#Iran’s Growing Debate Over How to End the War 🔹The differences within Iran’s leadership over how to proceed with the war are becoming increasingly visible. 🔹Today, both President Masoud Pezeshkian and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf made unusually direct comments about the need to end the war and the economic costs of continuing it. 🔹Ghalibaf said that regardless of how much military power Iran possesses, “if people are hungry” and there is no economic growth, the country cannot endure. Security, he argued, cannot be sustained without a functioning economy. He then added that, as someone with a military background, “we know the value of peace better than those who talk about peace.” 🔹That last point is important. Ghalibaf has increasingly positioned himself alongside Pezeshkian in arguing for a diplomatic way out, while pushing back against hardliners who portray such an approach as capitulation. 🔹Pezeshkian was even more direct: “The war must end at some point.” His argument was that Iran should end it now, while Tehran still believes it is negotiating from a position of strength, rather than wait until its economic situation deteriorates further. He also lashed out at critics of his administration, saying those sitting “outside the ring” have little understanding of the pressures the government is actually facing. 🔹These comments come amid increasingly open acknowledgments of Iran’s economic problems. Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati recently admitted on state television that Iran cannot sell its oil because of the blockade. Trump’s new economic pressure campaign is making the situation even more difficult. 🔹There is also a growing concern about Hormuz. Before the latest two weeks of fighting, Ghalibaf had already warned that the Strait has strategic value only as long as ships continue to use it. If traffic remains disrupted, other countries will inevitably search for alternatives. 🔹That appears to be happening. Reports that millions of barrels of oil are already being moved through alternative routes are now being cited by the more pragmatic camp as evidence that Iran cannot rely indefinitely on disruption in Hormuz as its main source of leverage. This is consistent with the broader problem I discussed earlier: Iran can impose substantial costs through Hormuz, but it cannot remain in a permanent state of confrontation with the U.S. and the GCC states. 🔹The problem is that the hardliners also have a point. According to them, even if Tehran is prepared to return to diplomacy, there is little indication that Trump wants to return to the previous terms. His new economic campaign suggests that Washington may instead use Iran’s growing difficulties to demand more. 🔹This is creating a vicious circle. The longer the confrontation continues, the stronger the economic case for diplomacy becomes. But the more Washington increases pressure, the harder it becomes for Iranian leaders to make concessions without appearing to capitulate. 🔹What is becoming clearer, however, is that an important part of Iran’s leadership now believes that the current situation is not sustainable and that the military leverage accumulated during the war needs to be translated into a diplomatic outcome sooner rather than later.