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让刺破 ai 泡沫的加息风暴来得更猛烈些吧 :)
mp.weixin.qq.com/s/0J_DFd6F6…
记得著名脱口秀主持人 Jay Leno 1992 年曾经讲了一个很损的笑话:
当时俄国经济困难,叶利钦上电视说:
我有一个坏消息,一个好消息。
坏消息是,我们的擦屁股纸用光了。
👌消息是,我们吃的东西也没了!
Neocloud 好像擦屁股纸,即使破产了,股价归零,算力也不会涨价。因为破产清算后的新主人,其成本会更低。
而且支持算力需求背后的现阶段大量投机资本,也会破产,他们制造的伪需求,也会消失。
neocloud 本质是帮背后干爹扩表的白手套。干爹投资一美元,neocloud 可以借此出去融资 20 美元,并承担所有风险,让干爹可以卖更多芯片,抬高其股价。但 neocloud 存在结构性的,融资成本和出租算力的价差错配的风险。成本端很多短期债务,借贷利率超过 10% 而且不断上升。收入端大多是长期低价的算力合同。错配的尽头就是突然死亡,比如 2023年三月的硅谷银行.
没有亲自全过程经历过 2000年 dot com 泡沫,和 2008年次贷金融危机的人,其实没有资格对现在的 ai 泡沫发表观点。
因为这里面有太多噪音,太多欺骗性的矛盾的信号,只有事后亏损惨重,才能慢慢恍然大悟。而不愿意悟,不愿意观察各种细节的人,还会注定被未来的类似骗局套牢,亏光。
“苦主 all in 买了 coreweave 的股票,仓位缩水 37%. 早上发现老婆收拾行李要搬到 all in spy 股票的隔壁老王那里。苦主哀求老婆,说根据 Jevon’s paradox, coreweave 的收入和股价都会反弹回来。老婆反问道,Jevon 是谁?他帅吗?他有钱吗?”
With CRWV at 74 in pre-market, I’m now -37% since my all-in. I woke up this morning to my wife packing a suitcase. She’s moving in with her boyfriend, who is 100% allocated to SPY. I begged her to be patient and explained that CRWW will bounce back due to Jevon’s Paradox, but that didn’t help. “Who’s Jevon? Is he good looking and rich?” She replied. My life is over. Citadel ruined it.
Lmfao...
With CRWV at 74 in pre-market, I’m now -37% since my all-in. I woke up this morning to my wife packing a suitcase. She’s moving in with her boyfriend, who is 100% allocated to SPY. I begged her to be patient and explained that CRWW will bounce back due to Jevon’s Paradox, but that didn’t help. “Who’s Jevon? Is he good looking and rich?” She replied. My life is over. Citadel ruined it.
经历或者研究过海啸的人,一般都了解一些基本的微妙的信号,可以警告他提前逃命。比如说潮水如果突然往下迅速退却几十米 (不是每次都发生),露出很多海底生物 ;或者听到类似喷气式飞机飞过或者火车经过的巨大声响 。而且有些海啸是分阶段的,后面几波的高度往往远高于第一波。但很多没有经验的人见到第一波潮水不高,不仅没跑,反而觉得无非如此,继续流连忘返,驻足街头玩耍 (比如 2004年袭击泰国普吉岛的海啸)。
类似的,一些庞氏融资结构的泡沫,即将破灭之前会有很多预警的信号:比如一些提供贷款融资的银行,手上的贷款市价遭遇巨大损失,无法转手卖给下家,开始收紧贷款规模和标准 ; 一些项目新发放的贷款利率大涨,超过 10% ;多个严重亏损的空壳项目试图以高估值上市,遭到投资者冷遇而被迫放弃,或者降低估值和融资规模 ; 某个习惯拆东墙补西墙的超级负豪,向全世界的银行把能借的债都借过一遍后,又回到中东,试图借更多的债来维持。如果只是孤立事件,可能不必惊慌。如果各种事件越来越频繁,声音越来越响,仅仅因为自己本地仍然歌舞升平还不跑,那未来被灾难埋葬,就不能怪运气不好了。
Surprise, surprise - the race to fund AI data centers first is now backfiring on the big banks
“Six months ago, banks were racing each other to underwrite data center loans tied to Oracle, Meta and the rest of the AI buildout.
