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Wir waren in Transnistrien und haben erlebt wie stark der Einfluss Moskaus dort ist und wie von dort versucht wird auf die Wahlen in Moldau Einfluss zu nehmen. Die ganze exklusive @ZDF Reportage gibt es hier:
zdf.de/politik/auslandsjourn…
#moldova #Moldavie #moldau #auslandsjournal
Das Angebot Putins an die Europäer nach Moskau zu kommen, um den Frieden zu verhandeln, ist ein Vergiftetes.
1. Putin weiß, dass die Europäer sich nicht einig sind, einen Verhandlungsführer zu benennen.
2. Selenski - und um dessen Land geht es - wird niemals nach Moskau kommen
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Die Zerstörung der Krim-Brücke ist für Putin ein schwerer symbolischer Schlag. Sie steht wie kaum ein anderes Bauwerk für seinen Anspruch auf die Krim. Ausgerechnet kurz bevor er in Shenzhen mit Jalta 2.0 eine neue Weltordnung beschwören wollte. Die Ironie könnte kaum größer sein
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Sebastian Ehm retweeted
It's good to question any new and unverified data. It is in theory possible that the Rosstat leak was manipulated to increase the numbers. In practice, it is rather unlikely. What makes me trust this leak? 🧵
Regarding the Russian casualty "leaks".
As with any leak from either side, there is simply no way to verify if this is true or not. These are just numbers, with no evidence. If you are going to blindly trust a "leak" of Russian casualties, then I would expect you to apply that same (lack of) logic to "leaks" of Ukrainian casualties.
The only thing that makes this seem slightly more plausible to be real compared to previous leaks is that it largely lines up with Mediazona's figures when extrapolated based on its delays in reporting for 2025 and 2026. I previously estimated that both Ukraine and Russia have likely suffered around 500,000-600,000 KIA. This "leaked" data estimates that there are around 504,000 KIA based on the delay of death records to be sent in.
However, even though it lines up well, this does not confirm or even indicate these leaks are real. This can easily be faked just to legitimise the extrapolation that many have done of Mediazona's data, where the statistics become a bit more murky compared to their "absolute minimum" of 286,000 KIA death records.
This doesn't change the fact that these numbers, in my opinion, are likely somewhat accurate for the real death toll. But I think it's important to not just blindly assume that any release of casualty data are automatically 100% legitimate and official numbers.
Sebastian Ehm retweeted
The leaked Rosstat-numbers look accurate and inline with other open source estimates, made using available rus stats like KIA-payments and inheritance files or the mediazona-count. The leak also contradicts the argument, that Putin “doesn’t know, how the war is going”.
Wenn sie stimmen, sind es gigantische Zahlen. Nicht einberechnet sind die Verwundeten und die, die mit schwerem PTSD nach Hause kommen.
Das hat natürlich Auswirkungen auf hunderttausende Familien und Kinder
Die ru Gesellschaft wird Generationen brauchen, um das zu verarbeiten
Sebastian Ehm retweeted
Thank you, Mr. Kushner. Those five principles are important. However, Moscow subscribed to these principles in documents signed in 1975 (Helsinki Final Act) and 1990 (Charter of Paris).
The problem isn't agreeing to principles, but Moscow's failure to abide by them. 🧵 /1
President Trump today advanced an important discussion with several European leaders about the need for a broader European security architecture that can help establish the conditions for lasting peace.
Building on his leadership and the substantive work undertaken this week in Brussels with Ukraine, NATO, and our European partners, @SEPeaceMissions and I wanted to share some of the objectives guiding our ongoing discussions.
For more than 30 years, Europe and Russia have struggled to establish a sustainable security framework. Decades of mistrust, competing security concerns, and the devastating consequences of this war make this an extraordinarily difficult challenge, but one that is essential to lasting peace.
Our objective is to develop practical arrangements that address the security concerns of all sides, reduce the risk of future conflict, and create a more stable and predictable security environment.
