WORI 𐤊 retweeted
This was my morning. 🤩
Got to finally meet @elldeeone and @DesheShai of the @KaspaCurrency team. Was a surreal experience. Blood was pamping from all the coffee so I started handing out $KAS pamphlets 😂
I made sure to give it to one guy in particular. 🤫
WORI 𐤊 retweeted
We made some technical optimizations
18 June 2024 Version 1.04
1. Optimized node synchronization state detection mechanism
2. Adjusting the calculation of timestamps
- Now we use the block generation time to calculate timestamp
3. Two new fields are added to the interface:
- version : Returns the version number of the current indexer(/info)
- checkpoint : Each op's query results contain this field, to support data integrity verification in the future.(/oplist/op, /op/:id)
WORI 𐤊 retweeted
Replying to @Vortexto @MichaelSuttonIL
Node download, startup and full sync took a total of ~45 mins. On a “nothing special” laptop with a “nothing special” WiFi connection. Holy moly that was easy. Here is video of the last few seconds of the DAG syncing. I’m kind of floored.
WORI 𐤊 retweeted
#ICYMI - Our #Kazakhstan Ambassador represented #Kaspa at the @binance Kazakhstan event in May! @SocietyAmigo had lots of merch and Battle Cards and met with the Head of Marketing, @RachelConlan to hand her some gifts and ask the most asked question of all Kaspains, #When? :)
kaspa.org/kazakhstan-ambassa…
#L1 #ProofofWork #CryptoCurrency
WORI 𐤊 retweeted
Some visualizations of KIP9 $kas.
Recall that the purpose of the KIP is to enforce a triple-pronged tradeoff between the cost, length, and effect (in terms of storage consumed) of a UTXO spam attack.
The first graph shows the length of an attack as a function of the amount of storage it burns for attackers with different budgets.
The second graph shows the length of an attack as a function of its cost for attackers with different goals (in terms of how much storage they want to spam).
Interesting things to note: the cost becomes negligible very fast with the size of the attack, indicating there is no detrimental effect for everyday use (where the transactions are small).
Even the entire fully diluted budget of Kaspa is not enough to spam 1TB within a period shorter than a year.
Compare this to the state before the dust attack where an attacker could, in theory, spam the network at a rate of 148TB/year for a cost of about 500kas/day.
KIP9 solves state bloat!


















