为什么她总是一副很无知却又表现的好像很自信的样子?
EU's Kaja Kallas:
If we start discussing Russia's demands regarding the security architecture, we fall into the trap Russia has set for us.
We shift attention away from the fact that there is no ceasefire and instead start to listen to Russia's claims.
Let's focus on what is at hand. We have one aggressor and one victim, and the aggressor has no security concerns.
舆论的手段。
Fascinating article by the China Academy: the US has stopped trying to win the argument and started renting the speakers
Trump "killed" VOA in 2025 only for Marco Rubio and the State Dept to resurrect it as an $11M ASEAN influencer op 👀
Why? Because a Singaporean think tank (ISEAS) dropped a brutal study showing Chinese embassies posting dry, copy-paste "win-win cooperation" updates were crushing "hip, localized" US embassies in actual audience engagement💀
So Washington’s came up with a new anti-China brain wave:
Rebrand American state propaganda under a $238M "International Communication Activities" slush fund
Initially spend $11M in Southeast Asia to fly 180 social media influencers and journalists to DC & Houston for "training" 🧠
Pay 30 local ASEAN lifestyle & food bloggers a whopping🤭 $2,500 each to casually slip US foreign policy talking points on tech standards and the South China Sea between noodle reviews and makeup tutorials
My favorite detail: recruits are ranked on a "rejection-to-acceptance continuum"
Not the hostile one. Not the converted. Rather picking the one sitting on the fence, in the middle
That's old classic U.S. 1950s two-step-flow theory
The ASEAN project deliberately avoids recruiting outspoken pro-U.S. voices. Instead, it targets fence-sitters—lifestyle, food, and financial creators who are neutral or mildly skeptical—recognizing that converting a non-political local voice yields vastly higher organic credibility than amplifying existing partisans
The idea behind is the asymmetric cost of official state rebuttal: By embedding geopolitical friction into lifestyle content (e.g., a Manila blogger linking local job anxiety to Chinese imports, or a beauty vlogger making a negative remark on Chinese investment) Washington hopes to create a "whack-a-mole" dilemma. If China’s Foreign Ministry or embassy responds officially to a mid-tier influencer, it looks heavy-handed and amplifies the creator; if it stays silent, the narrative hopefully takes hold and get amplified at the grassroots level
Now let's do the math: 30 influencers × $2,500 = $75K
That's just 0.7% of the budget
The influencers can't be the main operation — they're more like the initial storefront. The other $10.9M is a recruitment pipeline for future elites who want to learn which opinions keep the cash flowing
And as usual the irony writes itself:
The US requires foreign-funded opinion-shapers on its own soil to register under FARA as "foreign agents." Abroad, it funds influencers whose entire job to act as "foreign agents" 🤡
And as far as winning "hearts and minds" goes— that phrase was coined for colonial Malaya and made famous selling the Vietnam War. Now it's an $11M line item for paid influencers in the same region. Same vibe, same audience, 60 years later. The empire has a real memory problem
Read the whole article 👇
thechinaacademy.org/voas-rei…
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红岸 retweeted
🚨💥美国前副财政部秘书的CONFESIÓN:
乌克兰的26个生物武器实验室由美国控制。
Covid-19在乌克兰制造,然后运到武汉,并故意释放到全球人口中!
美国党争至此,都开始说真话了。
中国,可是背了7年的黑锅啊!😡😡
即便是听上去,都让人觉得这是一种粗鲁的弱智行为,经过这几天中国人在网络事件中的表现,你们认为以专业和不露痕迹的国家安全部人员会做这种低级的劣质行为的事情吗?
Stanford University student Elsa Johnson became a target of the Chinese Communist Party in 2024.
Elsa attended a private school as a child with a heavy focus on foreign languages and became fluent in Mandarin Chinese while still in elementary school. Years later after she was accepted to Stanford, she studied international relations and researched Chinese industry and military tactics while working at the Hoover Institution on campus.
She soon came to the attention of members of the Chinese Communist Party, which has a heavy presence at Stanford and throughout Southern California. There are currently more than 1,000 Chinese students attending Stanford each year, and the university has received more than $64,000,000 in private donations from Chinese individuals and organizations since 2010.
In June 2024, a man claiming to be a fellow Stanford student named Charles Chen contacted her online. She was not initially suspicious as they had many mutual associates, and his photos and posts appeared to be centered on campus. But his questions and requests quickly put her on edge as he invited her on a paid trip to China. And he seemingly knew details about her that she had never shared with him.
When she tried to disengage with him, she began receiving threatening phone calls by Chinese speakers. Elsa contacted Stanford administrators and the FBI, who told her Charles was likely affiliated with the Ministry of State Security, had been posing as a Stanford student for years, and had targeted at least ten other female students since 2020 in a similar manner. They also told her she was under physical surveillance on campus by the Chinese Communist Party.
Elsa wrote articles in the Stanford Review and The Free Press about Chinese influence on campus, and in March 2026 testified about espionage threats on college campuses before the House Committee on Education and Workforce.
For episode 270 of the Spycraft 101 podcast I spoke with Elsa about being targeted by a foreign government right in the middle of a US college campus. The episode is available now.
#stanford #college #student #china #hooverinstitute
open.spotify.com/episode/6KO…
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