As the military situation escalates in Sudan’s western Kordofan region, it’s worth noting that numerous Sudanese army units are sitting idly far from the front, including the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 11th, 12th, and 17th infantry divisions. For SAF, the *appearance* of fighting and winning a war is more important than actually fighting and winning it. The military-led Sovereignty Council, which took power in a coup in 2021, depends on the perpetuation of armed conflict as the source of its legitimacy. It only acted with urgency when it needed to recapture the national capital, Khartoum. The 19th Division at Merowe is marginally involved along the North Darfur/Northern State frontier, but it hasn’t brought serious manpower into the fight either. The 9th Airborne, which played a key role in the fight for Omdurman, is nowhere to be seen. Logistical constraints may explain this in part: frontline cities and towns can only host so many soldiers, fuel is expensive, etc. But does that explain the *total* absence of these underutilized formations from the combat zones? This leads me to different explanations: questions of politics, military doctrine, command rivalries, etc. Meanwhile, SAF-aligned paramilitaries (Al-Baraa Bin Malik, Sudan Shield, Joint Force) grow larger and larger, and carry out a growing share of frontline combat operations.

The timestamps indicate that this destruction occurred after the RSF had been driven out of Khartoum, so it appears this neighborhood was deliberately demolished by Sudanese authorities. The heavily damaged intelligence service HQ and SAF General Command adjoin this area.