We are exploring five principal goals: permanent security consultations, reliable crisis communications, greater military transparency, reciprocal measures to reduce escalation risks, and an enduring framework for long-term European security and stability.
Any arrangements must fully respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independent decision-making of every nation. Each country will retain authority over its own security and alliances, and no country would have a veto over another’s sovereign choices. NATO will remain central to European collective defense, and this initiative would build upon existing institutions and commitments.
We will continue consultations through the Shell Bay format with Ukraine, NATO, the EU, and our European partners, expanding engagement to ensure that all relevant perspectives and ideas are considered. We will also engage Russia as part of the peace negotiations.
Next week in Abu Dhabi, the United States will convene the first trilateral peace discussions with Ukraine and Russia since February. All parties remain intensely engaged in preparing for substantive and productive negotiations. We will consult closely with our European partners on the sidelines and, if progress is made, aim to move toward a broader multilateral format with their direct participation.
These ideas continue to evolve, and we welcome thoughtful input. Creating the right structure will be critical to ending this war and transitioning from conflict toward conditions that make possible a durable peace.
This is difficult, detailed work. There are no easy solutions. But the opportunity to help end this devastating war and build a foundation for a more peaceful, secure, and prosperous Europe for generations to come makes it a challenge well worth undertaking.
We will see how these discussions develop and continue working intensively with all parties toward President Trump’s objective of a comprehensive and lasting peace.
„My growing conviction is that there will be no lasting settlement of the conflict.“
Some thoughts on the prospects for a settlement of Russia's war against Ukraine.
Mainstream thinking about the conflict largely revolves around when the war might end, how to pressure Russia into a ceasefire, and what a possible settlement could look like. We often hear that if the current attempt to advance the peace process fails, another window of opportunity may open in, say, six months. The problem is that we have been hearing this mantra about the "next six months" for almost five years now.
My growing conviction is that there will be no lasting settlement of the conflict. A ceasefire may be possible, but it is likely to be partial, fragile and tactical, doing little to bring about sustainable peace. Instead, we should prepare for a prolonged period of deterioration and escalation across multiple fronts.
This is not simply about the continuation of the war. It is about a broader, pervasive process of destabilisation, at least over the medium term.
Ukraine is facing what could be its worst winter yet, amid mounting domestic pressures. I see little that could fundamentally change this trajectory. Even an unlikely settlement could — and probably would — accelerate domestic political conflicts and fuel instability. A ceasefire would bring elections closer, introducing another potential source of destabilisation. And I struggle to imagine any scenario in which any Ukrainian leadership would agree to Putin's terms for ending the conflict. Whatever agreement might eventually be signed, if one is signed at all, would risk remaining largely unimplemented, as happened with the Minsk agreements.
Russia will not emerge stronger either. Financial and budgetary pressures, a struggling economy, increasingly frustrated elites, an unsettled society and unresolved geopolitical tensions — which would not disappear with a ceasefire or settlement and could even intensify — are likely to drive further domestic repression, erode Putin's authority and push elites to focus increasingly on their own survival, whatever the cost. The war has been steadily exhausting the Russian economy, and this process will continue. And this, too, may lead to less predictable and more dangerous geopolitical behaviour.
Europe faces potentially pivotal elections in France. It is likely to become more divided, more fragile in its ability to provide financial and military support to Ukraine, and less coherent in its approach. Individual European states are already taking more initiative and gaining greater agency to act independently of Brussels institutions.
Meanwhile, existing trends and persistent structural factors point towards an intensifying confrontation with Russia, growing sub-threshold threats, and an increasingly visible and tangible pattern of incidents and hybrid attacks. What appears to be a red line today may become the new normal tomorrow. And these red lines are shifting not only on the Russian side, but in Europe as well.
The broader picture is that we have entered a protracted period of destabilisation, erosion of international rules and weakening of international institutions. As those institutions lose their ability to coordinate responses, individual countries are increasingly compelled to act on their own. But this growing fragmentation and lack of coordination will, in turn, further accelerate the deterioration.
