I’ve been exploring revenue-generating crypto organizations for years and have found very few that fully align tokenholder economics, ownership rights, and actual control.
Lido DAO is one of the strongest designs I’ve seen, but meaningful tokenholder participation and effective control still feel insufficient.
Chainflip is another favorite, particularly for its financial alignment. That’s a major reason I became an operator.
Protocol fee revenue flows to FLIP stakers through validator operators. Frontends and brokers can charge separate fees, and Labs’ frontend-related income is separate from protocol revenue.
That separation is valuable: businesses can earn revenue by building on the protocol while the protocol itself generates value for tokenholders.
The next area I’d like to see develop at Chainflip is governance and ownership rights. Labs remains the primary steward today. As the protocol matures, I’d welcome a gradual shift toward governance shared across the operator set, alongside stronger accountability to delegators.
That would build on the existing financial alignment by distributing decision-making more broadly. Combined with clearer tokenholder ownership rights, it could strengthen FLIP’s long-term value.
I have far too much experience in my short life with Swiss, Cayman, and other Fdn/Assc.
My take is that in general these vehicles are not conducive to aligning incentives to benefit token holders and thus also eventually fulfilling their intended purpose/mission.
It’s not to say it’s impossible and sometimes you can find that balance. But, it’s why I thought the CLARITY act was so beneficial, it attempted to remove those misaligned incentives. @milesjennings has pointed at this extensively.
There’s way too much nuance to get across in a tweet and I won’t comment on this particular filing. I don’t know what’s happening.
I will say that activist investing is only done for the long term benefit of the business which in return should by design benefit investors.
Hope this gets resolved and I’m always here to support if needed.
Affected LPs are being made whole using Chainflip’s accumulated protocol surplus.
While some of that surplus may still carry residual historical user claims, to the extent it is considered unencumbered, it effectively functions as treasury-like protocol capital.
So it’s important to underline that the ~$749k recovery carries a real economic cost for the Chainflip network and, ultimately, its tokenholders.
Chainflip node operators have passed a proposal to make LPs affected by the 12 September Tron USDT exploit whole.
Details here:
chainflip.io/blog/proposal-0…
Sad day for Chainflip, which had made it this far in crypto without a major exploit.
But Labs’ statement that “impacted users will be made whole” shows strong intent and a clear commitment to standing behind the Chainflip brand and its users.
What doesn’t kill you makes you stronger.
An update on yesterday's exploit affecting Tron USDT.
736,442.17 USDT was taken. All other funds are unaffected and secure, and impacted users will be made whole.
The network stays paused while we finalise the fix and the restart plan.
Full update: chainflip.io/blog/tron-usdt-…
the bull market has started.
BREAKING: Bitcoin surges over +7% to its highest level since June 2nd as $1.2 billion worth of shorts are liquidated in 60 minutes.
Imagine an onchain organization where tokenholders and validators receive all protocol-level revenue.
And tokenholders are also the ones who determine who runs the blockchain through their delegations.
That’s Chainflip! No stealing, no value extraction. You get what you own!
We’re evolving the FLIP token model.
Today:
Protocol revenue goes toward buying FLIP on the open market and then burning it forever.
Next:
Revenue will still purchase $FLIP from the market, but instead of sending it to the burn address, those tokens will be paid out to stakers as extra rewards.
chainflip.io/blog/flip-token…
bcvfinance.eth retweeted
The rewards for the first month of ENS Delegation Incentives have been distributed!
A total of 5,000 ENS was distributed to 734 participants.
If you delegate to an active voter, go check your wallet. If you missed July, August is open now.
A quick reminder of how the pool works: each month, the ENS DAO distributes rewards to voters and holders who delegate to an active voter. The pool grows as more people take part, so the more people join, the bigger the pie.
Thank you to everyone who delegated in July.
If you want to participate, simply delegate your ENS to an active delegate to start earning rewards.
bcvfinance.eth retweeted
The proposed issuance cap is designed to price out the lowest revenue, highest marginal cost stakers. Not only does it lower the revenue from staking to near 0, it especially penalises the weakest stakers most because it burns eth equivalent to perfect participation, not what you actually achieve. The 98% uptime solo validator gets even less rewards than the 99.5% professional, on top of their higher relative costs.
It is a bottom up filter for stakers, and will lower Ethereum's security budget until it fails and Ethereum gets compromised.
Ethereum should be focusing on becoming CROPS not ultrasound money.
bcvfinance.eth retweeted
Native $ETH staking:
>Can't be used with less than 32 ETH
>High reward variance. If you ain't lucky, you can go years without proposing a block
>Can't be used as collateral to unlock liquidity
>Terrible for taxes. wstETH held long term is 0% for me; validator rewards are taxed at 48% as soon as I receive them
>Hardware costs have doubled over the past year due to RAM shortages
>Requires active maintenance & monitoring
The EF made staking terrible.
@LidoFinance made it great and accessible.
That's why they hate them for it.
bcvfinance.eth retweeted
Save ETH staking.
what if we asked solo stakers what they actually think?
good news for you: @ethStaker has been running a survey of solo stakers for 3 years and have actual data to back the eth issuance debate.
most solo stakers would exit their validators if the yield goes below 2% APR
😬
bcvfinance.eth retweeted
If we let a small group of people make decisions on Ethereum's monetary policy, we lose the core value of Ethereum.
The sentiment is clear. Ethereum community, developers, builders, and users do not support EIP-8361.
Let's make sure it will never make it to the fork!
It could have been better for ENS, but the DAO’s governance is now effectively controlled by ENS Labs’ new Foundation.
The positive aspect is that tokenholders will retain ultimate authority to appoint and remove Foundation directors through the Foundation’s legal processes following non-executable votes, preserving formal oversight of treasury and executive functions.
Proposal: discuss.ens.domains/t/draft-…
The executable vote is close to passing.
bcvfinance.eth retweeted
Your ENS has been sitting idle in your wallet.
Starting today it can do two things at once:
> make ENS governance stronger
> and earn you rewards from the ENS DAO
The ENS Delegation Incentives Program is live.
What a strong comment on Lido DAO’s financial status by @Stefa2kEth : research.lido.fi/t/goose-202…
If even one of the biggest DAOs still cannot provide public-company level financial legibility and fiscal discipline, that should make the whole industry think.
The hope with DAOs was that revenue-generating organizations could remain sustainable under public ownership. But across the industry, we have too often ended up with DAOs showing weak financial discipline, poor transparency, and limited accountability. DAOs still seem far from proving they can replace the standards imposed by regulators, disclosure rules, and corporate law. Every month, I lose a bit more confidence in the idea of a sustainable public company model without regulators.
I increasingly doubt that a durable DAO standard can be established with the current investor base. My instinct and experience tell me that many first-generation DAOs may end in structural failure, and that only after that will a second generation emerge, one built around a more educated owner base that actively participates in governance, enforces oversight and transparency, and allocates capital more responsibly.
bcvfinance.eth retweeted
KYC is so redundant in a world of enormous data leaks and AI
we need to abolish KYC and replace it with either cryptographic proofs or game theory
DeFi is ahead of the curve on this one
dont let the institutions say otherwise
Interesting data point from the ongoing @ENS_DAO retrospective conducted by @metagov_project :
Interviews suggest that the largest grant recipients were also the strongest opponents of retrospective accountability reviews.
This is a fascinating example of the structural incentive tensions discussed in the article above.
docs.google.com/document/u/0…

















