This “mutabarrijah” has a sounder ʿaqīdah concerning the Lord she will meet who is established above His Throne, distinct and separate from His creation, in a manner befitting His majesty, bilā takyīf wa lā tamthīl, wa bilā tahrīf wa lā taʿtīl .. than you ever will with your full beard Haroun Cringe. May Allāh continue to guide her, increase her in knowledge, and keep her steadfast upon the truth.

The Ideological Roots of the Houthi Movement: To understand the religious ideology that shaped the modern Houthi sect, it is necessary to begin with two figures: Badr al-Din al-Houthi and his son Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi. Badr al-Din al-Houthi was a senior Zaydi Shiʿi scholar from Saʿdah and the patriarch of the al-Houthi family. He was not merely the father of later Houthi leaders; he was one of the principal religious and ideological figures from whom the movement developed, and the root of today’s Houthi movement. His sons included Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, who became the principal founder and first major leader of the modern Houthi movement, and ʿAbd al-Malik al-Houthi, who later became its leader. The religious background of the al-Houthi family is important, they are Jarudi Zaydi's, not merley Zaydi's. Zaydism is itself a milder branch of Shiʿasm, but it has historically contained several different tendencies. Among them, the Jarudiyya whom adopted one of the harshest extreme positions toward the first three caliphs. More moderate Zaydis did not condemn Abu Bakr, ʿUmar and ʿUthman for failing to recognize ʿAli's claim, the historical Jarudi school condemned them far more severely. Thus it is important to point out that Houthis are not synonymous with Zaydism, and the Houthi movement should not be treated as representing every Zaydi. Zaydism is an old branch of Shiʿi Islam whose history extends more than a millennium before the emergence of the Houthi family. Historically, Zaydi doctrine differed substantially from Twelver Shiism, the dominant form of current Shiism, primarily in Iran and Iraq. In numerous areas of jurisprudence and theology, Zaydism developed positions considerably closer to Sunni Islam than those of the Twelver tradition. The following statements of the Houthi founders and leaders demonstrate how this hostility toward major Companions appears in material of Badr al-Din and, even more extensively, in the recorded teachings of Hussein al-Houthi. Badr al-Din al-Houthi 1. Badr al-Din al-Houthi explicitly affirmed takfir (excommunication from Islam) of Companions whom he believed had opposed the Messenger peace be upon him. Badr al-Din explicitly states: “I personally believe in declaring them unbelievers because they opposed the Messenger of Allah.” [1] 2. Badr al-Din defended severe criticism of the Companions and rejected the proposition that companionship itself prevented attacking a Companion's reliability. In his treatise, Badr al-Din argues that simply being a Companion does not prevent criticism of someone whom he believes has committed something damaging to his reliability. [2] Badr al-Din's son Hussein al-Houthi transformed these ideas into the ideological teaching of the movement that would ultimately bear his family's name. Hussein became the dominant figure within a faction of the Believing Youth (al-Shabāb al-Muʾmin) a Zaydi revivalist movement that had emerged in the 1990s. Armed conflict began in Saʿdah in 2004 after the Yemeni government attempted to arrest Hussein, who was then leading the movement. He was killed by government forces on September 9, 2004, but his followers continued the rebellion and subsequently became widely known as the Houthis. Hussein left behind a large collection of transcribed lectures known as his malāzim, or Durūs min Hady al-Qurʾān. These texts became central ideological material for the movement. 3. Hussein blamed the Caliphs of Islam; Abu Bakr, ʿUmar and ʿUthman (may Allah be pleased with them) for the suffering and corruption of the Muslim ummah. In Durūs min Hady al-Qurʾān, Sūrat al-Māʾidah, lesson one, Hussein claims that Muʿawiyah (r.a) was among the consequences of ʿUmar's (r.a) actions and proceeds to place responsibility for the oppression and suffering of the Muslim community upon Abu Bakr, ʿUmar and ʿUthman, singling out ʿUmar in particular. [3] This is significant because Hussein was not just simply saying that the first three caliphs had made isolated mistakes. He portrayed their accession to authority as the starting point of a historical disaster whose consequences continued throughout Islamic history. 4. Hussein described the bayʿah (formal oath or pledge of allegiance) of Abu Bakr as a calamity whose evil continued into his own time. Discussing Abu Bakr's accession following the death of the Prophet peace be upon him, Hussein said that its “evil remains until now” and portrayed the Muslim world's subsequent decline as a continuing consequence of that event, he follows by stating that “The evil of that bayʿah .. We Muslims continue to suffer from its effects until today. It was an extraordinary calamity; it was the cause of the problem” [4] 5. Hussein stated that even a small amount of walāyah toward Abu Bakr and ʿUmar prevents a person from attaining guidance. In Sūrat al-Māʾidah, Hussein states: “Whoever has an atom of walāyah for Abu Bakr and ʿUmar cannot be guided.” [5] 6. Hussein claimed that allegiance to Abu Bakr and ʿUmar places a