Now some of the same banks are trying to get that debt off their books.
JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley, SMBC and MUFG have been exploring significant risk transfers, according to a report from the Financial Times.
These are deals that let a bank keep a loan on paper while shifting its riskiest slice to outside investors.
The banks are doing this because they are bumping up against internal limits on how much AI-linked exposure any one lender can hold….”
- @Startup_Fortune
“The pattern, every time: a search finds a needle, the needle becomes a narrative, the narrative becomes a valuation, and the capability never ships. That's the tell. ”
Every few weeks, a frontier lab announces that AI has touched the summit of human thought.
Here is how the machine actually works.
A lab can throw a system at a hard problem millions of times, overnight, cheaply. When one attempt finally works, that attempt becomes the press release. The failures live in a log you will never see. The lab runs the search, owns the logs, picks the survivor, sets the test conditions, times the release, and films the explainer video. In any other industry that's called an ad.
Pharma ran this playbook for decades. Publish the winning trials, bury the losers. Regulators finally forced preregistered trials with independent monitors. We don't let drug companies grade their own homework on billion-dollar medicines. We should stop letting AI labs grade theirs on hundred-billion-dollar machines.
Consider the most celebrated case making the rounds, the AI-assisted counterexample to the decades-old Jacobian conjecture, which the hype machine instantly promoted into a referendum on machine genius. A counterexample is a single carefully constructed object. Finding one is a needle-in-a-haystack job, exactly what machine search plus a human guide is built for, and checking one is mechanical, like scanning a barcode. So take the result at full value, and then ask the only follow-up that matters: can it do it again? If this is machine reasoning rather than machine luck, the same system should be able to solve the same class of problems on demand. It should produce similar constructions for the neighboring conjectures in that family, work the variants, and hit targets that someone outside the lab chose in advance. A system that finds one object after a million hidden attempts has proven the search works. A method proves itself by working twice, on problems picked by strangers.
There's a simple test for real capability: adoption. When computers conquered chess, the proof never appeared in a press release. Within five years, every serious player on earth had a stronger-than-champion engine on a laptop. Textbooks rewritten, profession permanently transformed. Same story with Go. Real capability escapes the lab and colonizes the field. Walk into a math department today and you'll find the same whiteboards and the same stuck grad students. And notice the simplest tell of all: you cannot buy it. No product accepts your unsolved problem. The capability gets announced, then never ships. Available means adopted. Announced means advertised.
Then follow the money. These are private companies with the largest raises in business history, valuations in the hundreds of billions, revenue many times smaller. The gap between those numbers is filled with a story. Every capability announcement is a financial event wearing a lab coat. Watch the calendar: announcements cluster around funding windows, and funding windows open toward the IPO valuations waiting behind them.
Here's the absurdity at the center. A machine that could genuinely solve hard problems would be the most valuable commercial instrument ever built. Batteries, drugs, chips, pricing. Its owner would compound the largest silent fortune in history. Instead the capability appears in a blog post and evaporates. What actually gets sold, at scale, today: words by the token, subscriptions by the month. The revenue mix is the confession.
Now the tells the insiders can't fake. When employees know a goldmine is real, they quit and quietly mine it. Top AI people do leave, constantly, and they go to chatbot startups and agent tools. Nobody leaves to launch the fund that never loses. The departure pattern prices the insiders' honest opinion of the story: model and hype, in that order.
And the locks. Your bank, your messages, your passwords all run on standard mathematical locks. If their machines had picked those locks, the labs would switch their own locks first. Cheap for them, invisible to you. They haven't. Same TLS as your bank, public bug bounties on the very same locks. There's precedent: in the 1970s the NSA secretly knew an advanced method of attacking codes, and it left fingerprints, quietly strengthening the official standard against that exact attack. Holders of real secrets leak through what they build. The labs leak nothing. Their infrastructure is a daily confession that standard math holds.
