUS issue. Almost all of this is covered in the paper at blastradius.fail
What doesn't work?
* Changing timeouts
* switching to Kerberos, Diameter, TACACS+, IPSec
freeradius retweeted
blastradius.fail
RADIUS/UDP considered harmful:
RADIUS/UDP vulnerable to MD5 chosen-prefix collision attack #BlastRADIUS
Great joint work with @goldbe @miro_haller @nadiaheninger Mike Milano @realDBRGBreaker Adam Suhl!
cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-202…
Upgrade all of your switches, routers, VPN concentrators, firewalls, access point controllers...
inkbridgenetworks.com/blastr…
Oh boy. Upgrade ALL RADIUS clients and servers. World-wide. Full details at inkbridgenetworks.com/blastr…






