Without lies Christianity dies... It seems that Inspiring Polytheism, did not read the study he shared properly. Jonathan Fox explicitly states in his study: "The results show that there is INSUFFICENT evidence to support the stereotype of the Islamic militant." (Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions? A Cross-Sectional Study of Ethnoreligious Conflict, Jonathan Fox, p. 1.) Fox also explains that similar stereotypes of religious violence can be applied to other religious groups. He specifically mentions Christian fundamentalists who violently oppose abortion, Jewish settlers, and the conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. (Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions? A Cross-Sectional Study of Ethnoreligious Conflict, Jonathan Fox, p. 2.) Although Fox finds that religion plays a more prominent role in conflicts involving Islamic ethnoreligious groups, he does not conclude that Muslims are inherently more militant or inclined towards violence. His findings distinguish the importance of religion in particular conflicts from the stereotype that Muslims are naturally more violent. (Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions? A Cross-Sectional Study of Ethnoreligious Conflict, Jonathan Fox, p. 1.) As for Monica Duffy Toft's study, Getting Religion Right in Civil Wars, her research does not establish that Islam inherently causes violence. Her principal statistical finding concerns politically excluded Arab Muslim populations and a particular category of religious civil war. She explicitly states: "There is no evidence of Arab Muslim exceptionalism for other kinds of civil wars." (Getting Religion Right in Civil Wars, Monica Duffy Toft, p. 1624.) Toft herself distinguishes this finding from a general association between Islam and religious warfare. Although she concludes that religion can motivate rebellion, her research does not show that Islamic teachings inherently encourage violence, as IP attempts to suggest. In fact, she explains that the findings concern Arab Muslim populations in particular, rather than Muslims generally. (Getting Religion Right in Civil Wars, Monica Duffy Toft, pp. 1624, 1626.) She also discusses how political leaders and armed organisations compete to present themselves as the most credible defenders of religion, thereby gaining political support and resources. (Getting Religion Right in Civil Wars, Monica Duffy Toft, p. 1626.) She provides two relevant examples. Iraq, 2003: Following Saddam Hussein's removal, the armed opposition initially consisted largely of former members of the Ba'ath Party. Toft explains that militant religious organisations subsequently became increasingly influential within the insurgency. (Getting Religion Right in Civil Wars, Monica Duffy Toft, p. 1626.) Libya, 2011 to 2014: Following Muammar Gaddafi's removal, political instability and competition created conditions in which several militant Islamist organisations emerged, including the Islamic State. (Getting Religion Right in Civil Wars, Monica Duffy Toft, p. 1626.) Turning to Seung Whan Choi and Davis Brown's empirical study, the authors explicitly acknowledge: "Despite Islam itself not being necessarily violence-prone", before discussing how militant organisations may exploit religion to justify political objectives. (Islam and Suicide Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis, Seung-Whan Choi and Davis Brown, p. 4.) They also conclude: "Our overall analysis suggests that Islam is more than epiphenomenal but less than causal." (Islam and Suicide Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis, Seung-Whan Choi and Davis Brown, p. 11.) Furthermore, they explicitly acknowledge: "We cannot claim that Islam is a direct cause of the deadliest political violence." (Islam and Suicide Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis, Seung-Whan Choi and Davis Brown, p. 11.) In other words, although the researchers find an association between Islam and particular patterns of suicide terrorism, they cannot demonstrate that Islam itself directly causes these attacks. Which is what IP tried to make it out to be. Regarding Davis Brown's study, The Influence of Religion on Interstate Armed Conflict: Government Religious Preference and First Use of Force, 1946–2002, the research identifies relationships between government religious preferences and the likelihood of initiating armed conflict. However, Brown acknowledges that the study does not establish why these relationships differ between religions. He explicitly states: "No explanation is offered for the different results herein", before discussing several possible explanations, including religious identity, religious commitment, political circumstances and religious teachings concerning warfare. (The Influence of Religion on Interstate Armed Conflict: Government Religious Preference and First Use of Force, 1946–2002, Davis Brown, p. 817.) Consequently, these studies does not establish that Islamic teachings are responsible for the observed relationship. This raises an important question: Why do countries with a Muslim majority account for a disproportionate share of armed conflict??? Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ida Rudolfsen address this question in their study Are Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence? (2016). They discuss several possible explanations for the greater concentration of armed conflict in Muslim countries. Colonialism: European colonial powers imposed artificial borders that contributed to territorial disputes and subsequent conflicts. (Are Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence?, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ida Rudolfsen, p. 5.) Foreign interventions: Military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya contributed to political instability and armed conflict. The authors suggest that the increase in conflicts after 2001 may partly reflect reactions to interventions by major powers. (Are Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence?, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ida Rudolfsen, pp. 5, 6.) Political repression: Authoritarian governments, state repression and political instability may contribute to the emergence and continuation of violence. (Are Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence?, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ida Rudolfsen, p. 6.) Economic conditions: Lower levels of economic development, dependence on oil revenues and large young populations are among the factors associated with greater conflict. (Are Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence?, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ida Rudolfsen, p. 6.) Sectarian conflicts: Fighting between Sunni and Shia groups contributes to violence in parts of the Muslim world. The authors also compare this phenomenon with historical conflicts between Catholics and Orthodox Christians. (Are Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence?, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ida Rudolfsen, p. 6.) Declining conflicts elsewhere: Muslim countries account for a greater proportion of global civil wars partly because the overall number of civil wars elsewhere declined considerably after the Cold War. Nils and Ida explain that this does not necessarily indicate a substantial increase in the absolute number of civil wars involving Muslim countries. (Are Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence?, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ida Rudolfsen, pp. 1, 3.) Most importantly, Gleditsch and Rudolfsen reference Karakaya's 2015 study, which found that the increased conflict proneness of Muslim countries disappeared after accounting for economic development, political repression, oil dependence and large young populations. (Are Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence?, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ida Rudolfsen, p. 6.) This is particularly significant because it demonstrates that the statistical association between Muslim countries and civil war can disappear when relevant political, economic and demographic variables are taken into account. Conclusion None of these studies proves that Islam itself causes violence. Although several identify statistical associations between religion and particular forms of conflict, these findings should not be confused with evidence that Islamic teachings inherently produce violence. Choi and Brown explicitly acknowledge that they cannot establish Islam as a direct cause of the deadliest political violence. (Islam and Suicide Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis, Seung-Whan Choi and Davis Brown, p. 11.) Furthermore, Gleditsch and Rudolfsen identify numerous political, historical and economic explanations for the concentration of armed conflict in Muslim countries. They also reference Karakaya's findings, which show that the association between Muslim countries and civil war disappears after controlling for several important factors. (Are Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence?, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ida Rudolfsen, pp. 5, 6.) Therefore, presenting these studies as proof that Islam itself is inherently violent MISREPRESENTS what their findings actually establish.

The Ashʿarī Doctrine of Kasb (Acquisition) and Aḥmad ʿIṣām al Najjār's Refutation The Ashʿarī Belief That Humans Have No Control Over Their Actions The Ashʿarīs believe that Allah alone creates human actions, while the servant's qudrah (power) and irādah (will) possess no actual influence in bringing those actions into existence. Instead, Allah creates both the action and the servant's power associated with it. Al Rāzī (d. 606 AH) said the position of Abū al Ḥasan al Ashʿarī (d. 324 AH), stating: "According to his position, the servant's power has no influence whatsoever over his actions or any aspect of them. Rather, Allah alone creates the action and also creates within the servant a power connected to it. However, this power plays no part in bringing the action into existence. This is the position of Abū al Ḥasan al Ashʿarī." (Al Arbaʿīn fī Uṣūl al Dīn, al Rāzī, 1/319) Accordingly, the servant does not actually produce the action through personal power or will. Rather, the action is created entirely by Allah, while the servant's qudrah (power) merely accompanies it without causing it. The Ashʿarīs refer to this relationship as kasb (acquisition), distinguishing between Allah as the Khāliq (Creator) of the action and the servant as its kāsib (acquirer). Al Jurjānī (d. 816 AH) said: "The voluntary actions of servants occur through the power of Allah, the Exalted, alone, and their power has no influence upon them. Rather, Allah has established the customary occurrence of power and choice in the servant. When there is no obstacle, He brings about the action alongside them, so the servant's action is created by Allah and acquired by the servant." (Sharḥ al Mawāqif, al Jurjānī, 8/145) Thus, the distinction between Allah's creation and the servant's acquisition does not establish any actual causal influence for the servant's power or will. Al Rāzī's Admission That Kasb (Acquisition) Leads to Jabr (Compulsion) The difficulty with the Ashʿarī doctrine becomes apparent when the servant's power is denied any influence over the action attributed to the servant. Al Rāzī (d. 606 