New Notes of a Wooden Head idea is out: $GLPG (biotech, but not the GLP-1 circus).
Link in bio.
Thomas Moroder ποΈ^ποΈ=e^(-π₯/2) retweeted
Enjoyed AndyFest Vienna 2026 @evfcfaddict so much that Iβve temporarily modified my X address until the conference glow up fades.
Iβm no longer Jason β¦ Iβm EuroTrack180.
Thomas Moroder ποΈ^ποΈ=e^(-π₯/2) retweeted
Buying more Watkin Jones $WJG.L - market continues to punish me and there are always delays in completion of real estate deals, but so what? I think there is substance, real assets and net cash. Longer.
This one aged very well!
It's just like Buffett said when he was running his partnership:
"I've got more ideas than capital."
Here's another for anyone interesting in deep-value stocks:
Shinden Hightex (3131.T) looks cheap to assets and earnings. (Rare for Japanese stocks)
TBV Ratio = 0.84
NCAV Ratio = 0.88
EV/5Y FCF = 3.2
P/5Y FCF = 3.5
5Y avg FCF: Β₯1.76bn. Upside to liquidation = 19%, upside to fair value = 108% (as I calculate it).
Business: Japan-based trader of semiconductors, displays, batteries & IoT parts.
Cheapness tied to weak multi-year EPS growth, thin margins, cyclical worries.
Yet it trades below cash-rich tangible assets with little intangibles. Margin of safety is clear; re-rating could offer an asymmetric return profile.
Would love to hear from anyone that digs into this deeper...
Summer reading thx to @Premski_SGP & @lorenz_swen
Does $USOU still exist, @calvinfroedge ?
BREAKING: We just caught a wild trade.
Representative Dan Crenshaw just filed a purchase of a triple-leveraged oil ETF, $USOU.
He sits on the House Energy Committee and the House Intelligence Committee.
Why on earth is a congressman trading a leveraged oil ETF right now?
Thomas Moroder ποΈ^ποΈ=e^(-π₯/2) retweeted
Unreal $META
Thomas Moroder ποΈ^ποΈ=e^(-π₯/2) retweeted
$ABVX As a follow-up to a few posts that I saw regarding the perceived elevated rates of NMSC and malignancies in the 50 mg arm specifically in the phase 3:
A few thoughts:
1) The phase 3 50 mg dose is actually a small minority of the patient years of safety data acquired -- the much larger dataset for that dose comes from the phase 2b long-term open label follow-up, which can be reasonably pooled with the phase 3 results given the same dose and detection protocols (Note, we have seen some analyses that pool 25 mg and 50 mg arms. We would NOT recommend doing this as it is not fair to claim that the risk of developing cancer in the 25 mg arm is known to be the same as the 50 mg arm). Pooling 50 mg phase 2b and 50 mg phase 3 data sets yields a much lower rate of events across the board. (I suspect it was just a bit of bad luck on the smaller phase 3 dataset for the 50 mg dose in isolation, see below chart for what we've been working off of after integrating these phase 2 data -- note there are some assumptions that go into this but the variability should be pretty de minimis);
2) Two ways things generally cause cancer: DNA damage from some oxidative/radiation/something else source that damages DNA or inhibits DNA repair mechanisms at their core OR substantial or highly targeted immunosuppression. Because both of these events are total exposure related, typically events accelerate over time. The phase 2 had the much longer follow-up with fewer patients whereas the phase 3 had more patients followed up for less time. The phase 2 had a very low number of events, and the phase 3 50mg dose was the only arm that had an elevated set. A priori, if the drug was a carcinogen, we would have expected the opposite: that the phase 2 would have a higher incidence/100 PY than the phase 3 given the individual patient exposures on a cumulative basis to such carcinogens are much higher in the phase 2 than the phase 3 in addition to the idea that there is a delay between when the carcinogen can cause the malignancy to when it can be detected (and T=0 is always the first instance in which that timer could start). Also, if the drug was as immunosuppressive as would be needed to cause cancer, you would expect to see a boatload of opportunistic infection before you'd see the cancer signal -- we see none.;
3) Pre-clinical testing confirmed that the drug is actually an anti-proliferative -- we would have expected the drug to be protective against tumor growth, not stimulating it;
4) No consistency or clustering for any cancer type at any time point;
5) NMSC carries a much different (lower) risk profile than other types of malignancies since they are caught very easily and have a low rate of metastases, and are seen at a massively disproportionately high case numbers relative to other types of malignancies (also included in the bottom table following pooling of the 50 mg arm), so FDA is less concerned about it than non-NMSC;
6) To warrant a black box, the FDA usually requires, at a minimum, consistency of preclinical and/or striking clinical datapoints such that careful consideration must be made to determine if the benefit/risk profile inverts in a subset of all patients that may receive the drug. In this case, we not only have completely disparate and conflicting datapoints, but we even have one data point relating to the MoA and pre-clinical data findings that suggest the drug should have the opposite effect. In addition, black box decisions are not made in isolation. They are heavily debated back and forth between the company, internally, require a lot of internal consensus on establishing causal link, and are not made in a vacuum to unmet need and efficacy;
7) UC patients have an elevated rate of inflammation (by definition) and, in turn, elevated rates of cancer compared to healthy individuals (~+.5 events/100PY vs non-UC). Obefazimod is now a proven highly effective therapy that leads to robust endoscopic remissions and attenuation of much of this inflammatory effect. I would hypothesize if you ran a large enough study and followed patients for long enough, you would find that there would be a cancer benefit from the drug secondary to the disease control that it would afford. The weight of this potential benefit (which makes sense given the pathophysiology) must be considered against the risk of the agent itself causing cancer (for which we have no reason to believe it actually should cause cancer).
