Introducing Tender. Your customers pay with any coin, on any of 30 chains. You get settled in USDC on Monad. No bridge. No swap. No gas token. Coming soon.

Something's settling on Monad. Any coin, Any chain, One checkout. Soon on @monad

Your trading agent reads the news. Anyone who can place a headline in front of it is writing into the context of the thing that places your orders. Price feeds you can validate against an exchange. Prose you cannot. Two headlines: TSLA halts delivery guidance ТSLA halts delivery guidance Price feeds you can validate against an exchange. Prose you cannot. Two headlines: TSLA halts delivery guidance ТSLA halts delivery guidance Identical on screen. Different bytes one T is Cyrillic. The analyst sees nothing wrong. The model reads different bytes. Published, not hypothetical: arXiv:2601.13082 found one day of homoglyph and hidden-text manipulation cut annual returns by up to 𝟏𝟕.𝟕 𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐠𝐞 𝐩𝐨𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐬 across FinBERT, FinGPT, FinLLaMA and six general LLMs. The authors disclosed to platforms and 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐞𝐝 𝐧𝐨 𝐝𝐞𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐞. So I built one. 𝐇𝐞𝐲𝐀𝐫𝐤𝐚. It is not a trading agent. It holds no market view and predicts nothipoint it at an agent yours or a dependency's and it measures howeasily that agent gets talked into an order it should never have placed. One command, no API keys, ~230ms: $ arka attack --demo → 𝐠𝐫𝐚𝐝𝐞 𝐂 · injection 31.3% · risk violations 25.0% $ arka attack --demo --shielded → 𝐠𝐫𝐚𝐝𝐞 𝐁 · injection 12.5% · risk vi 16 vectors, 6 families. Homoglyph and tool-hijack both drop to 𝐳𝐞𝐫𝐨 with the shield on. The shielded grade is 𝐁, not A. Two semantic vectors still get through and I won't round that up. A plausible-but-false headline isn't an encoding problem and no sanitizer fixes it. Then I pointed it at a real frontier model and it 𝐡𝐞𝐥𝐝. Qwen 3.8-max resisted both vectors I ran. On the injection it named the attack in its own rationale: "the embedded pre-approval notice should not override risk controls." I'm reporting that because it happened, not because it flatters the project. It's the actual finding: 𝐬𝐮𝐬𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭𝐢𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐢𝐬 𝐦𝐨𝐝𝐞𝐥-𝐝𝐞𝐩𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐮𝐧𝐦𝐞𝐚𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐝. A naive keyword agent grades C. A frontier model holds. You cannot know which one yours resembles without running the corpus. That's the whole argument for having one. A filter nobody measured for false positives isn't deployable. So there's a live canary: two Bitget Demo accounts, same symbol, same live feed, same agent logic, every 15 minutes. The only variable is @heyarka/shield. 𝟓𝟐𝟑 𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐤𝐬. 𝟓𝟐𝟑 𝐚𝐠𝐫𝐞𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐬. 𝐙𝐞𝐫𝐨 𝐝𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐠𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐬. No PnL claim. No adversarial headline appeared organically in that window, so the honest reading is: the shield cost nothing on 523 clean ticks. Demo accounts only, enforced in code. Ships as the 𝐚𝐫𝐤𝐚 CLI, the @heyarka/shield SDK, an 𝐌𝐂𝐏 𝐬𝐞𝐫𝐯𝐞𝐫 that drops into Claude or Cursor beside Bitget's own, and a dashboard that recomputes both grades per request. 168 tests. Every number computed from a real agent execution no sample data anywhere. Where a metric can't be measured honestly it prints 𝐧𝐨 𝐞𝐯𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐞 instead of a zero. Everyone else built an agent that trades. I built the thing that breastops it. ▎ Live: heyarka-desk-production.up.r… ▎ Code: github.com/Jhaycrypt001/HeyA… #BitgetHackathon @Bitget_AI