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People are not exploiting it, they are topping it up 😂😂.
Phill retweeted
24 hours ago I built honeypots directly into my live web servers.
There has been over 60 attempts of php2shell on the servers. Out of those 60, none of them have been done correctly.
Here are two examples
Phill retweeted
For comparison I checked with the Wordfence team and we saw 5 site cleanings for the UpdraftPlus infrastructure compromise 6 days ago. And that WordPress plugin has 3 million installs. BuiltWith says there are 23 million or 104 million PHP sites, depending on whether you count 'expired' or not. And not a single compromised site hit our site cleaning team. 🤔
xitter.cf/mmaunder/status/211335…
We protect over 5 million PHP sites and when we find a major exploitable vulnerability, we always see site cleanings. We have seen exactly zero hacked sites from php2shell. Zero. Across a population of 5 million PHP sites that our product protects. Draw your own conclusions. #php2shell
🚨 PHP warns of another unpatched remote code execution risk; CVE-2026-115560
The newly disclosed vulnerability is separate from the two PHP2Shell flaws patched earlier this week and is not fixed by PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 or 8.2.35.
⠀
PHP says exploitation requires an unusual configuration where an application:
• Uses php_binary or php_serialize as its session serializer
• Changes the serializer to php at runtime before session_start()
• Has session upload progress enabled
⠀
PHP considers the risk unlikely and plans to release a fix during its next regular update cycle.
Until then, administrators with affected configurations should set:
session.upload_progress.enabled=0
Applications that do not change the session serializer at runtime are not exposed through this path.
No exploitation has been reported.
Source:
php.net/
Phill retweeted
I'll be the first to admit I'm mediocre at exploit development, but I am in contact with enough extremely talented exploit developers to say this for certain:
Anyone claiming they were "easily" able to generate a working php2shell exploit with AI is either:
a) a world-class exploit developer with an extreme case of imposter syndrome.
b) currently looking at some very confident-sounding but wrong LLM output.
I'm rather certain it's the latter based on the number of AI-hallucinated exploits I've seen posted on GitHub. Threat actors are also blasting my honeypot network with "php2shell" exploits that not only don't work, but aren't even within 10,000 miles of anything to do with how the exploit actually works.
I've seen the same technique from the attached image in multiple alleged "php2shell exploits", including one on GitHub with over 100 stars. Problem is, it's not php2shell, nor is it even a vulnerability at all. It's a technique known as "session poisoning", which can be leveraged to exploit local file inclusion (LFI) vulnerabilities in PHP apps (not PHP itself).
The only thing it has in common with CVE-2026-109618/CVE-2026-109619 is they both use the "PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS" feature. And mitigation advice for both issues reference setting "session.upload_progress.enabled" to "Off".
People are shoving loose details of the vulnerability into LLMs, the LLMs are keying in on the "PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS" string, then generating session poisoning code that has nothing to do with the actual CVE. And because the people doing this have absolutely no idea what they're doing, they're confident enough to post their "proof of concept exploit" to GitHub and share it on social media.
So if you see people talking about "session poisoning + LFI" it's likely their LLM hallucinated an exploit based on a 2018 blog by Orange Tsai talking about a local file inclusion attack vector.
What's even worse is that "security researchers" are then using LLMs to triage these exploitation attempts, falling victim to the same hallucinations, then confirming there is ongoing mass-exploitation (there currently isn't).
The actual real exploit is very difficult to exploit, and so far I've not seen anyone successfully get it working on more than a handful of PHP version with highly-specific configurations.
LLMs are useful tools in the hands of skilled professionals, but for others, they're often just a Dunning-Kruger accelerator.
Phill retweeted
We protect over 5 million PHP sites and when we find a major exploitable vulnerability, we always see site cleanings. We have seen exactly zero hacked sites from php2shell. Zero. Across a population of 5 million PHP sites that our product protects. Draw your own conclusions. #php2shell
Phill retweeted
We plan the retreat, your team enjoys the time together.
Company offsites across Thailand planned end-to-end for remotely distributed teams.