For honesty, there's a control case. AlphaFold entered blind competitions graded by independent judges, won decisively, became standard equipment in every biology lab on earth, and collected a Nobel. Blind test, adoption, a product you can use. The math announcements skip every step of it. And the honest numbers tell you the true scale: Google's own math-search showcase saved one multiplication step in a standard calculation, the first improvement in over fifty years, plus a fraction of a percent of compute reclaimed across its data centers. Real. Useful. Small. The distance between that and the destiny in the press releases is the marketing budget.
So the next time an announcement is pushed on social platforms, ask what the company is raising, and when. Ask where the attempt logs are. Ask whether the system can do it twice, on a problem a stranger chose. Ask whether you can use the capability this quarter, on your own problem. Ask whether working mathematicians adopted it, and whether insiders act like the story is true, and whether the test was blind and independently run. A lab that believes its own headlines welcomes every one of those questions. A lab that dreads them has told you everything.
The pattern, every time: a search finds a needle, the needle becomes a narrative, the narrative becomes a valuation, and the capability never ships. That's the tell.
Math deserves better than being collateral for a financing round. So do you.
搜索就是用蛮力尝试各种方法,然后发现了某个解决方案或者微小的进展。
理解则是真正知道原理后,不用浪费资源在大量无效的搜索方向上,而直接做出解决方案。
迄今为止 ai 在数学研究上的各种发现和进展,本质是提高了(相对于人脑的)搜索的效率,靠蛮力来实现,但并不能提供真正的新的结构和规则的理解。
片面夸大 ai 的力量,号称它能够以一块钱的蛮力,来解决至少需要一百万元才能摸得着边的问题,主要是为了忽悠外行,为了圈钱而做的宣传。
AI 把冯玉祥的风格比作索罗斯,刘裕的风格比作卡尔*伊坎,朱元璋像洛克菲勒 :)
最接近索罗斯风格的军阀的是冯玉祥。索罗斯做的是宏观和反身性:看一个维持不住的价格,借钱打上去,错了就砍。军阀里靠反复站队、放大中央裂缝吃饭的,是他。冯玉祥从北洋的旅长做到国民军首领,资本不是一块省里的稳税,而是手下那支能突然倒戈的军队。曹锟、吴佩孚、段祺瑞、后来的北伐,他都押过,北京政变里把总统赶走过。每一次都是看旧中心的“汇率”守不住,用自己的兵当杠杆去换下一轮的名义和地盘。赢的时候扩张很快,输了就退到西北,没有阎锡山那种省内复利。这和量子基金打英镑像:头寸集中,方向取决于对方的制度撑不撑得住,不取决于自己有没有工厂。吴三桂是另一类,更像一笔不能砍的大仓。降清是看明朝的价格已经破了,押对了一次;后来在云南抗撤藩,是在协饷这根钉上加杠杆,砍不掉,昆明城破就归零。索罗斯强调错了要走,吴三桂没有这个开关。安禄山则是单边杠杆加到爆。手上一块边镇的兵和税,全押反唐,没有对冲,也没有退回范阳当省长的选项。索罗斯不会把基金的生存押成一次无法减仓的叛变。所以冯玉祥最近:吃的是秩序裂开时的价差,仓位可以换边,地盘不是复利来的。这种风格在中央还稳的时候没有生意,一稳就只剩西北那点本金。
