Restraint is the feature. A proactive agent that checks before it acts is one a CIO can actually sign off on. Enterprise rollout will be a governance project, not a download.
Megapack capacity nearly sold out through 2027 is the quiet story. Energy storage is becoming a second pillar, and the grid is the customer.
Here are the most important highlights from @Tesla's Q3 2026 earnings call:
• Tesla's 2027 Megapack production capacity is nearly sold out.
• Tesla is aiming to produce 5 million vehicles annually by 2030.
• Customers are increasingly visiting Tesla showrooms specifically to experience FSD rather than shopping for a particular vehicle model.
• Tesla said more than 75% of new North American vehicle deliveries included a paid FSD subscription signup, despite every vehicle already coming with a free one-month trial.
• FSD financial disclosure: Tesla plans to disclose additional FSD financial and operating metrics as the business scales, including subscription revenue and churn rates.
• Elon said Tesla is hoping for EU-wide FSD approval within a few months and would be surprised if approval takes longer than Q1 2027, although the timing depends on regulators.
• Unsupervised FSD for customer vehicles: Tesla expects to enable some customer-owned vehicles to participate in its autonomous Robotaxi network around Q2 2027, subject to fleet-management and geofencing requirements.
• Tesla is developing its own AI-based mapping and navigation system that will rely on intelligence gathered from its vehicle fleet rather than traditional third-party mapping systems. The system will support conversational voice commands, personalized routing preferences, improved parking, and more intelligent destination handling.
• Tesla plans to launch Cybercab service in Dallas in November 2026, followed by additional cities.
• Tesla plans to progressively extend robotaxi operating hours, with the goal of reaching 24/7 service by the end of 2026. Tesla expects to expand service to highways, higher-speed roads, additional weather conditions, and nighttime operations by the end of 2026.
• Elon expects Robotaxi to begin making a noticeable contribution to Tesla's financial results around Q2 2027, potentially becoming a significant business by Q3 or Q4 2027.
• Tesla is targeting the first deliveries of Cybercabs to fleet owner customers by the end of 2026, but Elon said the vast majority of Cybercabs will be Tesla-owned and operated as transportation-as-a-service vehicles rather than sold directly to consumers.
• Tesla has started early Optimus production. Elon said: "The growth of Optimus is an S curve, but the initial curve is a shallow slope. There's still some things we need to tweak about the design. There's still quite a lot of work to do with the AI in the robot. I would expect that the AI, the electromechanical design, reliability, usage life, expect these issues to be solved by the end of next year."
• Elon said most of the equipment for an Optimus production line designed to manufacture approximately 1 million robots annually is already at Fremont. Elon expects it will take at least another year, possibly longer, to reach an annualized production rate of approximately 1 million Optimus robots, equivalent to roughly 20,000 per week.
• Elon said Tesla may release a new Optimus V3 demonstration video within one or two months, saying that it should show genuinely AI-driven tasks rather than preprogrammed movements.
• Tesla is targeting mid-2027 to integrate its AI5 chip into Optimus.
• Management said Optimus production costs are trending toward the expected manufacturing cost of Cybercab, although the robot's design is still being refined.
• Tesla hopes to manufacture its first experimental semiconductor chips around May or June 2027. Tesla is targeting useful chip production at volume in Terafab around Q3 2028.
• Management expects higher Megapack average selling prices and further improvements in gross margins (currently 33%) as production expands.
Dhaya 🇳🇿 retweeted
Security called me at 6:12 AM today.
"Patch every PHP server immediately."
I asked what happened.
"Two critical vulnerabilities. Remote code execution. No authentication required."
Cool.
How many PHP servers do we have?
According to inventory: 12
According to reality:
Nobody knows.
We found one running WordPress.
Three running old internal tools.
One under someone's desk.
Two inside vendor appliances.
A forgotten employee directory from 2016.
And a server named:
PHP-OLD-DO-NOT-TOUCH
Naturally, that one runs payroll exports.
Then we found a PHP 5.6 box.
I asked who owned it.
The documentation said:
BRIAN.
Brian left in 2019.
We called Brian.
He said:
"Oh wow, that's still running?"
Excellent.
By 8 AM, leadership joined the incident call.
CEO:
"Can hackers actually get in?"
Security:
"Potentially yes."
CEO:
"Without a password?"
Security:
"Yes."
CEO:
"Then why do WE need passwords?"
Not the lesson.
Finance asked if we could wait until the weekend to patch because downtime affects revenue.
Security explained that the alternative was letting strangers execute code on our servers.
Finance asked for a cost comparison.
At 9:17, someone suggested temporarily taking the vulnerable websites offline.
Marketing refused.
"Our campaign is live."
So for the next hour, the company officially decided maintaining a landing page for 20% off webinar registration was more important than preventing remote server takeover.
We finally patched everything we could find.
Then our scanner discovered another PHP server.
Hostname:
TEMP-PHP-2014
Uptime:
4,512 days.
Nobody knows what it does.
Nobody owns it.
Nobody can shut it down.
But every time we block network access, the warehouse stops printing shipping labels.
Security has classified it as critical infrastructure.
It is running PHP 5.4.
The vulnerability has existed longer than half our employees.
The emergency patch took four hours.
