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China has now released its official press release of today's Xi-Trump meeting at the White House. At the moment, the US side's press release is not out yet. I read the Chinese version as soon as it came out. It is not particularly long, but it is surprisingly dense. And one thing stood out to me: Beijing is not simply talking about "cooperation." It is laying out a framework for how China and the United States can compete and win together. And the structure of Xi's remarks is revealing: Trade: cooperate. AI: compete, but cooperate. Taiwan: red lines. Read together with the written statement Xi issued upon arriving in Washington yesterday, today's readout may offer the clearest explanation yet of what Beijing means by a "constructive relationship of strategic stability." Here is how I read it. As in my previous posts, the italicized text comes from the Chinese official release, the bolded text highlights key points, and everything else is my analysis. -- Xi pointed out that the exchange of visits between the heads of state of China and the United States in less than half a year is unprecedented in the history of China-US relations. President Trump and I have maintained communication through various channels and have jointly been steering the great ship of China-US relationship. In May this year, President Trump and I jointly agreed to work toward building a constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability. The new vision reflects the realities of China-US ties, embodies our aspirations for the future, and represents an important step toward finding the right way for the two countries to get along with each other. We need to work toward a relationship featuring cooperation as the mainstay, competition with bounds, manageable differences, and promises of peace, so as to find the right way for two major countries to coexist. China and the United States should, and fully can, achieve mutual benefit and win-win results through practical cooperation, help each other succeed through healthy competition, properly manage differences by seeking common ground while respecting differences, and build peace by fostering mutual trust, so that a constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability can better benefit the two peoples and people around the world. There is a lot packed into these three paragraphs. First, the reference to the "unprecedented" frequency of leader-level exchanges is notable. Xi's framing moves from his personal communication with Trump, to sustained communication between the two presidents, and then to something much larger: a mechanism for stabilizing the bilateral relationship itself. Then comes the metaphor of the "great ship." This is not new. Xi has used the ship metaphor in previous meetings or phone calls with Trump. A ship this large does not turn quickly. And if it veers badly off course, the consequences can be enormous. I think the stage on which this "ship" is sailing is the broader Pacific. The ship may encounter storms and rough seas, but the two countries' top leaders are presenting themselves as jointly responsible for keeping it on course. And then there is a phrase that appears twice: "finding the right way." I don't think that repetition is accidental. Beijing is trying to define what coexistence between two competing major powers should actually look like. And the next sentence gives us the formula: "cooperation as the mainstay, competition with bounds, manageable differences, and promises of peace" was already included in Xi's statement after arriving in the United States the day before. It provides a concrete framework for managing the competition and building this new type of relationship. In many ways, this is an attempt to answer a question that has long complicated China-US relations: Do China and the United States have to choose between cooperation and confrontation? Beijing's answer is no. And more importantly, it is beginning to spell out what that alternative might look like. -- Xi stressed that the economic and trade teams of the two countries held a new round of consultations and reached a new joint arrangement, which is good news for industries and people of both countries, as well as the global economy. Cooperation is a two-way street. The stability of US-China economic and trade relations requires both sides to expand the list of cooperation, while shortening the list of problems. As long as the two sides uphold the spirit of equality, mutual respect and mutual benefit, a way out of problems can be found. Xi expressed his hope that the two sides will work in the same direction, stay committed to the principle of mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, and promote the sustained, stable and sound development of China-US economic and trade relations. And this is where the broader idea of "strategic stability" starts becoming concrete. How do you prevent competition from turning into confrontation? Beijing's answer begins with two lists: The cooperation list. The problem list. In my view, expanding the cooperation means continually broadening the areas in which both sides can achieve tangible results. Reducing the problem list, meanwhile, means preventing new disputes from continuously piling onto the bilateral relationship. This is very pragmatic to manage the relationship. The goal is not to build a relationship completely free of friction-that is clearly unrealistic. The real goal is this: To keep increasing the number of areas where the two sides can cooperate, while preventing disputes from expanding to the point where they overwhelm the entire bilateral relationship. And that helps explain why Xi repeatedly emphasizes equality, mutual respect, and mutual benefit. In addition, the phrase "cooperation is a two-way street" carries a significant message: Beijing is signaling that it is willing to cooperate, but it does not believe strategic