AH) acknowledged this consequence, stating: "The human being is compelled while appearing to possess choice." (Al Maṭālib al ʿĀliyah, al Rāzī, 3/60) He further declared: "It is established that the actions of servants occur through the decree and determination of Allah, the Exalted, that the human being is compelled in his choice, and that nothing exists except compulsion." (Al Mabāḥith al Mashriqiyyah, al Rāzī, 2/544) These admissions demonstrate the difficulty of affirming genuine ikhtiyār (choice) while maintaining that the servant's qudrah (power) and irādah (will) have no effect upon the action. Consequently, al Rāzī concluded: "Upon this examination, it becomes apparent that kasb (acquisition) is a name without anything corresponding to it." (Muḥaṣṣal Afkār al Mutaqaddimīn, al Rāzī, p. 199) The fundamental objection is that naming the servant an acquirer does not explain how the servant exercises genuine choice when the servant's power contributes nothing to the occurrence of the action. The Attempt to Distinguish Between Allah's Creation and the Servant's Acquisition The Ashʿarīs attempt to distinguish between Allah's creation of an action and the servant's acquisition of that same action by describing it as occurring under two different aspects of power. Al Taftāzānī (d. 792 AH) explained: "The servant directing his power and will towards an action is acquisition, whereas Allah bringing that action into existence afterwards is creation. Thus, one action falls under two powers in two different respects: under Allah's power in respect of creation, and under the servant's power in respect of acquisition." (Sharḥ al ʿAqāʾid al Nasafiyyah, al Taftāzānī, p. 287) However, this explanation may be consistent with the Māturīdī position rather than the original Ashʿarī doctrine, because it appears to give the servant's power and will an actual role in bringing about the action. Al Bājūrī (d. 1276 AH) likewise maintained that the same action falls under Allah's power through khalq (creation) and under the servant's power through kasb (acquisition), even though Allah alone independently creates the action. (Tuḥfat al Murīd ʿalā Jawharat al Tawḥīd, al Bājūrī, p. 175) The difficulty is that the servant's power remains entirely without influence. Describing the action as occurring under two powers does not establish genuine participation when only one of those powers produces any effect. The Failure to Establish a Meaningful Definition of Kasb (Acquisition) Al Bājūrī (d. 1276 AH) explained that kasb (acquisition) may refer to the connection between the servant's created power and the action, or alternatively to the servant's created will. He further explained that this connection is not itself created when understood merely as an iʿtibārī (conceptual) relationship. However, when acquisition is understood as the servant's created will, it is itself created by Allah. (Tuḥfat al Murīd ʿalā Jawharat al Tawḥīd, al Bājūrī, p. 176) This explanation still fails to establish how the servant actually produces an action. A connection between power and action does not necessarily mean that the power influences the action. Al Bājūrī consequently acknowledged: "In summary, the servant has no influence upon anything. Thus, he is compelled inwardly while appearing to possess choice outwardly." (Tuḥfat al Murīd ʿalā Jawharat al Tawḥīd, al Bājūrī, p. 176) The distinction between inward compulsion and outward choice does not resolve the difficulty. If Allah creates both the action and the servant's will without the servant possessing any effective power, the apparent choice does not establish genuine ikhtiyār (choice). Moreover, the claim that an action falls under two different powers does not establish that two effective causes produce it. A power that contributes nothing to an action cannot be treated as an independent cause of that action. Consequently, kasb (acquisition), as understood in this doctrine, remains a name without a genuine causal reality. The servant is described as acquiring the action, but the acquisition neither produces nor influences it. (Tuḥfat al Murīd ʿalā Jawharat al Tawḥīd, al Bājūrī, pp. 176–177) The Difference Between Voluntary and Involuntary Actions The Ashʿarīs distinguish between al afʿāl al ikhtiyāriyyah (voluntary actions) and al afʿāl al iḍṭirāriyyah (involuntary actions), although both are created entirely by Allah. Al Ṣāwī (d. 1241 AH) explained that involuntary actions include falling from a mountain or the movement of someone trembling, whereas voluntary actions are attributed to the servant through kasb (acquisition). He said that voluntary actions are created by Allah but are attributed to the servant because the servant's power and will are connected to them. He illustrated this distinction through the example of cutting with a knife, which occurs when the servant possesses the necessary power and will. (Sharḥ al Ṣāwī ʿalā Jawharat al Tawḥīd, Aḥmad al Ṣāwī, p. 241) However, this distinction remains insufficient if the servant's power and will possess no actual taʾthīr (causal influence). The mere presence of power and will alongside an action cannot establish that the servant genuinely brings about the action. Under the original Ashʿarī doctrine, Allah alone produces the action, while the servant's power contributes nothing towards its occurrence. Therefore, distinguishing voluntary actions from involuntary actions does not remove the underlying difficulty of jabr (compulsion). The Contradiction Between Kasb (Acquisition) and the Reality of Created Causes The denial of causal influence in human actions follows from the wider Ashʿarī rejection of taʾthīr al asbāb (the causal influence of created causes). According to this doctrine, created