刘裕最像把一家快倒的公司整个买下、自己当经营者的人,不是巴菲特,也不是索罗斯。投资家里较近的是卡尔·伊坎这一类控制型投资者。他起于北府兵的低级军官,投的是已经垮掉的东晋。桓玄篡位,他打着复晋的旗号把桓玄除掉,军权从此在自己手里。这一步像买进一家董事会失灵的公司,用原有的章程当合法性,再换掉管理层。索罗斯只赌价格会破;刘裕要的是破了之后的控制权。打仗的方式则像集中仓位做一次收购,而不是长期复利。灭南燕、灭后秦,洛阳和长安都拿回来过。长安守不住,是因为他必须回建康处理帝位,不能把本金全留在前线。这和杠杆收购里卖掉边远资产、先保住控股公司是同一顺序:外围可以丢,股权不能丢。阎锡山不会去打这一仗,冯玉祥打完会再换边。对人更像收购后的清洗。功臣、宗室、原来的晋室,能威胁控制权的都被除掉,然后自己称宋帝。伊坎式的投资者也是先拿下董事会,再卖分部、换经理、把现金流握进自己手里。差别是刘裕没有退出按钮,皇冠就是最终仓位。所以映射下来:冯玉祥是宏观对冲,阎锡山是长期持有一个省,刘裕是恶意收购一个王朝,用原政权的名义完成过户,再把不赚钱的北方分公司丢掉,只留江南这个能控制的主体。
朱元璋最像洛克菲勒。先在一块基地上把现金和后勤做成壁垒,再一个个吃掉对手,最后不许任何人在体系里另留股权。他早期的“高筑墙、广积粮、缓称王”,就是不在没有留存收益时扩张。应天屯田,李善长管民政,龙凤年号先借着,称帝往后放。这和标准石油先控炼油、运价和现金,不急着把名字铺满全国,是同一顺序。刘裕更急着过户,冯玉祥更依赖站队,阎锡山则从不试图统一市场。打陈友谅、灭张士诚,像把同一行业里两个最大的竞争者清出局。他要的不是价差,是对方的地盘和粮不再能独立计价。统一之后拆藩王兵权、定卫所、杀功臣,则是收购完成后取消所有少数股东:淮西旧将相当于有投票权的合伙人,他不接受魏博那种本地股权。巴菲特留管理层,洛克菲勒把托拉斯收成一个中心;朱元璋比后者更极端,连退位的通道都不留。所以在这套映射里,阎锡山是长期持有一省的巴菲特,冯玉祥是索罗斯,刘裕是伊坎,朱元璋是洛克菲勒。差别只是他没有外部监管可以把托拉斯拆开,股权清掉就是清掉。
李自成最像把一轮暴涨当成永久收入、在最高点加满杠杆的人。投资家里接近泡沫顶上还在加仓、没有退路的成长股投机者,不是索罗斯,更不是巴菲特。他1641年破洛阳,免粮把饥民收成兵,两三年里从河南打到西安、打进北京。这一段的“收入”是沿途的归顺和王府的积蓄,增长极快,利润却不存在:军队靠下一座城的缴获发饷,没有屯田和税册。进北京后的追赃,等于在成交量最大的时候向客户强行要钱,把原来的买方全部推成对手方。山海关是融资被抽走的那一天。吴三桂和清军入关,相当于协饷和信用同时停了。他没有阎锡山那种本省现金,也没有朱元璋那种应天粮台,败退就是清盘。余部后来在川鄂山地拖了十几年,像破产后剩下的壳,已经不是原来那只按“百万雄兵”估值的基金。侯景是冲进建康把公司拆烂;李自成是自己把估值打到全国最高,再在巅峰上失去所有买方。两人都没有可重复的现金流。差别只是侯景一开始就在掠夺,李自成曾有过一段真的高速增长。
黄巢最像用灰色生意的现金流冲进主市场、把交易所本身打垮、却没有上市后经营能力的人。和李自成是同一类顶部加杠杆,只是他的本金来自私盐,崩了之后连唐朝这个市场一起失去流动性。他贩私盐起家,本钱是朝廷禁榷之外的那笔钱,不是节度使的税。王仙芝死后他接过流民,一路扩仓,广明元年打进长安,称大齐。这一步和李自成进北京一样:估值到了全国最高,饷仍靠缴获和追索,没有留下可重复的税。长安的供应线被藩镇切断,他守不住,只能退出,最后在狼虎谷被杀。和李自成的差别是退场方式。大顺败了,清廷还在,市场换了一个做市商。黄巢把唐的中枢打散之后,汴州、河东、剑南的节度使各自报价,魏博那种本地股权反而更稳。他的仓位清零了,市场结构改成军阀分散持有。侯景是拆一家公司,黄巢是把整个交易所砸停板。所以映射下来,他不是索罗斯那种打完可以走的空头,也不是陈霸先那种接手残部的重整人。他是泡沫里最大的一笔投机多头,成交在长安,交割失败,留下一地没有中央做市的藩镇。














