<오늘의 고민 : ‘메가 프로젝트’에 중소기업이 참여하기 위해서는 무엇이 필요할까> 오늘 메가 프로젝트 성과 확산을 위한 중소기업 간담회를 개최하고, 메가 프로젝트 3대 분야인 ‘반도체, AI 데이터센터, 피지컬AI’ 관련 중소기업인들과 여러 의견을 나누었습니다. 아직 메가 프로젝트가 추진 초기다보니 대기업을 중심으로 논의가 이뤄지고 있지만, 중소기업 참여의 파이가 커져야 하고 지금부터 준비와 고민이 필요하다는 점을 함께 공감하는 자리였다고 생각합니다. 대기업의 생산이 늘어나는만큼 소부장 기업들도 ‘대량 적기 납품’이 가능한 생산설비를 사전에 구축해야 하고, 이를 위한 자금조달 지원과 풍부한 투자가 필요하다는 의견. 협력업체 입장에서 장기적으로 매출 증대의 기대감이 있지만, 매출 실현 전에 상당한 투자가 이뤄져야 하기 때문에, 한정된 자금과 인력의 재배분에 있어서 어려움과 고민이 있다는 의견. 연장선상에서, 메가 프로젝트에 참여하게 될 국내 소부장 기업들에게도 국민성장펀드의 투자가 이뤄지면 좋겠다는 의견, 등. 다양한 말씀들 들으며, 중기부가 고민하고 노력해야 할 부분이 많다는 것을 다시 한번 느꼈습니다. 곧 메가 프로젝트 성과 확산을 위한 중소기업 협의체를 정식으로 구성하여, 더 체계적으로 목소리를 담아내겠습니다.

프랑스 폭도들이 결국 터는데 실패했다는 루이비통 ㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋ 이미 몇번이고 단련되서 최고급 방탄 유리로 방어 성공 ㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋ 대놓고 명품 전시한탓에 1순위로 공략 타겟됐는데도 결국 안 뚫렸다고 함

호주기업, 얘들은 버블인데. 상장안하길 잘했따 작년매출의 600배 밸류 미칫. ------------- 유진투자증권 허재환님 =위기의 진원지, 호주 퍼머스= * 코어위브 회사채 금리가 급등한 계기 중 하나는 지난 9일 호주 데이터센터기업 퍼머스(Firmus)의 초대형 IPO 계획 철회입니다. 코어위브 CEO인 마이크 인트레이터가 사내에 직접 언급했습니다. * 퍼머스는 엔비디아와 블랙스톤이 투자했고, 기업공개에 성공했다면 호주 사상 두번째로 큰 대형 IPO였을 겁니다(기업가치 305억 달러). * 퍼머스만 그런 것은 아닙니다. 최근 호주 기업 Air Trunk, 미국의 람다랩스, 영국 엔스케일 등등 AI 및 데이터센터 기업 IPO나 부채 조달이 줄줄이 부진했습니다. * 문제는 퍼머스 기업가치 306억 달러였습니다. 이는 2개월 전의 세 배였습니다. 동사 기업가치 305억 달러는 지난 회계년도 매출(26/6월 결산 5,100만 달러)의 600배입니다. * 닷컴버블 당시를 상기시킵니다. 2000년 닷컴버블 붕괴의 대표적인 상징이었던 Pet.com은 매출의 50배에서 상장되었습니다. * 당시 호황을 구가하던 인터넷 기업들의 매출 대비 시가총액은 20배 내외였습니다. 현재 앤트로픽과 Open AI조도 15~30배 수준입니다(앤트로픽 상장 논의 1.5~2조 달러, 3Q 매출 168억 * 4 기준). * 고금리가 장기화되면서 투자자들의 눈높이가 높아졌습니다. 자금 조달도 까다로워졌습니다. AI 설비투자의 어느 정도 감속은 불가피해 보입니다. * 코스피는 분할매수 구간으로 보이긴 하나, 보수적으로 접근해야 할 것 같습니다. 시장 자체와 저같이 어줍잖은 전문가에 대한 불신도 커졌습니다. * 그래도 전형적인 버블 붕괴와는 차이가 있습니다. 기술혁신은 늘 공급과잉으로 마무리되었는데, 지금 위기는 공급 부족에서 비롯되었습니다. * 공급 부족 상태에서는 투자하고, 생산해야 합니다. 이러한 희망회로가 미련인지, 현실인지 좀더 고민해 보겠습니다. 험악한 시간 속에서 마음을 지켜내야 할 것 같습니다.