things do not actually produce effects in other created things. Instead, Allah creates effects when their respective causes are present, rather than through those causes. Consequently, the servant's qudrah (power) and irādah (will) cannot influence an action any more than fire can influence burning or water can influence the growth of plants. Al Ghazālī (d. 505 AH) maintained that kasb (acquisition) is merely the occurrence of the created action alongside the servant's power, without that power possessing any real influence over the action. (Al Iqtiṣād fī al Iʿtiqād, al Ghazālī, p. 55) However, the Qur'an affirms that Allah creates effects through the causes He has established. Allah says: "And We have sent down blessed water from the sky and caused gardens and grain to grow thereby." (Sūrat Qāf, 50:9) Allah also describes sending winds, bringing down rain, and giving life to dead land through that water. (Sūrat al Furqān, 25:48–49; Sūrat al Rūm, 30:24) The Ashʿarī interpretation treats these effects as occurring when the causes are present, not through the causes themselves. This interpretation is rejected because the Qur'an affirms that Allah brings about effects through created causes, while remaining their ultimate Creator. Furthermore, affirming that causes possess real effects does not require believing that they operate independently of Allah. Created causes may be incomplete, requiring additional conditions and the absence of obstacles. Allah can also prevent a cause from producing its usual effect. Thus, recognising genuine taʾthīr (causal influence) in created things neither contradicts Allah's qudrah (power) nor establishes independent creators besides Him. The same principle applies to human actions. Allah creates the servant, the servant's power, and the conditions through which actions occur, while the servant genuinely acts through the power Allah has created. The Refutation of the Ashʿarī Interpretation of Allah's Creation of Human Actions The Ashʿarīs use the following statement of Allah as evidence that human actions are created entirely by Allah: "While Allah created you and what you do." (Qur'an 37:96) The meaning of the expression "what you do" depends upon the grammatical interpretation of the original Arabic. If understood as referring to the actions themselves, it affirms that Allah creates human actions. However, it may also refer to the objects produced by human actions, particularly the idols being carved and worshipped. This interpretation agrees with the context of the preceding verses concerning the objects that people worship. (Jāmiʿ al Bayān fī Taʾwīl al Qurʾān, al Ṭabarī, 21/66) Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728 AH) explained that even when the verse is understood as affirming Allah's creation of human actions, it does not contradict the servant's genuine participation in those actions. Allah creates the servant and the servant's ABILITY to act. Therefore, affirming that Allah creates human actions does not require denying that humans act through the powers He has given them. (Minhāj al Sunnah al Nabawiyyah, Ibn Taymiyyah, 3/337; 3/261) Likewise, the Qur'an affirms that Allah is the Creator of everything, without requiring that created beings have no actions or effects of their own. (Sūrat al Furqān, 25:2; Sūrat al Zumar, 39:62) The Qur'an even attributes khalq (creating or forming) to ʿĪsā عليه السلام when describing the formation of a bird from clay by Allah's permission. (Sūrat al Māʾidah, 5:110) This does not establish that ʿĪsā عليه السلام possessed independent creative power. Rather, the term describes forming something through a power granted by Allah. Therefore, there is no contradiction between affirming that Allah alone is the independent Creator and affirming that human beings genuinely act through the abilities He has created within them. The Rejection of Jabr (Compulsion) by the Early Scholars The doctrine of jabr (compulsion), which denies meaningful human choice and agency, also conflicts with statements transmitted from the early scholars. Abū Bakr al Khallāl (d. 311 AH) narrated that Abū Bakr al Marwadhī (d. 275 AH) was informed of a man who said: "Allah compels His servants." He rejected this expression and instructed that it should not be said, referring instead to Allah's statement: "He misguides whom He wills and guides whom He wills." (Sūrat al Naḥl 16:93) (Al Sunnah, Abū Bakr al Khallāl, p. 920) Another narration reports that when Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241 AH) was informed of someone saying that Allah compelled His servants to obey Him, he responded: "How terrible is what he has said!" (Al Sunnah, Abū Bakr al Khallāl, p. 921) Al Awzāʿī (d. 157 AH) likewise rejected this terminology, stating: "I know of no foundation for compulsion in the Qur'an or Sunnah. However, I affirm divine decree, determination, creation, and the natural disposition." (Al Sunnah, Abū Bakr al Khallāl, p. 923) The rejection of jabr (compulsion) does not entail denying Allah's qadar (divine decree) or khalq (creation). Rather, Allah creates the servant, the servant's qudrah (power), and the conditions necessary for action, while the servant genuinely acts through that created power. The fundamental distinction is therefore between affirming Allah as the Creator of human actions and denying that the servant possesses any genuine influence in performing them. The Ashʿarī doctrine of kasb (acquisition) fails to establish this distinction because it attributes actions to the servant while simultaneously denying the servant's power any actual effect upon them. (Ḥurriyyat al Irādah bayna Ahl al Ḥadīth wa al Ashāʿirah wa al Muʿtazilah wa al Shīʿah, Aḥmad ʿIṣām al Najjār, pp. 113–122)