A Shitty Developer

Joined September 2017
I am not going to give up this life 💪💪💪💪💪💪💪
1
6
823
Utsav Singh retweeted
It's crazy how much illegal shit GLM 5.3 uncensored can do
84
98
12
4,403
340,758
Utsav Singh retweeted
In 2026, no program is closed source. We decompiled a propAMM into Rust that recompiles to the exact on-chain binary, then used it to find a critical bug that put $6.1M at risk.
20
50
13
396
18,652
Utsav Singh retweeted
Cash Out Sony paid Jordy $50K for the Hypervisor Bug that affected the Ps5 upto 13.60 and probably 14.10 #Sony #Jordy #Jailbreaknews
51
30
22
1,996
409,902
Utsav Singh retweeted
chinese ass darksword panel and their exploits
6
22
1
168
19,302
I found a critical unauthenticated SQL injection that earned a $4,000 bounty. The WAF blocked most SQLi payloads, but I turned HTTP 500 errors into a data extraction channel. The exploit came down to 3 things: - SQL injection: A public API passed user input directly into BigQuery SQL. - WAF bypass: Keyword filtering missed BigQuery scripting techniques. - Error-based extraction: Detailed database errors exposed query results in HTTP 500 responses. Here's how I chained all three together: 1. Find the injection A public analytics endpoint accepted JSON input. Adding a single `'` to a parameter returned: `500 → Syntax error: Unclosed string literal` The error also revealed Google BigQuery was the backend. 2. Build a boolean oracle The WAF blocked keywords like `UNION`, `SELECT`, `AND`, and `OR`. But BigQuery scripting constructs like `IF` and `ASSERT` still worked: `IF TRUE THEN ASSERT FALSE; END IF;` → 500 `IF FALSE THEN ASSERT FALSE; END IF;` → 200 This let me ask the database true/false questions and read the answers from HTTP status codes. 3. Turn the 500 error into an output channel This was the biggest breakthrough because blind SQLi normally requires guessing data one character at a time using those true/false responses. But BigQuery supports: `RAISE USING MESSAGE = 'hello'` This deliberately throws a database error containing `hello`. Because the API exposed database error details, the response included: `500 → ... hello ...` Now imagine replacing `hello` with a database query result. The database includes that result in its error message, and the API returns it. Instead of guessing characters, I could retrieve an entire value in one request. 4. Bypass the WAF using BigQuery's own features The WAF blocked `EXECUTE IMMEDIATE`, which runs dynamically constructed SQL. But this worked: `EXECUTE/**/IMMEDIATE` The SQL parser understood it, while the WAF's keyword matching didn't. Another blocked keyword was `INFORMATION_SCHEMA`, used to enumerate tables and columns. The bypass was: `REVERSE('AMEHCS_NOITAMROFNI')` BigQuery reconstructs `INFORMATION_SCHEMA` at runtime. Using that reversed string in a dynamic query let me access database metadata without sending the blocked keyword literally. 5. What this unlocked Using those techniques, I was able to: - Enumerate datasets, tables, and columns - Query tables unrelated to the original analytics endpoint - Retrieve customer records, names, and addresses - Access operational records containing personal identifiers and contact information - Read sensitive fields that another API intentionally redacted #BugBounty tip: When a WAF blocks SQLi, don't just try random payloads. Understand the database dialect, what the WAF filters, and whether verbose errors leak data. Sometimes a `500` isn't just an error. It may be your output channel.