Finding out what PHP actually runs took eleven.
The internet isn't held together with code.
It's held together with servers everyone is afraid to turn off.
A physicist who has advised on arms control now sits on the trust that governs the model lab. Governance is hiring for risk expertise, not just AI credentials. Boards will copy this.
Dr. Christopher Stubbs is joining our Long-Term Benefit Trust. Chris is an experimental physicist and a former Dean of Science at Harvard University. He has also advised the US government on national security and arms control.
Read more: anthropic.com/news/christoph…
Sloth to Mad Max is a proper dial now. A wider range of driving styles is real progress for FSD. What I want to see is how it behaves in the busy lanes at the top end.
300,000 designs in 64 hours, 211 sent to the lab, 17 worked. The scarce resource in drug discovery is shifting from ideas to wet-lab throughput. Biotech's next bottleneck is a physical one.
New on our Science Blog: designing protein binders against scorpion neurotoxins.
Scorpions sting about 1.2m people every year, and antivenoms are often costly or in short supply. Claude has made an early step toward finding new treatments.
anthropic.com/research/claud…
Ownership structure is quietly becoming a vendor-selection criterion. Procurement decks in 2030 will have a slide for it, right next to uptime and data residency.
We’re committing a portion of Anthropic’s shares to the Anthropic Public Benefit Fund, a new wholly owned entity dedicated entirely to the public benefit.
It will start off with 5% of our shares. For every 50% increase in the company’s value over a set baseline, we can contribute up to an extra 2%, subject to our board’s discretion.
In total, this means that roughly 20% of Anthropic’s shares are committed to the public good. Our co-founders have already pledged to donate 80% of their equity, and around half our employees are donating a portion of their equity as part of a donation matching program we’ve run since our founding.
In the post below, we share more details about our new fund.
anthropic.com/news/public-be…
Dhaya 🇳🇿 retweeted
🇺🇦 Zelenskyy delivers a blunt message to the United States:
“Just give us Starlink back. If you refuse, Ukraine will survive. We will continue defending ourselves with or without it.
But why would you restrict a country fighting for its survival? Why make it harder for us to defend our people?
I simply cannot understand the reasoning behind this decision. It is a mistake.”
Ukraine isn’t asking America to fight its war. It’s asking America not to stand in the way of its defense.
Dhaya 🇳🇿 retweeted
In case you missed it, Trump, Putin, Netanyahu, and their legion of sycophants are, in fact, the bad guys.
Dhaya 🇳🇿 retweeted
Nie pozwólmy, żeby te protesty przeciw Trumpowi i jego technokratom zniknęły w czeluściach internetu.
Bardzo na tym zależy Elonowi i temu od Meta ‼️
Podawajcie gdzie się da.
Dhaya 🇳🇿 retweeted
Something to be aware of when encountering viral French riot videos online. Especially when loaded with right wing narratives and talking points, as they are on X. Make note of the accounts pushing this campaign for future review.
Russian intelligence services have a documented history of exploiting civil unrest to destabilize governments, deepen political divisions and undermine public confidence in democratic institutions.
Warnings of possible Russian hybrid attacks came days and weeks ahead of protests in France. Large demonstrations provide opportunities for sabotage, provocations and other forms of interference to take place amid existing unrest, making it harder for authorities to distinguish politically motivated violence from coordinated foreign operations.
Riots and violent confrontations can be exploited to increase tensions between demonstrators and police. A single violent incident can trigger a wider confrontation, provoke a heavy police response and undermine public support for otherwise peaceful demonstrations. Russian operatives do not need to control a protest movement to exploit it.
Kremlin-linked influence networks can then circulate selective footage, misleading claims and fabricated accounts of the violence. The same incident can be presented to different audiences in contradictory ways: protesters are portrayed as violent extremists, while police and government officials are accused of authoritarian repression. Both narratives encourage hostility and distrust.
This is where the GRU and Russia's wider influence apparatus become relevant. Russian military intelligence has been implicated in sabotage and other covert operations across Europe, while Kremlin-linked online networks have conducted coordinated campaigns to manipulate political debate. Physical disruption and online amplification can reinforce each other, although evidence is needed to establish whether they are coordinated in any particular incident.
The timing of warnings before major demonstrations matters because authorities must prepare for the possibility of deliberate interference without treating legitimate protesters as suspects. Provocateurs can take advantage of crowded streets, existing tensions and the presence of large numbers of police officers. Any resulting violence may initially be attributed to protesters, regardless of who was responsible.
Prolonged unrest also strains policing resources, consumes government attention and diverts political debate from other issues, including France's military and diplomatic support for Ukraine.
Images of burning vehicles, street clashes and damaged infrastructure can be circulated internationally to portray France and its European allies as unstable. These images are particularly useful to Russian propaganda when presented without context or when isolated incidents are made to appear representative of an entire protest movement.
Russia does not need to organise demonstrations to benefit from them. It can exploit legitimate grievances, amplify isolated violence and encourage opposing groups to blame one another.
The protests in France may have entirely legitimate causes. That does not prevent Russian intelligence services from attempting to exploit them. But warnings of possible hybrid attacks are not, by themselves, evidence that Russian operatives have infiltrated the demonstrations or caused specific incidents.