stability can be built by China alone. One side cannot keep extending the cooperation list if the other side keeps extending the problem list. Meaningful progress requires both sides to engage, compromise, and reciprocate. -- Xi said that while China and the United States, as both major powers in AI, compete in AI, they have even more reasons to cooperate. The two sides should leverage respective strengths in AI rather than guarding against each other. We can continue to engage in dialogue on AI, exchange views on its risks and benefits, and work together to prevent the misuse and abuse of AI. The two sides should maintain human control over AI technologies, uphold a people-centered approach and the principle of using AI for good, and ensure that AI serves human progress. What happens when an issue belongs on both lists at the same time? That is where AI becomes particularly interesting. The AI competition between the two countries are obvious. But the risks of AI do not respect national borders. Misuse, loss of human control, safety risks, and broader questions of governance cannot necessarily be contained within China or the United States alone. Two countries can compete fiercely over who develops the most advanced AI systems while still sharing an interest in preventing those systems from creating risks neither side can control. This is why Xi said the two countries have even more reasons to cooperate. And the remark also echoes President Trump's statement on social media that he would discuss "super intelligence" today. Trade is about expanding the cooperation list. AI sits on both lists. But Taiwan is different. Let's move on. -- Xi stressed that the Chinese side's position on safeguarding national reunification and territorial integrity is clear-cut. It is hoped that the US side will adhere to the correct position of opposing "Taiwan independence," and handle the Taiwan question with caution, so as to lay a solid foundation for China-US strategic cooperation and the development of bilateral relations. The Taiwan question finally came into focus. It's different from the previous topics. There had previously been speculation in the United States that Xi's asking Trump to stop arms sales to Taiwan based on the 1982 US-China Communique. I do not know whether that report was accurate. But the language of the communique is quite explicit: "Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution. " Clearly, 44 years is long enough to qualify as a long term. Yet US policy has failed to follow through on the promise made in that document. Looking at the structure of Xi's remarks, Taiwan has surely been placed within the boundaries of strategic stability. After outlining substantial areas for cooperation, the Chinese side is also sending Washington a clear message: Strategic stability does not mean stability without red lines. -- Trump said that the state visit of Xi to the United States is a great visit. China and the United States are both major countries, and he and Xi are good friends who maintain in-depth and close communication. The US-China relations will surely be handled well under the leadership of the two heads of state. The latest round of economic and trade consultations between teams of both countries achieved new outcomes, and both sides should continue dialogue to reach a better agreement. Artificial intelligence concerns the future of humanity, and China and the United States should maintain dialogue and strengthen cooperation on this issue. Trump's response, as presented in the Chinese readout, is notable for what it reinforces. He described the visit as "great." This effectively signaled to the outside world that the meeting did not need to be portrayed as a tense, difficult, or deeply divided encounter. Judging from the narrative presented in the Chinese readout, the two sides have established fairly clear areas of common ground on several fronts: - High-level communication should continue. - Economic and trade negotiations should continue. - Dialogue on AI should continue. - The overall stability of bilateral relations needs to be maintained. At the same time, it is equally important to note that Trump's remarks were relatively broad and general, while Xi's remarks played a more substantial role in defining the broader framework of the relationship. -- Both heads of state also exchanged views on major international and regional issues including the Middle East situation, Ukraine crisis and Korean Peninsula. The two leaders also confirmed that the two countries will support each other in hosting the 2026 APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting and the G20 Leaders' Summit. I would not pass over this final section too quickly. The Middle East. Ukraine. The Korean Peninsula. None of these issues is simply about China-US bilateral relations. Their inclusion reminds us that the relationship between Washington and Beijing does not exist in isolation. China and the United States are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, two of the world's largest economies, and leading technological powers. Whether they can maintain channels of communication therefore has implications far beyond trade, technology, or Taiwan. Both are deeply embedded in a broader multilateral system. The immediate references to the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in China's Shenzhen and the G20 Leaders' Summit in America's Miami reinforce that point. They place the bilateral relationship in a wider context: even as China and the United States compete with each other, they must also continue engaging within institutions and forums where their decisions affect countries far beyond their own. How will Beijing and Washington manage the competition in a healthy way? When the cooperation list and the problem list are both on the table, which one will Washington choose to make longer? There is no answer to that question tonight. What comes next will.