I won't re-list my disagreements but maybe there are some who wish to know how estimates of "undervaluation" are constructed so they can form their own view on the right policy response. According to this piece, the renminbi is undervalued by 35%. I have not seen how this is calculated. If this is a back-of-the envelope adjustment to the IMF measure of 20% then let me clarify how the IMF measure is calculated. The IMF measure is an estimate of how much the renminbi would need to appreciate (given an estimate of elasticity of the current account to the real exchange rate) to close the current account gap over the medium-term *IF* all else was held equal, that is if there was a way to do this with no change in any component of aggregate demand in the country, and *IF* there was no feedback from changes in the real exchange rate to aggregate demand. In this sense it is a rough *dual* measure to the current account gap which is based on the Saving-Investment (S-I) relation. It is therefore not a statement that the problem is necessarily the exchange rate. Alternative measures of undervaluation come from estimating a price regression or using a variation of the PPP relation. Based on either of these measures the renminbi in 2025 was barely undervalued, 3% or so. The IMF focuses on the S-I relation because that is the relevant lens through which to understand the current account. The mapping to ERs requires many (more) crude assumptions. If interested, you can read more here: imf.org/-/media/files/public…

Sostuvimos una histórica reunión con el presidente de los Estados Unidos, Donald Trump, con quien conversamos sobre el fortalecimiento de la relación bilateral entre nuestros países y el avance de una agenda de cooperación en áreas estratégicas como energía, minería, seguridad

Ok, we now have the actual text of the Greenland deal (whitehouse.gov/briefings-sta…), so we can say how it compares to the existing 1951 arrangement and who, between Trump and Denmark, lied the most in their framing of it. Long story short - which may surprise some - the Danes lied the most: Trump is pretty much correct in saying that this new deal grants the US control of Greenland. Let's look into what changed compared to the 1951 deal. 1) This is now a permanent arrangement: whereas the existing 1951 deal only lasted as long as NATO existed, this one "does not have an end date and may only be amended by mutual consent." It even survives a hypothetical future independence of Greenland: in that event, Denmark and Greenland must ensure that the independent Greenlandic state "affirmatively assume[s] all of the rights and obligations of the Kingdom of Denmark specified in this Agreement." 2) In the 1951 agreement, the US could set up bases only where both governments agreed, and only on the basis of NATO planning. The new deal locks in three bases: the US can "modernize and expand its activities" at Pituffik, its only base in Greenland until now, and "shall be allowed to establish an additional Defense Area at Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig." Further bases beyond these 3 can be justified by the defense of "the American continent," a US interest rather than a NATO one. Also, quite subtle but this is interesting: Article IV(iii) says that "the United States may establish additional defense areas in Greenland" and that consultations are then held "to decide implementation details based on mutual agreement." What this means is that the principle of a new base is automatically granted and only the implementation details require agreement. Article VII also gives the US "the right to raise concerns regarding construction, or change of use" of any building near a US base, after which the parties decide together what to do. Which means that the US has a say over civilian planning around its bases. 3) On US military movement across Greenland, the wording change between the 1951 agreement and this new one is quite funny. The 1951 text said (Art. V(3)): the US "may enjoy... the right of free access to and movement between the defense areas through Greenland, including territorial waters, by land, air and sea," but only "in accordance with general rules mutually agreed upon and issued by the appropriate Danish authority in Greenland." The new one says: "the United States of America shall enjoy... the right of free access to and movement between the Defense Areas through Greenland, including the Territorial Waters, by land, air and sea." That's it: "May" becomes "shall," and the US military movement no longer has to follow rules "issued by the appropriate Danish authority in Greenland." The US also gets something new on top: "undersea access to and movement within the Territorial Waters," i.e. submarines. 4) Non-NATO exclusion: non-NATO states are barred from military installations or a persistent presence in Greenland unless all three parties approve, giving the US an effective permanent veto. The 1951 deal had no equivalent clause. 5) Investment screening: this is entirely new. "States or investors from a state that is not a member of NATO, a NATO partner, or an EU member state" (i.e. Russia, China, India, the Gulf States, etc.), "shall not be allowed to have (i) control, (ii) significant influence, or (iii) access to non-public information...within Particularly Sensitive Sectors or Activities in the territory of Greenland (including the Territorial Waters), unless agreed between the Parties." Again, it basically means that the US has a permanent veto over who can invest in strategic sectors in Greenland, as far as non-NATO or EU states are concerned. 6) Lastly, in stark contrast with the 1951 deal, the framing of the deal changes significantly: this new deal is largely framed around the US. The 1951 agreement existed only "for the benefit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." The new one lists the defense of "the American continent" as an objective, celebrates "the irreplaceable role" of the United States military as well as "the United States' indispensable historical and ongoing contributions to the security and defense of Greenland," and names the establishment of Trump's "Golden Dome" missile defense system as a key goal. So, to sum up: - The US secured a permanent military foothold that even an independent Greenland would inherit whether it likes it or not - The US now has veto power over any non-NATO military presence in Greenland, and over who can invest in its strategic infrastructure and resources (beyond NATO and the EU) - Denmark signed away its say over the principle of new US bases, with only the right to discuss the "implementation details" - Danish authorities no longer set the rules for US military movement across the island - And all of it is now justified by the defense of "the American continent" I don't know in which universe this even remotely "recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom and the Greenlandic people's right to self-determination," as Danish PM Mette Frederiksen put it (stm.dk/en/press/press-releas…). Yes, the preamble of the text cynically "reaffirms" Danish sovereignty but, in my book, when you let a foreign country put bases on your soil, move its troops without following your rules and veto who else can come in, in perpetuity, after it spent two years threatening to take you by force, the word for that is anything but "recognized sovereignty" 🤷

