Yet again—this time thanks to pioneering research by Rear Admiral Philip Yu, @USNavy (Ret.) & Benjamin Rosen—the @NavalWarCollege/@ChinaMaritime Studies Institute (CMSI) offers insights available nowhere else in the #OpenSource world! digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cm… This penetrating deep dive surfaces pressing questions: ⚓ What is the cost of #China #Navy reliance on Dual Command Structure (Commanding Officer-Political Commissar) decision-making & Party Committee Meetings? ⚓ Particularly during time-sensitive or wartime submarine operations? ⚓ With all the communications/bandwidth challenges that operating submerged (& *hopefully* undetected) entails?

New! @NavalWarCollege/@ChinaMaritime Report #59—“Be Focused, Be Humble, Be Happy: Career Progression, Organization & Training of PLAN Submariners” digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cm… From CMSI Director @ChrisHSharman, @USNavy (Ret.)— #China #Navy Watchers: What are the career tracks aboard Chinese Navy submarines? How do #submarine crews train? And what are the dynamics between a sub’s Commanding Officer & the Political Commissar? CMSI’s latest CMR tackles these ?s & more. Authored by Rear Admiral (Ret.) Phil Yu & Benjamin Rosen, this report dives deep (pun intended) into the human factors that shape China’s sub force, an aspect of the PLAN that receives far less attention than its platforms & capabilities. China’s diverse sub fleet & increasingly ambitious ops demand a hi degree of tech expertise & professional competence. Yet while sub hulls, weapons & capabilities frequently dominate analysis, far less is known about the crews who operate these platforms & the personnel systems that support them. This CMR breaks new ground by examining the career progression, org structure & training of PLAN submariners. It explores how the sub force develops its officers & NCOs, how different career tracks support increasingly complex ops & how the PLAN is adapting its workforce to meet evolving technological & op demands. The report also examines the role of the Party Committee & the relationship between the Commanding Officer & Political Commissar, including efforts to improve political officers’ op expertise. It maps career benchmarks for sub officers, assesses promotion opportunities for equipment & special tech officers & highlights the increasingly important role of NCOs in the sub force. For those seeking to understand not just what China’s subs can do, but how the PLAN develops, organizes & leads the people who operate them, CMR No. 59 is essential reading. Main Findings •Led by the political commissar w/ the commanding officer serving as deputy, party committees are responsible for major decision-making, maintaining party control, training & general leadership aboard PLAN subs. While Chinese sources extoll this collective leadership model, it is unclear how this command structure influences decision-making efficacy in practice. •PLAN political officers play a critical role in the leadership & decision making on PLAN subs, but reportedly lack understanding of sub ops. Despite attempts to improve the operational competency of political officers, this likely remains a problem for the PLAN sub force. •The diverse PLAN submarine fleet & its increasingly ambitious operations require a hi degree of technical competency w/in the submarine force. Recent reforms to the career structure of tech officers can be seen as efforts to retain increasingly needed technical expertise in the PLA, in part to meet this requirement. •According to PLA media reporting, the PLAN has made progress in expanding educational & career opportunities for NCOs, while enhancing their professionalization & tech competence w/ updated policies aimed at recruiting more college educated NCOs. •PLAN subs’ apparent lack of a dedicated “supply department” may pose challenges to the sub force’s ability to become a true “far seas protection” force. The PLAN is attempting to address this via tech investments at Shore Service Departments. •The US sub force uses lessons learned from incidents & accidents not only to enhance ops but also as a training tool. In contrast, the PLA treats accidents & near misses primarily as opportunities to promote the importance of political commissars in military decision-making, while prioritizing party loyalty & propaganda value over genuine learning. While public discussions in Chinese media about sub accidents & incidents are scarce, those that do exist reveal a clear focus on using such events for political messaging. •The PLAN sub force has invested in simulators & training systems to enable its crews to exercise op……

Big Splash! @NavalWarCollege/@ChinaMaritime Translation #37: “The Technical Evolution & Future Development of Chinese Navy’s 3rd-Generation Conventional Submarine” digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cm… Don’t let the title of this incredibly detailed article fool you! This lengthy analysis *also* offers deep-dive insights into why #China is now focusing on #nuclear #submarine development by producing both larger SSNs/SSGNs/SSBNs + small/micro-reactor “SSPns” [e.g., Type 041]—the latter optimized for shallow Near Seas operations—as part of Xi’s directive to build a “world-class Navy” second not even to America’s. As I explain in my Statement for the Record for the @USCC_GOV Hearing “Part of Your World: U.S.-China Competition Under the Sea,” Beijing is greatly emphasizing undersea warfare: uscc.gov/sites/default/files… My 83-page Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy Policy Report—“China’s Nuclear Submarine Development Quest: Strategy, Saga, Significance”—traces PRC nuke sub prioritization & progress up through ongoing 3rd-gen advances & Type 041 development: en.kims.or.kr/publication/ki… CMSI’s new translation by @RealNickHendo concludes with a worrying portent: “As China’s defense‑industrial research & manufacturing capabilities continue to advance, China may become the only country capable of developing entirely new‑concept submarines. In the future, the underwater operational posture & force balance in China’s near seas & the broader Western Pacific, both in quantity & quality, will shift dramatically, signaling that the Chinese Navy’s underwater combat capability is entering a completely new era of development.” China recognizes nuclear power as the submarine gold standard, it’s optimizing for its own situation & objectives, & it’s now apparently getting good enough technologically to leverage its unrivaled production scale & scope. Such powerful alignment of national goals & strengths is where the tides of history may turn…

Hot off the NWC Press! In the new Autumn 2026 issue of Naval War College Review, I’m honored to publish a “Special Feature—Twenty Years of the China Maritime Studies Institute”   digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nw…   In the words of Professor Sam J. Tangredi / @tangredi_j, Editor-in-Chief, @NavalWarCollege Press: “we present a retrospective essay from Professor Andrew Erickson on the twentieth anniversary of the official launch of the College’s @ChinaMaritime Studies Institute (#CMSI). Very quickly, CMSI established itself as an indispensable center of gravity for thought on #China’s broader #maritime ambitions and activities and their implications, as well as a vital repository of translations of Chinese sources to illuminate and enable research in the broader community of interest. CMSI’s conferences and publications, outreach, and expertise have helped steer national conversation and help ensure that Navy leadership and the broader government are equipped with the knowledge they need in this vital arena, a mission CMSI and the community of researchers it supports look forward to pursuing for many years to come.”   digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nw…   Access the full issue here: digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nw…