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The CDU/CSU in Germany must finally embrace more of Adenauer’s legacy (“mehr Adenauer wagen”) if they want to avoid becoming just another 15% party like the SPD and Greens. The CDU, in particular, must break away from its one-sided leftward drift and find a true balance that includes its center-right faction. Only then can it regain strength and consolidate its current 30% support in the long term. Long gone are the days when the CDU/CSU commanded over 50% of the vote (50.2% in 1957) or even over 40% (41.5% in 2013). And if they don’t act soon, the time when they still polled above 30% will also become a distant memory. The party must break the decades-long downward trend and return to its roots, reinstating the conservative values that once made it great. The CDU’s increasingly left-leaning course under Angela Merkel—and now, apparently, under Friedrich Merz—is one of the main reasons for the rise of the AfD. Many voters see the CDU as indistinguishable from the SPD and Greens. As a result, much of the center-right electorate has been left politically homeless—many have turned to the AfD, while others have become frustrated non-voters. Under Merkel, the CDU underwent extreme social democratization, whether in energy policy (nuclear phase-out), immigration policy (“Wir schaffen das!”), EU policy, or cultural issues like gender and climate. This alienated its traditional voter base and left a significant center-right political void that the AfD has successfully occupied. Another major issue is that, despite decades of declining election results, the CDU continues to form coalitions exclusively with left-wing parties rather than building a center-right alternative. This reinforces the perception that conservative voters in Germany have no real choice—except for the AfD. The CDU has essentially become a sister party to the SPD, a reality its own voters have long since recognized. Therefore, the CDU urgently needs to reclaim Adenauer’s legacy. The Adenauer-era CDU was exactly where today’s massive conservative voter bloc, positioned between the CDU/CSU and the AfD, currently stands. Adenauer was a staunch advocate of Germany’s close ties to the West and a strong partnership with America. He believed in a well-equipped Bundeswehr capable of fulfilling its role within NATO. He championed a strong, free-market economy—not the centrally controlled economy we see today under the leftist SPD and Greens, but a truly free and competitive market. He was also a firm opponent of communism in all its forms, including German socialism—a critical conservative stance the modern CDU seems to have completely abandoned. Additionally, Adenauer was a leader of stability and the rule of law. He was a law-and-order chancellor. The crime wave and immigration crisis currently plaguing Germany would never have happened under his leadership, as he stood for strictly defined immigration policies that prioritized national security and social stability. If one takes these points into account, the CDU doesn’t need to reinvent itself but rather undergo a renaissance of its own values. A return to its roots, a rediscovery of the principles that once made it great—these are the same principles that made Adenauer one of Germany’s greatest chancellors and helped Helmut Kohl achieve historic success. If the CDU fails to realign with its original principles, it will continue its downward trajectory, leaving the door wide open for the AfD to fill the void. The bottom line is clear: the AfD is this strong because the CDU has abandoned its traditional values and no longer offers a clear conservative alternative. And there could be no better time for such a renaissance of conservative values than now—at a moment when Germany has the strongest possible allies for such a realignment in the U.S.: President Donald J. Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance, who would fully support Germany in reclaiming its conservative identity—if only its leaders had the will to do so.