Here is the link to the Cornell University panel: “The Future of International Order: Rupture, Resistance, and Prospects for Peace,” where I was a speaker. My key points: • “Rules-based order” is not same as “Liberal International Order.” There were rules-based orders in the past: closed ones like the European “standard of civilization (SOC) and open ones like the Indian Ocean (trading, ideational & cultural) network (ION) before the European imperial powers arrived. • The LIO is a more recent term, and it is to some degree a privileged, selective club of western powers & their “invited guests” like Japan. It did exist but not as an overarching, benign construct that its proponents claim. • To be genuinely rules-based: three conditions must be me: (1) rules must be created democratically, with participation of all; (2) rules must be clear & transparent to all; (3) rules must be applied fairly, not selectively. The SOC & LIO did not meet these criteria to a large degree. The ION met these criteria to a greater degree. • World order is turning upside down. This can mean two things: instability, but also bottom-up construction. The latter means more regional layering. But not regions would be alike in terms of rules & institutions: Middle East, South Asia, & Northeast Asia have little or none, Southeast Asia & parts of Africa & Latin America have much more, Western Europe has most. There is a risk of regions developing into spheres of influence; but this can be exaggerated, due to internal balancing within regions against a dominance-seeker, and relative “porosity” & openness of regions including through inter-regional trade agreements (e.g. EU-India, EU-MERCOSUR) • With such cross-regional interactions, the world is becoming multiplex, rather than conventionally multipolar. It also means multi-layered and bottom-up. Hosted by the Reppy Institute for Peace an Studies, part of the Einaudi International Studies For details watch: m.youtube.com/watch?v=aa3UkD…

耶鲁一位计算机博士生，把自己发论文用的画图脚本全开源了，项目叫 figures4papers。 支持柱状、雷达、折线趋势、三维球体示意、概念等类型图，8 个论文项目各一个文件夹，脚本、数据、成图放在一起，照着改数据就能出自己的图。 他还把这套画图风格整理成了一个 Skill，接进 Cursor、Claude Code 或 Codex，让 Agent 按这套规范帮我们写画图脚本。 GitHub：github.com/ChenLiu-1996/figu… 规范写得挺细，去掉上边和右边的坐标轴线，柱子加黑边，配色固定一套语义，蓝色给自己的方法，绿色系给改进项，红色系给对比基线，默认 300 DPI 导出。 不装也能用，把仓库在 Agent 里打开，提示词里让它照 SKILL.md 和设计原则文件来写就行，README 里给了现成的提示词模板。 前几天分享的 vivid-figures-skill 是让 AI 选图画图，这个更像拿一位常年投顶会的作者的审美当模板，写论文要出图的可以两个都看看。

it's brutal. the two great prophets of international politics are now tim snyder and john mearsheimer, two men thoroughly captured by their own theories

Jesse Watters: How does taking out a dictator in Venezuela help the average American? VP JD Vance: It means is we are going to be able to control the incredible natural resources of Venezuela. @acyn (2026)

Nobel laureate María Corina Machado is planning to return to Venezuela, setting up a clash with the U.S.-backed interim government on.wsj.com/4rmCvTc

This was in Amsterdam. All she said was "Free Palestine" at a pro-Israel rally. She was arrested within a second. I have seen hundreds of videos of Palestinian protests being disrupted by pro-Israeli activists. Not once have I seen them be arrested for simply shouting a slogan. What is it about these two words, "Free Palestine," that terrify so many in the West? The echo of complicity?