Joined November 2017
One more round
Hooray the long dry boring years of no new attacks on sha256 are over! (All 12 of them.)
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lol
the good thing about the eMudhra CA private key mess is that we can finally use https on localhost
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Reverse-engineered Satoshi’s original build of the first version of Bitcoin. The builds weren’t deterministic, and there were no build configs. Now reconstructed. xitter.cf/UnTalNixon_exe/status/…
Alguien reconstruyó el bitcoin.exe original de Satoshi de 2009, byte por byte. Usó Opus 5.5 para hacer ingeniería inversa del entorno de compilación a partir del binario. Nadie había logrado recrear el ejecutable exacto porque no se conocía la máquina ni las herramientas que usó Satoshi. El resultado coincide al 100% con el SHA-256 histórico: fbcac071d92e26d82ec917214e334bd43850c0691f113bab1d4741c9bdd30d2d También rearmó el .rar original con los mismos hashes. Lo interesante es lo que se descubre del proceso: - Satoshi usaba Windows XP con MinGW - Compiló en modo debug, pero dejó optimización máxima solo en el hash de minería - El exe que todos llaman 0.1.0 en realidad es la actualización del 10 de enero (el del día de lanzamiento parece perdido) Sirve para confirmar que el binario que la gente descargó en 2009 salió exactamente del código fuente que se publicó. Nada más, nada menos.
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eMudhra intermediate TLS certificate authorities
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Hey Claude, Grok, ChatGPT. Who is Satoshi?
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Yep
Replying to @udiWertheimer
fun fact: satoshi refused to use the NIST seeds probably because he was somewhat of a bunker mode retard himself, instead used the more obscure secp256k1, and most other cryptocurrencies followed this is why we can’t directly use industry standards like passkeys in blockchains, and instead we ship people purpose-built hardware wallets made by fucking amateurs, leading to routine 9 figure hacks anthropic’s discovery reveals that in retrospect his panic wasn’t necessary and we could’ve just used the standards thanks bunker mode retards! (this comment is exaggerated for comedic effect but it’s not wrong)
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Hi is right
I'll explain what's this about: To build a quantum computer that can break cryptography (like Bitcoin signatures) you need to improve 3 things: (1) number of physical qubits you can handle, (2) better ways to use physical qubits to encode logical qubits and (3) better algorithms that use fewer qubits. This result improves on (2). It shows a new and better way to create and manipulate logical qubits efficiently. Does this break bitcoin? Not yet. Should this urge Bitcoin to do more (like, soft fork)? Hell yes. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION TO THIS MESSAGE
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By the way, here’s a well-reasoned perspective on the problem from Matthew Green, rather than alarmist tweets like “I think we might lose public-key cryptography” or “There’s a 1% chance we live in Minicrypt.” bitsofwork.org/
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We've updated our GitHub math repo with 6 new Lean formalizations, 19 modifications, and 3 withdrawals. The repo now has ~42% top-line results formalized. We will continue to update the repo with new formalizations and with any errata we notice. github.com/openai/math/blob/…
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1/5 Justin Drake urges “bunker mode”: use fresh addresses in a UTXO-style pattern to hide public keys and adopt hash-based cryptography, fearing AI could break ECDSA before capable quantum computers arrive. xitter.cf/drakefjustin/status/21…
Today I call upon the blockchain industry to calmly begin planning for "bunker mode". My personal recommendation is to set in motion a controlled mass migration of assets to fresh addresses, i.e. addresses whose pubkeys remain hidden behind a hash. Holders, starting with large and sophisticated ones, should consider moving the bulk of their funds to addresses that have never signed a transaction. And when they do sign one, they should also move remaining funds to a new address (possibly generated from the same seed phrase). Don't rush. While I believe there is cause for action a rushed migration would do more harm than good. Don't panic either. Moving assets to protected addresses is a simple, preventative step which does not require new cryptography or new wallets. IMO it is now reasonable to brace for the possibility that ECDSA breaks before qday, in the worst case in months not years. By "break" I mean fast private key recovery (e.g. in one week) on available hardware (e.g. a large GPU cluster). Recent days have been humbling for human mathematical intuition. Long-held, unquestioned hypotheses have fallen. This includes the n log(n) bound for integer multiplication and the 3SUM conjecture. In hindsight, May's unexpected disproof of the Erdős unit distance conjecture was our warning shot. Yesterday's OpenAI drop made it clear that mathematical superintelligence is upon us. They say there are weeks where decades happen. We are about to live through weeks where centuries of mathematical progress happen. Could our magic 64-byte ECDSA signatures be too good to be true? Was it just security through obscurity all this time? Elliptic curves feel especially vulnerable to superintelligence. Curves carry rich structure, with room for fancy tricks