In my opinion, @ElonMusk’s statement that Hitler was on the left, not the right, and that he was a socialist should not be dismissed as mere rhetorical exaggeration. When critics respond by insisting that fascism can only ever be a right-wing phenomenon, they rely on a narrow historical definition that obscures important structural similarities between different forms of totalitarian rule. In the strict historical sense, fascism is normally classified as right-wing, ultranationalist, anti-liberal and anti-Marxist. That point should not be denied. But if the term “fascist” is used more broadly to describe systems characterized by one-party dominance, leader cults, ideological conformity, mass propaganda, secret police, political purges, state worship and the complete subordination of the individual to the collective, then left-wing regimes have also exhibited clearly fascist-like characteristics. Stalinism and Maoism were not fascist in the narrow historical sense. They originated from Marxism-Leninism rather than from classical fascism. Nevertheless, their practical features displayed striking structural parallels with fascist systems: total state control over society and the economy, personality cults, labor camps, systematic purges, ideological re-education, the elimination of independent civil society and the suppression of every serious opposition. It is therefore legitimate to speak of left-wing totalitarianism with fascist characteristics, and even of “left-wing fascism,” because the underlying observation is analytically sound: authoritarian methods and the destruction of individual liberty are not the exclusive domain of one side of the political spectrum. Even more importantly than this systemic comparison, Adolf Hitler himself never regarded National Socialism as the antithesis of socialism. On the contrary, he repeatedly presented it as a genuine, albeit national and racial, form of socialism. In a 1923 interview, he stated: “Socialism is an ancient Aryan, Germanic institution. Our German ancestors held certain lands in common. They cultivated the idea of the common weal. Marxism has no right to disguise itself as socialism. We are not internationalists. Our socialism is national. We demand the fulfillment of the just claims of the productive classes by the state on the basis of race solidarity. To us, state and race are one.” In other words, Hitler considered Marxian communism a socialist heresy. Yet his description of National Socialism as “socialism in evolution, a socialism in everlasting change” echoes the Marxist view of history as a process of dialectical change, even though Hitler replaced international class struggle with racial and national struggle. This does not make Hitler a socialist in the modern democratic sense. It does mean, however, that National Socialism was much more of a socialist system than most commentators today want people to believe, and it cannot be understood honestly if the “socialist” component is simply dismissed as meaningless branding. Hitler’s own language presented Nazism as a national, authoritarian form of socialism. Hitler’s contempt for the right-wing spectrum of politics and society, including bourgeois and liberal parties, was consistent and often expressed with remarkable bluntness in private. He dismissed the business-oriented German People’s Party, the DVP, as a mere “milling about of ants” and described its members as “harmless, unimportant, politically without strength.” His verdict on the liberal German Democratic Party, the DDP, was even harsher. He called it “a stinking sore within the nation.” By contrast, he spoke far more favorably of left-wing groups such as the Social Democratic Party. In private notes, he remarked that “the racially most impeccable and best German people live together in Social Democracy.” He regarded the SPD as a revolutionary force and had hoped before the First World War that social democracy in Austria would weaken the Habsburg monarchy he despised. Hitler also admired Communism for its fanaticism and revolutionary seriousness. He did not see the Communists as harmless outsiders, but as dangerous rivals for the same revolutionary energy. In 1941, he recalled: “My party at the time consisted of ninety percent of people from the left. I could only use people who had fought.” At the same time, Hitler was far more contemptuous of conservative and bourgeois forces on the right, which he regarded as weak, cowardly, sterile and incapable of genuine resistance. He wanted to harness revolutionary energy from both nationalist and communist milieus, while rejecting liberalism, parliamentarism, bourgeois conservatism and free-market individualism, all typical elements of the right that he forcefully rejected. For Hitler, nationalism and socialism were not opposing principles. They were two sides of the same coin. He stated: “Any truly national idea is social in the final analysis, that means whoever is prepared to commit himself to his nation so completely that he truly does not have any higher ideal than only the well-being of this, his nation, … is a socialist.” Elsewhere, he argued: “The more fanatically national we are, the more we must take the welfare of the national community to heart, that means the more fanatically socialist we become.” He also sharply rejected bourgeois