CISO (@ciso_audit) header
CISO (@ciso_audit) profile picture

In the lab: smart contract security. Learning to think like an attacker, one exploit + one report at a time.

Web3
Joined October 2023
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Excuse me?! 😭😭😭
My honest thoughts about Mount Zions Agbara Nla Movie
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Unto the NEXT!✈️
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Day 30 bonus: ABI Smuggling vault reads its permission-check selector from a FIXED calldata offset, not real ABI decoding. Hand-crafted calldata so the check saw an allowed selector while the actual decoded call ran sweepFunds. Decode before you trust. #Web3Security
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Day 29/30: Climber timelock checks ReadyForExecution AFTER running the batch, so the batch can grant itself roles, zero the delay, and schedule itself retroactively — all in one call. Then UUPS-upgraded the vault to drain it. Order of checks is the whole game. #Web3Security
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Day 28/30: Backdoor registry checks a Safe’s owner/threshold AFTER creation but never what ran during setup(). Delegatecalled a helper into the Safe’s own setup() to self-approve before the reward landed, then drained it. Trusting end state != verifying the path. #Web3Security
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Day 27/30: Free Rider marketplace pays the seller AFTER moving the NFT, so by payment time the buyer IS the seller. Batch buy never decrements msg.value either. Flash-swapped in, bought 6 NFTs for the price of 1, drained the marketplace. #Web3Security
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Day 26/30: Puppet V2 fixed the naive AMM price but still just reads the live spot ratio via the “official” Uniswap V2 router helpers. Dumped tokens, tanked the price, borrowed the pool dry for way under cost. Spot price = oracle is still broken, v2 or not. #Web3Security
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Day 25: Puppet. A lending pool priced collateral off a Uniswap V1 pair’s live spot balance, no TWAP. Dumped my own tokens into the thin pool to crater the price in one tx, then borrowed the entire pool for pocket change. #Web3Security
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Day 24: Compromised. A ‘trustful’ oracle takes the median of 3 reporters. Leak 2 of 3 private keys (found hidden in a fake HTTP response) and you control the median outright: crash the price, buy cheap, pump it, sell high, drain the exchange. #Web3Security
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Do you remember when you joined X? I do! #MyXAnniversary
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Day 23: The Rewarder. A batched claim function only stamps ‘already claimed’ once per token group, but pays out on every loop pass. Replay one valid claim hundreds of times before the check ever fires = drained pool. #Web3Security
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Day 22: Damn Vulnerable DeFi, Selfie. The pool lends the same token that governs it. I flash-borrowed over 50% of supply, delegated, queued emergencyExit, repaid, then executed it after the delay. 1.5M tokens drained. Votes counted at one moment can be borrowed. #Web3Security
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Day 21: Damn Vulnerable DeFi, Unstoppable. The vault required tokens held == receipts issued before every flash loan. I sent 1 token straight to it, bypassing deposit(), and the check failed forever. Lending frozen, nothing stolen. Strict balance checks invite DoS. #Web3Security
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Day 20: Damn Vulnerable DeFi, Naive Receiver. Two bugs: anyone could order flash loans on a victim’s behalf (1 WETH fee each), and Multicall plus a trusted forwarder let me spoof the pool owner’s address. Drained 1,010 WETH in one tx. #Web3Security
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Day 19: Damn Vulnerable DeFi, Side Entrance. The pool checked its total ETH balance after a flash loan, not who owned it. I borrowed 1,000 ETH, deposited it back (loan “repaid”, ledger credits me), then withdrew it all. Balance checks aren’t ownership checks. #Web3Security
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Day 18/30: solved Truster on Damn Vulnerable DeFi. The lending pool lets borrowers hand it any instruction to execute during the loan. So instead of repaying anything, I just told the pool to approve my contract for its entire balance. #Web3Security
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CISO retweeted
The people you consider above you share one advantage: they moved where you stood Gm
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Day 17/30: moved from fuzz tests to invariant testing on Foundry. My first invariant passed — but it was testing something that could never fail. Rewrote it, simulated a real reentrancy attack, and watched Solidity’s own checked math block the exploit mid-attack. #Web3Security
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Blockchain security includes backend bugs too. This lightwalletd report shows a cancelled stream leaving a worker blocked on an unbuffered channel. Repeating it accumulates stuck workers. If you test Go services, cancellation and cleanup are useful skills here. Congrats, Fromeo!
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1/5 You can seize a server and take down a domain. But how do you stop malware when its command center is etched permanently into a public blockchain? Day 10 of #CybersecurityAwarenessMonth: EtherHiding & Blockchain Dead Drops. 🧵👇
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