Hello, FT, Bloomberg, CNBC. Yesterday you went all out spreading fear about Korean neocloud Elice Group crashing on its first day of trading, didn't you? Today Elice Group hit limit up. Please hurry up and report it. hankyung.com/article/2026102…

Thank you for this, @_NathanCalvin. I appreciate and am a fan of the investigative work you’ve done on behalf of AI safety and believe your comments are coming from a constructive, honest place, and that it benefits the public to have people whose job is to scrutinize the actions of frontier AI companies. I think something would be wrong if companies of the size of Anthropic didn’t get harshly criticized basically every day; strong antibodies against corporate power are a healthy feature of a free society, and especially so when issues of the gravity of the one we’re facing are at play. I also do agree that some of the examples you cite were mistakes by Anthropic. That said, I disagree with the thrust of your post. At the core, a good fraction of the things you criticize are consequences of Anthropic’s basic theory of change that we have held for many years. Our strategy has always been what I’ve called the “race to the top” — by showing how it’s possible to build the technology responsibly, we can raise the bar for the entire industry. The forces that drive the race to the top are hugely more effective if the company practicing them is at the frontier; that’s one lesson I’ve learned repeatedly. And looking at that strategy as a whole, I’m proud of our track record and stand by it. I believe that if we take a list of things that Anthropic did in the past year that were pro-safety and commercially costly to us, they far outweigh the list you’ve made, while at the same time I also disagree with some of the items on your list. Here are some things Anthropic has done, in the same period you’ve cited (the last year), which were very costly to us commercially while having strong safety benefits: 1. We played a key role in SB53 (and other state laws), at a time when doing so was politically perilous to the company and AI regulation was very unpopular. We in fact argued for a stronger version of SB53 than was ultimately passed; there were a lot of stakeholders and we were not the limiting factor in the strength of the bill that was passed. 2. We have very strong biological safeguards on our models, because we’ve seen concerning results in bio uplift trials and even seen and blocked potential attempts to misuse our models for bioweapons (as seen in our threat intelligence report from a few weeks ago). This is a very serious threat that we want to have zero tolerance for. But having very low false negatives means having significant false positives (despite months of effort on our part to improve the classifiers), enough so that biologists joke about how restrictive our classifiers are, and competitors sometimes sell against us by touting their more permissive bio capabilities. This has been very painful to us in an area where we care a lot about supporting an ecosystem of Claude users (biomedical science; and it is particularly frustrating to me as a biologist), but it’s the right thing to do and we intend to keep doing it. 3. Similarly, we first had Mythos-class models in February but didn’t make them generally available until June (when we had stronger cyber safeguards in place). We only offered them to a limited set of partners in order to focus on cyberdefense. It would have been much more economically rational to simply release the model to everyone. We likely sacrificed a significant chunk of a several-month model lead. But because of this, many companies secured their cyber infrastructure before the deluge of widely available cyber-capable models. Of course there are ways it could have gone better or been run better, but this was what we were aiming to do. 4. I advocated forcefully and publicly, in my essay Policy on the AI Exponential in June of this year, for the government to have the power to block model releases. Back then this was still outside or maybe on the edge of the Overton window, though I understand the window has moved since then. We were attacked intensely for this. 5. I don’t want to re-ignite conflict, but the events of February 2026 are a strong example. It is clear that our public stance could have seriously damaged the company’s future. 6. We’ve continued to advocate for export controls on chips and chipmaking equipment to China, because we think it allows democracies to negotiate from a position of strength on AI safety agreements. We’ve done this despite problems it’s created for us with industry partners who hold very different views and on whom we are very dependent. 7. As far as I’m aware we were the first, and still only, frontier company to restrict the sale of AI services to PRC-controlled companies, including those operating through third countries (otherwise a major loophole). We’ve therefore forfeited significant short-term business to prevent fueling AI platforms and applications that would help the CCP’s military and intelligence services. We are also cracking down on distillation; generally, distillation is not a major threat to us commercially, but like chip exports it has concerning national security and safety implications, so we expend significant energy and company resources to address it. 8. As you mentioned, we’ve put out a lot of reports, announcements, long model cards, public advocacy, etc, all trying to inform the public about the risks of AI. These involve a level of detail and effort that would be implausible for a purely profit-maximizing company. 