Any settlement in Ukraine risks being extremely fragile, while confrontation between Russia and Europe is likely to intensify regardless of developments on the Ukrainian track.
This new reality may be with us for years, potentially until the accumulated escalation across multiple fronts reaches a peak that finally — and hopefully — forces all sides to sit down and engage in genuine dialogue.
Until then, I believe we should prepare for the worst.
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Finnlands und Norwegens Premiers haben mit Putin telefoniert. Keine großen Ergebnisse, aber sie haben vereinbart, dass sie auch zukünftig den telefonischen Kontakt halten.
Damit dürfte klar sein, wer für die Europäer zukünftig über den Krieg in der Ukraine verhandelt.
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Mark my words. Nach Hubbard und dem Oleschky-Melania-Deal gibt Trump bald bekannt, dass er zum Dreiergipfel mit Xi und Putin reisen wird. Das war der Preis.
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Der scheinbar von Melania Trump vermittelte Waffenstillstand von Oleschky ist in Wahrheit ein weiteres Geschenk von Putin an Trump vor den Mid Terms.
Dafür bekommt der Kreml eine Drosselung von Starshield und eine Verzögerung von Patriot-Lieferungen. Guter Deal für den Kreml.
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Man kommt aus dem Staunen nicht mehr raus.
The GRU hacked into Jared Kushner's iPhone. Dutch military intelligence (MIVD) then recruited a GRU spy who gave them access to the hacked phone. What MIVD discovered was that Kushner had access to two bank accounts --one Azerbaijani, the other Israeli --where Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Emirati ruler Mohammed bin Zayed deposited money. It sounds like a slightly far-fetched episode of "Slow Horses," but it's real. And it proves just how eye-poppingly corrupt this administration was and continues to be as its "special envoy" decides the fate of tens of millions in Europe in the Middle East. Simply incredible reporting by Matthew Cole, drawn from his new book on Kushner. vanityfair.com/story/jared-k…
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Witkoff und Kushner am Mittwoch in St. Petersburg für Treffen mit Putin.
Das meldet die New York Times.
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Sebastian Ehm retweeted
This has been Putin's dream for years: That his country, with GDP per capita lower than Poland, unable to conquer Donbas since 2014, will be treated as an equal to the US and China.
wsj.com/world/russia/putin-f…
Der Krieg dauert schon fast fünf Jahre und es ist keine Lösung in Sicht. Im Hintergrund aber laufen Gespräche - und die verlaufen ganz nach Putins Geschmack.
zdfheute.de/politik/ausland/…
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Bitte genau hinschauen bei den Sanktionsnachrichten. Es ist wie so oft nicht ganz so schwarz weiß wie die bloßen Meldungen vermuten lassen
I don't think the US is relaxing sanctions on Russia. Here is why:
1.) The timing of the Graham Act waiver is mostly a coincidence. Trump would have had to impose new sanctions and tariffs latest on 18 October. He had to use the waiver now - and it was clear that he would use it.
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Der kremltreue Blogger Ilya Remeslo wurde wegen Fake-News über die ru Armee festgenommen. Das meldet Reuters
Scheint als würde Putin die Zügel vor der Duma-Wahl nochmal straffziehen. Heute steht auch der kürzlich festgenommene Ex-Präsidentschaftskandidat Nadeschdin vor Gericht.
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Kein Korrespondent in Moskau, aber trotzdem Breaking News.
Wir haben zum Fall Tilly aus unserem Schnitt in Mainz live ins @ZDF geschaltet. Vorher standen wir mit unseren Kollegen im Moskauer Gericht in engem Austausch.
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Sebastian Ehm retweeted
Im Prozess gegen den Düsseldorfer Wagenbauer Jacques Tilly in Russland werden die Plädoyers beider Seiten erwartet. @Sebastian_Ehm, Korrespondent beim @ZDF für Russland, spricht über mögliche Folgen.