22
83
4
610
16,302
Utsav Singh retweeted
The write-up from @moyix is finally out! It covers how we discovered three Chrome vulnerabilities: a V8 memory corruption bug and two sandbox escapes (one from V8 and another from the renderer), and chained them together into a full Chrome exploit that earned a $250K bounty! xbow.com/labs/research/zero-…
2
24
2
78
5,638
Utsav Singh retweeted
谁把教材上传Arxiv了? 《Agentic Large Language Models》(智能体大语言模型):来自荷兰莱顿大学的AI教材,内容涵盖大模型工作原理、Agent原理等相关AI内容,共472页。 地址:arxiv.org/abs/2610.13455
63
293
14
1,871
124,184
Utsav Singh retweeted
i am going to sit and watch through this video over next 3 days
33
197
6
2,582
74,389
Utsav Singh retweeted
Very excited to share details on the bugs used in our full chain Chrome exploit! We used three bugs (V8 corruption, V8 sandbox escape, and renderer sandbox escape via Crashpad). The third bug is my favorite!
Replying to @Xbow
7/ Read more on the blog: xbow.com/labs/research/zero-…
15
54
2
252
16,136
Utsav Singh retweeted
Received $7,500 from the Azure Bounty Program! 🎉 Really happy to see the hard work pay off. Thank you @msftsecresponse #BugBounty #MSRC
8
7
235
6,223
My First Article, if you like it retweet ♥, ill do more ♥
10
125
2
525
14,243
Utsav Singh retweeted
Another $13,337 from Google Gemini. An indirect prompt injection in Gemini's Generative UI pipeline led to sensitive data exfiltration. Found. Reported. Fixed. Rewarded. #GoogleVRP #Gemini #AISecurity #BugBounty #CyberSecurity
🤖 Made with AI
8
8
199
7,116
Utsav Singh retweeted
For the second time in Google Chrome’s history, Google awarded a $250,000 bounty for a full-chain exploit… to @XBOW. Here’s the full story: At an all-hands at the start of 2026 in Malta, I set the team a crazy challenge. A full-chain exploit of Chrome by the annual Black Hat cybersecurity conference in August. I believed there were few better tests of whether @XBOW could move beyond web applications to desktop software, servers and devices. Chrome is one of the most hardened pieces of software on the planet, used by more than half the world’s population. A full-chain exploit lets an attacker take total control of a machine, where they can read every email, password and bank login the user types. You don’t need to download anything or click a phishing link. Visiting the wrong site is enough. So @moyix, Andres Luksenberg, Baul Lee, and Willem Pinckaers took on the challenge along with a fifth teammate: OpenAI's GPT-5.6 Sol. They built a chain they thought would win, but Google told us they already knew one of the bugs. We were already in Las Vegas for Black Hat and DEF CON, and the team didn’t want to go home without the win. So Brendan and the agents built a new exploit in just 6 days. We submitted it to Google and waited. The news came through that we'd done what should’ve been impossible. A full-chain bounty of $250,000, the first awarded under Google’s 2026 rules. It took just 6 days and $40,000 of compute to construct an exploit that affects a billion users of Chrome on Windows. An intelligence-agency veteran told me his team used to spend 6 months on this kind of vulnerability. My takeaway: the cost of finding truly critical vulnerabilities is collapsing, for attackers and defenders alike. Restricting powerful models is not the answer; GPT-5.6 Sol is already public. But defenders have one advantage attackers never will: they can test their own code first. Assume your software is exploitable. Whoever is hunting your bugs has the same building blocks we did. This is cause for urgency but not panic. XBOW is now developing an autonomous product for testing compiled software (desktop applications, servers, embedded devices), and partnering with the world’s top organizations to design that product. If you’d like to be one of them, get in touch. P.S. Restart Chrome whenever the Update button appears!
85
260
96
2,588
792,692
Utsav Singh retweeted
Today I got to know from a Grandmaster that Jane Street takes 12 rounds - 9 Online + 3 Offline for an entry level Quant Trader role at HK. 🙂
22
19
11
1,784
99,975
Utsav Singh retweeted
I wrote about attention, the mathematical operation that enables LLMs to process language at scale. Devised by Dzmitry Bahdanau in 2014, the trick was supercharged in the famous paper "Attention Is All You Need." I ask: 𝘞𝘩𝘺 is it all you need? Is it? quantamagazine.org/is-attent…
9
80
7
543
49,165