nationalism because it identified selfish class and profit interests with the interests of the nation. In his own words: “Socialism becomes nationalism, nationalism socialism. We do not recognize pride of estate, just as little as pride of class. We know only one pride, namely to be the servants of a people.” Within this national framework, Hitler wanted to create the kind of left-wing equality he associated with socialism. “Socialism can only exist within the framework of my nation,” because, in his view, “there can only be approximate equals within a national body in larger racial communities, but not outside of them.” This is the decisive distinction. Hitler’s socialism was not internationalist, liberal or humanitarian. It was national, authoritarian and collectivist. But it was socialism, and it was still explicitly anti-bourgeois, anti-capitalist and anti-liberal. He did not define freedom as individual liberty against the state, which would have been a typical theme of the political right. He defined politics as the subordination of the individual, the economy and society to the national collective, a mindset far closer to collectivist left-wing thinking than to classical liberal or conservative traditions. Hitler remained consistently anti-capitalist throughout his political career. That anti-capitalism was not merely a tactical pose. It was a core element of his worldview from beginning to end. He was deeply concerned with eliminating class distinctions within the national community and promoting a form of equality of opportunity for those he considered part of that community. His economic and financial policies reflected this socialist orientation. National Socialism was not free-market liberalism. It was heavily interventionist, dirigiste, debt-financed, protectionist and increasingly subordinated to the political priorities of the state. Hitler’s economic model relied on state planning, rearmament, autarky, deficit and shadow financing through instruments such as MEFO bills, price controls, wage controls, foreign-exchange controls, investment controls, expropriation, forced labor and war production. Private property formally continued to exist, and private companies could still generate profits. But they operated under a comprehensive system of political control and coercion. The Nazi economy was not a free-market system of the kind the political right would have introduced. It was a directed, debt-financed and increasingly militarized socialist command economy, in which private enterprise survived only under the primacy of state power and ideological command. These are clear features of a left-wing socialist economic policy, as many of Hitler’s instruments were much closer to centralist, statist and interventionist economic thinking than to classical market liberalism. State direction, subsidies, political investment steering, price and wage controls, debt-financed programs, protectionism and distrust of free markets are not liberal instruments. They belong to the toolbox of state control and socialism, which Hitler clearly favored. Also, Hitler’s attitude toward Bolshevism was less consistent than often assumed. Although he publicly maintained the thesis of “Jewish Bolshevism” until the end, his private conviction had already begun to waver by the late 1920s. In his final years, he expressed admiration for the Soviet Union’s capacity for state planning and industrialization. Reports from the Eastern Front about Stalin’s economic achievements impressed him, and he suggested that elements of the Soviet planning system could be useful for Germany after the war. Hitler saw Communists primarily as rivals in the revolutionary struggle rather than as complete ideological opposites. He assumed that the most dangerous opposition would come from the left because he respected its revolutionary energy. In reality, much of the most serious opposition to Hitler ultimately came from conservative, monarchist and military circles on the right, including figures such as Ludwig Beck, Franz Halder, Hans Oster, Erwin von Witzleben, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, Johannes Popitz, Count Peter Yorck von Wartenburg and Ulrich von Hassell. Many historians have therefore made a similar point when they argued that the only opposition that could really have become dangerous for Hitler came from the right. From that vantage point, Hitler stood to the left of the conservative opposition. That does not make him a leftist in the modern democratic sense, but it does make the simplistic habit of placing him neatly on the extreme right of the political spectrum much less convincing, as in reality he himself clearly favored socialism. On 24 February 1945, as the Third Reich faced total and irreversible defeat, Hitler stated: “We liquidated the left-wing class fighters, but unfortunately we forgot in the meantime to also launch the blow against the right. That is our great sin of omission.” That sentence is revealing. At the end, Hitler was not lamenting that he had failed to be more right-wing. He was lamenting that he had failed to crush the conservative and bourgeois right as thoroughly as he had crushed the left. These historical nuances clearly demonstrate that the ideological self-understanding of National Socialism was far more left-wing and far