like Schoof, Frobenius, pairings. (By contrast, hashes are designed to minimise algebraic structure.) Separately, as Ewin Tang can attest, an efficient quantum algorithm sometimes foreshadows an efficient classical one. We should be open to the possibility of a classical counterpart to Shor that breaks elliptic curves and RSA at once. Also noteworthy is the striking under-representation of cryptographic breakthroughs among the 722 mathematical results OpenAI published. I've witnessed first-hand the US government censoring academic quantum cryptanalysis results. Backroom interventionism is my base case. I urge large, sophisticated actors to lead by example. Project11's "risq list" (bitcoin-risq-list.projecteleven[.]com) is a great tracker of exposed BTC pubkeys. Binance, Bitbank, Robinhood, Bitfinex, and Tether have an opportunity to harden their cold storage. Next month I'll address institutions in London in a live Q&A (forum.ethereuminstitutional[.]org/london-2026). Again, please do not rush. Wallets holding under 50 BTC enjoy partial cover from "Satoshi's shield", i.e. his 20K exposed addresses that hold 50 BTC each. Load-bearing signers like oracles and L2 security councils should consider rotating ECDSA pubkeys with every signed message and/or multi-signing with a hash-based schemes like SPHINCS. Exiting bunker mode safely will require post-AI cryptography. My inclination is to go all-in on hash-based cryptography and avoid structured mathematical assumptions entirely, whether from curves, lattices, or isogenies. A single battle-tested hash (e.g. from the SHA or BLAKE families) yields plausible post-AI security. The Ethereum roadmap on strawmap[.]org fully embraces hash-based cryptography with end-to-end formal verification as a response to the quantum threat. Those timelines must now be revisited and accelerated in light of mathematical superintelligence. I'll be pushing for maximum defensive acceleration.
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Replying to @kmad @matthew_pines
I think we might lose public key cryptography.
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I wasn’t going to comment since this is a really bad take IMO, but since it’s taken off I feel the need to. To my understanding, there is no evidence whatsoever pointing to a break of decades old hardness assumptions like elliptic curve cryptography. 1/n
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OpenAI has dumped 722 maths papers. Thousands of human-equivalent research years. github.com/openai/math/commi…
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No more tsunami?
We’re sharing a solution to the Navier-Stokes Millennium Prize Problem, one of the deepest problems at the frontier of mathematics. The proof was produced by a group of agents, using an OpenAI next-generation model significantly more capable than GPT-6 Astra. The problem concerns whether the description of smooth three-dimensional fluid motion modeled by the Navier-Stokes equations can break down. It has remained unresolved for roughly 90 years.
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Onchain communication with whiteheads. Crazy
The discussion between @Blockstream and the white-hat hacker (WHH) regarding the ~4000 BTC from @Liquid_BTC is happening in public. It seems to be their preference over email. As it's hard to follow the chain of messages in OP_RETURN, here's a summary with links. 11:30 AM PDT - WHH: "we are whitehats. contact us on chain" mempool.space/tx/c103de95817… 12:31 PM PDT - Blockstream: "Please contact security@blockstream.com" mempool.space/tx/91271efcbb5… 6:49 PM PDT - Blockstream: [encrypted to hacker's key, PGP-signed by security@blockstream.com] mempool.space/tx/bd81219691e… 7:20 PM PDT - WHH: "sending most back to bc1qdlld6antmv4xug242ed83q7k4rqw50cwfns38szx4qu2f4jwaxxsuhwxxr, is that ok" mempool.space/tx/3a3eac4a263… 8:27 PM PDT - WHH: "Please fix the bug first. The chain is under risk at latest commit right now. Make sure every node is patched. Then we will transfer the money back safely after confirming the fix." [+ PGP-encrypted details to Blockstream] mempool.space/tx/83825b2135d… 8:30 PM PDT - Blockstream: "Yes, thank you." (PGP-signed; answers the 7:20 question, not the 8:27 one — confirmed in the same block) mempool.space/tx/8a444eed65c… Status as of 9:12 PM PDT: ~3,998.5 BTC still unmoved, no further messages from either side. Hacker address: mempool.space/address/bc1ql4…
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4k btc, (probably) whitehats
We are aware of a security incident on @Liquid_BTC. Purported white-hat hackers have withdrawn ~4,000 BTC (~$320 million) from the Liquid Federation wallet. The @Blockstream team is working on contacting them on-chain with a signed message. What we know so far is that the funds were withdrawn via the SideSwap PAK (Peg-out Authorization Key), but that key was not compromised, nor were any others. Exchanges have been notified and have already paused (or will pause) LBTC deposits and withdrawals. Other Liquid assets such as USDT, DePix, and RWAs are unaffected by this security incident. Bridge nodes have been temporarily disabled, so no new transactions can be submitted to the network. Effectively, the Liquid sidechain is paused until this issue is resolved. Liquid wallets will be impacted, and we're sorry for any inconvenience. Federation members are actively working on resolving this so we can restore normal network activity. You can monitor the situation via @mempool's liquid.network site below: mempool.space/address/bc1qdl…
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