9. Just this week, we announced we were putting 5% (and possibly more over time) of the company into a public benefit fund. All of these decisions came with very substantial costs to us. To be fair, those that involved holding back or restricting access to frontier capabilities also had a broader cost — for example, the public might otherwise have benefitted from faster progress in biology, so I am not saying that our decisions were without tradeoffs — but they were not driven by profit-seeking. For each decision, you can come up with ulterior motives that could have driven us — I think it is a general truth that any decision, on any topic, can always be portrayed as a nefarious scheme. But most of those end up being pretty farfetched or don’t fully make sense if you actually examine them closely. For example, it is deeply implausible that it would be a shrewd business move to block a large swath of research biology in order to do the work ourselves and compete with our customers; we expect the benefit to the ecosystem to greatly exceed the work Anthropic does itself, and for the two to complement each other. It is not in Anthropic’s interest to be perceived as unfriendly to biologists. Our Life Sciences Verification Program, which gives vetted biology professionals access to our models, also refutes this idea. Of course, a different set of people will see this and make a different criticism: that Anthropic shouldn't be making decisions about who gets access to what in the first place. I agree, in the sense that ideally the government would be making these decisions, and that’s why we advocate for regulation. But for now we are forced to make them, and enabling bioterrorism isn’t a better option. I think that even if I conceded every item in your list, I would happily hold up mine next to it; I don’t think it’s a close call. That is of course partly subjective and different things are important to different people. Maybe one way you could object is that several of the items above relate to AI misuse and not loss-of-control; if you think the latter is much more important than the former, that might change your calculus. But this is not Anthropic’s view — we view both as serious issues. You can also disagree with our decisions, as many have, but they are consistent. But I also disagree with at least some of your list. Several items don’t represent a deviation from Anthropic’s strategy or values at all, once we postulate the “race to the top” strategy that requires being a frontier AI company. Your items 1-4 are all simply examples of what it means to compete at the frontier, and we stand by them, both in the sense that they are transparently ordinary things to do as part of that strategy, and that we stand by the strategy as a whole. To be fair, there are important questions worth confronting (and that we are confronting) about what to do when the AI-driven acceleration gets fast enough that it is hard for safety to keep up. We are nearing that point and that’s what’s driving some of our thinking about “pacing.” But 1-4 are actions taken before that point and should be perfectly expected based on Anthropic’s strategy as a company. Of course it is possible to disagree with that strategy, but that’s a more fundamental disagreement that you could have had any time over the last few years. I agree we could have handled your items 7, 8, and 9 better. All fall into the category of “rhetoric or policy communication that wasn’t carefully written or resulting from fast-changing circumstances not propagating from one team to another fast enough.” This kind of thing happens a lot in large organizations (Anthropic is over 5,000 people), and doesn’t even necessarily represent a failure or mistake of any single person. I am of course the CEO, and I take responsibility. The volume of communication from Anthropic is enormous and if these are the worst examples, I think we’re frankly doing pretty well, though I will continue to work hard to make sure we do even better. Your 5th item (the change to our RSP) is the most substantive item, and people can debate this, but I think that the old, more rigid RSP created a lot of situations where we were technically required to do something that required a lot of effort but in retrospect wasn’t very important for safety, as well as not covering some of the most important things. Our current RSP’s focus on transparency brought things like risk reports and roadmaps, and its emphasis on independent external review laid the groundwork for even more intensive embedded evaluation, all of which I think have been valuable in driving a race to the top. In the original announcement in September 2023, we described the RSP as an “early iteration that we [would] build on” and said that “rapid iteration…will almost certainly be necessary.” I understand that changing plans is always a move that creates justifiable scrutiny — I just don’t think we ever represented that we wouldn’t do so. Relating to your 6th item (having an FCF in addition to our RSP), I know our intent is to meet the letter and spirit of our regulatory obligations (via our FCF) while also remaining able to experiment with more novel approaches to risk management that go beyond what the law currently requires (via our RSP). I promise to look into it further, as it’s a complex issue and it is possible we are not weighing the considerations in the right way. Overall, although Anthropic has made plenty of mistakes as an organization — including some of the items on your list — I feel that we have repeatedly taken serious and substantive actions counter to our bottom line and that there is a significant negativity bias distorting assessments like the one you are making above. We’ll always try to do better but, again, I am extremely proud of our track record and stand by it. I will have more to say soon about how we are going to further live our values in this moment of rapid change.

국장이 AI카나리아냐?!/ 스페이스X 발사급등/ 5500피 국장 어떻게?/ (아침시황) youtu.be/9lL4mpU7Xdo?si=UuQa…

많은 국가지도자들이 SNS를 하는 것은 알았지만 이 정도인 줄은 몰랐습니다. 더 열심히 직접 국민과 소통해야겠습니다.