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#offsitethailand #offsite #corporateretreat
Phill retweeted
Replying to @Denche2005
php is the kitchen that cooks food for a lot of websites.
someone found that if you shout a large order, the cook panics.
then stranger can walk in and put something rotten on plate waiting to be served to a customer.
Phill retweeted
The PHP security team is giving advance notice: Upcoming security release Wed, Oct 21st 2026, 14:00UTC, two critical vulnerabilities, both rated CVSSv4 9.2.
PHP users are encouraged to prepare to update. Earlier release if details become public or active exploit evidence.
Got a ping today to say my Content Injection vulnerability report in Astra Theme had been published.
I guess this was the last vulnerability I found, before AI changed the game.
patchstack.com/database/word…
Phill retweeted
Please update your sites ASAP.
The unauthenticated stored xss one can be reproduced in a stock install (comment moderation is off by default and previously made comment config can be bypassed)
CVE is still in process.
WordPress 7.1.1 is now available with 11 security fixes, 17 Core bug fixes, and 19 Block Editor bug fixes. Update your sites immediately from the Dashboard or by downloading the release. wp.me/pZhYe-5Eh
Currently all of my (already up-to-date) TranslatePress sites are receiving password resets ever since this was disclosed.
TranslatePress – Multilingual <= 3.3.1 - Unauthenticated Account Takeover
wordfence.com/threat-intel/v…
Phill retweeted
I read @DarioAmodei's essay calling on the labs to pace the frontier. @sama agreed. The frontier will move at whatever speed it moves. The rest of the world will not slow down. Our job in the cybersecurity community is to make sure it moves securely and safely.
Here’s what I see from the front lines:
1. The unit of threat is no longer the hacker. It's an autonomous campaign. I call it the Agent-state. We see coordinated AI agents executing attack campaigns at machine speed.
2. Sophistication is dead as an attribution signal. AI gives every criminal and lone actor elite execution. Identity, infrastructure, and intent tell you who's behind an attack. Skill doesn't.
3. Runtime is the control point. Endpoints, cloud workloads, and SaaS are the battleground. Governance documents don't stop an agent in motion. Enforcement at machine speed does.
4. Every AI agent is a privileged identity. Least privilege, short-lived credentials, traceable actions, and a kill switch. Permissions never expand because an agent decides it needs more.
5. Defense has to be autonomous but also bounded. Machine-speed response, tiered by consequence, with humans owning the high-impact calls.
6. Every failed attack should make every defender smarter. Feed what we block back into detection, across customers and models, with privacy intact. This is what CrowdStrike and NVIDIA introduced with SafeMind: an agentic, always improving model and harness protection system built for defenders.
7. The AI industrial base is critical infrastructure: weights, training clusters, APIs. Call it what it is and protect it like it is.
Pacing what comes next doesn't secure what's already here. The credible path is to deploy with proof: board-level accountability for AI security, independent external red teaming, incident disclosure, secure defaults, and controls that work in production - not on paper. Anthropic and OpenAI just committed to embedding independent evaluators with employee-level access. CrowdStrike will bring what we see from the front lines to that table.
The ability for AI to act must be matched by the ability for defensive AI to stop the breach.
We Must Pace the Frontier: I’ve written a new essay on why the AI industry should slow down, with a three-part plan for doing so.
Anthropic is unilaterally committing to the first of these steps. We’ll provide third-party evaluators with permanent, employee-level access to our systems, so that they can verify adherence to our safety measures, report on incidents, and assess models’ alignment during training.
You can read the full post here: darioamodei.com/post/we-must…
Phill retweeted
I resigned from Anthropic today. I spent the last three years doing pretraining research at both OpenAI and Anthropic. Neither company is acting responsibly. They are racing straight to self-improving superintelligence and gambling with our lives. More thoughts below.
The best way to breakdown those awkward moments after meeting remote colleague for the first time, is with laughter!😆
New leadership skill unlocked: Giving directions to a blindfolded colleague without laughing. #offsitethailand




