more complex than the simple and wrong label “extreme right” suggests. Hitler presented his movement as a national, anti-Marxist and authoritarian form of socialism. He rejected liberal market principles, bourgeois conservatism and parliamentary democracy. He despised the weakness of the bourgeois right, admired the revolutionary seriousness of the radical left, and placed the individual entirely beneath the collective power of nation, race, party and state. This historical complexity supports the broader point Elon Musk is making, which too many people simply reject because the matter is uncomfortable and complex. Authoritarian structures, the cult of the state, ideological conformity, anti-capitalism, planned economic control and the suppression of individual liberty are not the exclusive property of one side of the political spectrum. They can emerge wherever the individual is subordinated to a collective, whether that collective is defined by nation, race or class. They can emerge wherever the state claims comprehensive control over society, speech, culture, education and the economy. And they can emerge wherever political movements decide that dissent is not disagreement, but treason. That is why the claims that Hitler must have been right-wing and that fascism can only ever be right-wing obscure more than they explain once one moves beyond narrow and outdated historical definitions, examines the actual practices of totalitarian rule and listens to Hitler’s own words, which are quite revealing about his love of socialism and his preference for the left. The broader point is that authoritarianism, state worship, ideological conformity and planned economic control can very clearly emerge from the left, and many developments today should be a cause for concern, whether authoritarian steps under Biden-Harris in the United States, authoritarian steps currently being taken by the EU in Brussels, or the suppressive actions of left-leaning governments in Germany, Spain, France and the United Kingdom. At this moment, the greater threat to freedom does not come from the right side of the political spectrum, but from the left. And Elon Musk would say: again. nitter.cf/elonmusk/status/205262…

„Eine Pointe der deutschen Geschichte könnte darin bestehen, dass das Antiliberale, während fast alle Politikbeobachter nach rechts starren, von links einmarschiert. Der Teufel kommt selten zweimal durch die gleiche Tür“ welt.de/debatte/plus6ac7a7dc…

Hitler was a socialist, therefore all socialists are Hitler

According to DIE ZEIT, BMW withdrew its offer of an official car after AfD politician Rausch was elected president of Saxony-Anhalt’s parliament. @elonmusk, would @Tesla be willing to provide him with an official car?

Der neue Landtagspräsident von Sachsen-Anhalt, Tobias Rausch (AfD), könnte schon bald ohne eigenen Dienstwagen dastehen. Der Autobauer BMW hat ein bereits unterbreitetes Leasingangebot überraschend zurückgezogen. Brisant ist der Vorgang auch vor dem Hintergrund jüngster Äußerungen von BMW-Chef Milan Nedeljković: Dieser hatte sich gegenüber der FAZ gegen „Rechtspopulismus und Nationalismus“ ausgesprochen. nius.de/politik/bmw-zieht-le…

Elon Musk is right about the invasion-like conditions in Europe right now. But one thing needs to be added: this has been building for years and decades, and it has developed a momentum of its own, a mass, an inertia, that cannot simply be reversed. You cannot just say stop and expect it to end. The people rioting on the streets of France are second and third generation immigrants, and they have held French citizenship since the first generation. And then there is the fertility rate, the point @ElonMusk keeps raising, and rightly so. France as a whole is down to about 1.6 children per woman and falling, the lowest level since the Second World War. For European women born in France with no migration background at all, the figure is around 1.3 to 1.4, while immigrant women are at roughly 2.2, women from the Maghreb at around 2.5, and women of sub-Saharan origin above 3. That is what turns the momentum into something closer to a moment of inertia. The gap keeps widening. The original European French have fewer and fewer children and are dying out, while the immigrant population has more and more. That is a self-reinforcing dynamic. And it is not only the fertility rate that is pulling the two curves apart. The immigration itself, or the invasion, as Elon Musk calls it, continues unabated. Every day, every week, every month, more immigrants arrive, legally and above all illegally, e.g. on the boats. Each new arrival adds to the base from which the next generation grows, and that makes the gap worse still. Demography and immigration are not two separate problems. They compound each other. I believe France is a country where it may already be too late to turn things around. Even if Marine Le Pen becomes president, Jordan Bardella becomes prime minister and the RN takes over the government, which is foreseeable, they cannot deport their way out of this. They will not deport millions, soon tens of millions, of French citizens. The RN is too moderate for that, and Le Pen and her prime minister are far too tame. So the honest conclusion is that nothing fundamental in France may really change, even under Marine Le Pen. Sad but true.