Was thinking the same.. the only thing that changed was that the company can currently borrow up to $9.2mm under the credit line (vs $50mm, but that is probably due to "only" $10mm being currently posted as collateral). Seems strange this could cause such a sell-off?
Maybe the fact that the agreement listed the initiation of bankruptcy petition or other insolvency proceeding as an even of default tripped some algos regarding $LNSR !?
Thomas Moroder ποΈ^ποΈ=e^(-π₯/2) retweeted
This is the most SHAMELESS structural manipulation of a major index I've ever seen.
SpaceX is preparing what could be the largest IPO in history.
Target valuation: $1.75 trillion.
That would make it the sixth-largest company in America on day one.
And Nasdaq wants the listing so badly they're literally CHANGING how the Nasdaq-100 works.
In February, Nasdaq published a "consultation" proposing sweeping changes to how companies enter the index. The timing is pure coincidence, of course.
Just like it's pure coincidence that SpaceX has reportedly made fast index inclusion a CONDITION of listing on Nasdaq.
Here's what they're proposing:
A new "Fast Entry" rule would let any newly listed company whose market cap ranks in the top 40 of current Nasdaq-100 members get added to the index after just 15 trading days.
No seasoning period. No liquidity requirements. Completely exempt from the standards every other company had to meet.
Currently, new public companies typically wait up to a year before they're eligible for major index inclusion.
That waiting period exists for a reason. It lets the market establish real price discovery. It protects passive investors from being forced into untested, illiquid stocks.
And Nasdaq wants to throw all of that out. For ONE listing.
But the Fast Entry rule isn't even the worst part...
The real scandal is the 5x float multiplier.
Right now, the S&P 500 uses a free-float adjusted methodology. If only 5% of a company's shares are available for public trading, the index weights you at 5% of total market cap.
That's common sense. You weight a company based on what investors can actually buy.
Nasdaq's current methodology already uses total market cap rather than free-float for weighting. But for very low-float stocks, they at least had a 10% minimum float threshold.
Under the new proposal, that threshold DISAPPEARS entirely.
Instead, any stock with less than 20% free float gets weighted at FIVE TIMES its actual float percentage, capped at 100%.
Do the math on SpaceX:
If SpaceX IPOs at $1.75 trillion and floats 5% of its shares, there would be roughly $87.5 billion worth of stock available for public trading.
Under Nasdaq's proposed 5x multiplier, the index would weight SpaceX at 25% of its total market cap. That means passive funds would be forced to buy as if SpaceX were a $437.5 billion company.
But only $87.5 billion of stock actually exists in the market.
You are forcing hundreds of billions in passive buying into a $87.5 billion float.
QQQ alone manages nearly $400 billion. The total Nasdaq-100 ecosystem represents over $1.4 trillion in exposure across ETFs, mutual funds, structured notes, and derivatives.
Every single passive vehicle tracking this index would be REQUIRED to buy SpaceX at whatever price the market dictates.
On Day 15.
With zero price discovery. Zero track record as a public company. And a float so thin you could read through it.
So what this actually does is it creates a structural wealth transfer mechanism.
The passive bid from index funds pushes the stock price higher. That higher price benefits exactly one group of people: the insiders and early investors who own the other 95% of the shares.
And when lock-up periods expire 90 to 180 days later? Those insiders sell into the artificially inflated passive bid. Your 401(k) is the exit liquidity.
This is the fundamental corruption of indexing.
Indexing used to be brilliant. Low cost. Efficient. You were free-riding on the price discovery done by active managers. The index reflected the market.
Now the index IS the market. Trillions of dollars flow blindly into whatever the index tells them to buy. And the people who control the index methodology are changing the rules to serve the interests of a single IPO candidate.
The S&P 500 requires companies to have at least 50% of shares available for public trading. It requires 6 to 12 months of seasoning. It uses free-float adjusted weighting so passive investors aren't buying phantom liquidity.
Nasdaq is doing the exact opposite. 15 days. No float requirement. 5x multiplier on insider-held shares.
Every passive investor in QQQ, QQQM, and every fund benchmarked to the Nasdaq-100 should understand what's about to happen:
The rules are being rewritten to benefit IPO issuers and early-stage insiders, and your capital is the tool being USED to enrich them.
45 years in this business and I've watched Wall Street find creative new ways to separate retail investors from their money in every cycle. But usually they at least try to be subtle about it.
This one they put in a PDF and called it a "consultation."
What's your take?
EuroGroup Laminations $EGLA down 57% after FountainVest-EMS deal collapses (India clearance missing).. this is what happens when mergers fail on Presidents' day π€―
Thomas Moroder ποΈ^ποΈ=e^(-π₯/2) retweeted
"Even for the very best investors, identifying a bubble is a good deal easier than judging when it will burst.
With a 10 yr horizon, the inverse relationship between starting valuations and returns is clear. Over one year, there is no correlation at all."
economist.com/finance-and-ecβ¦






