person in opposition to the Qurʾān. Hussein stated that: “Merely giving walāyah to Abu Bakr and ʿUmar makes you stand against the Qurʾān.” [6] 7. Hussein stated that Abu Bakr, ʿUmar and ʿUthman had “opposed the Messenger” and therefore could not receive religious walāyah. Hussein states that walāyah cannot be given to the first three caliphs because, according to him, “they opposed the Messenger.” [7] He further says: “We do not give walāyah to Abu Bakr and ʿUmar.” [8] 8. Hussein commanded his followers to curse those Caliphs and companions whom he regarded as responsible for misleading the Muslim ummah. “Curse those who misled us.” [9] He instructs his followers to expose and disassociate themselves from such figures and asks Allah to disgrace those who follow their path. In related lectures, Hussein discusses historical figures revered under labels such as “the Companions” and “the righteous Salaf,” arguing that religious reverence should not protect anyone whom he believed had misled the Muslim community. 9. Hussein directly attacked the Sunni conception of “al-Salaf al-Sālih.” Hussein mocks the expression “the righteous Salaf” as applied to figures revered in Sunni historical memory. He names: Abu Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿUthman, Muʿawiyah, ʿĀʾishah (wife of the prophet), ʿAmr ibn al-ʿĀs and al-Mughīrah ibn Shuʿbah and accuses those he identifies with this historical legacy of establishing oppression and dividing the Muslim community. [10] This is particularly important when examining Hussein's attitude toward Ahl al-Sunnah, because reverence for the Sahābah and the early generations is foundational to Sunni religious identity. Hussein's criticism therefore directly not only confronts one of the central pillars of Sunni historical theology, but Islam itself. 10. Hussein criticized Sunni defenses of ʿUthman and questioned reports concerning his contribution to the expedition of Tabuk. While discussing the expedition of Tabuk, Hussein complained that Sunni presentations emphasized ʿUthman's financial contribution to the campaign. He then questioned whether the reported contribution had actually occurred, describing it as open to doubt. [11] 11. Hussein suggested that states spread false religious culture through scholars, including individuals among the Companions and Tābiʿīn. In another lecture, Hussein asks rhetorically who enables false religious culture to spread and answers that states accomplish this through scholars serving them, including, in his formulation, people from among the Companions, Tābiʿīn and later generations. [12] Hussein al-Houthi and the Formation of the Modern Houthi Movement The movement that became known as the Houthis did not suddenly appear in 2004. Its origins lie partly in the Zaydi revival of northern Yemen during the 1980s and 1990s. The Believing Youth (al-Shabāb al-Muʾmin) emerged during the 1990s as a Zaydi revivalist network. It organized religious education and summer camps partly in response to the increasing influence of Salafi and so-called "Wahhabi" preaching in traditionally Zaydi areas of Yemen, and the rapid conversions of Zaydi's to Sunnism/Salafism. One of the most important figures behind this expansion of Salafism was Imām Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadiʿi, himself originally a Zaydi religious teacher from the Zaydi religious environment of Saʿdah. who later converted to Sunnism and embraced Salafism after studying Islam more deeply, and becoming increasingly opposed to aspects of Zaydi doctrine. In 1979, Imām Muqbil Al-Wadiʿi established Dar al-Hadith in Dammaj, directly in Saʿdah, the historic heartland of Zaydism. Al-Wadiʿi became one of the most influential callers to Salafi Sunni Islam in Yemen, openly challenging Zaydi religious doctrines and authority and becoming widely regarded as the founder of the modern Salafi movement in Yemen. Imām Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādiʿī was praised and encouraged by numerous senior Salafī scholars, several of whom regarded him as a mujaddid (reviver) of Islam. Imām Ibn ʿUthaymīn (rahimahullāh) said, “Tell him that I regard him as a reviver of Islam,” while Imām Rabīʿ ibn Hādī (rahimahullāh) described him as “a reviver of Islam in the land of Yemen” and said that since ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Ṣanʿānī, no one had revived the daʿwah in Yemen like al-Wādiʿī. After his death, Shaykh Rabīʿ further said that he regarded him, inshāʾAllāh, “as a reviver in our time from the revivers of Islam,” praising his patience, zuhd, piety, and endurance in carrying the daʿwah. Imām al-Albānī (rahimahullāh) likewise defended Imām Muqbil as a scholar calling to the Qurʾān, Sunnah, and the methodology of the Salaf, and stated “Allāh has blessed him with ability which is probably unparalleled when compared to some of the other callers to Islām on the face of the earth today.” Dar al-Hadith grew far beyond a local religious school. Even Carnegie describes it as one of the most important religious centers in Yemen, attracting students not only from across the country but from Africa, the Americas, Indonesia, Western Europe, Egypt, Algeria and elsewhere in the Muslim world. Al-Wadiʿi's students subsequently established additional Salafi institutes throughout Yemen. The growth of Dar al-Hadith inside the Zaydi stronghold of Saʿdah generated considerable concern among traditional Zaydi authorities; al-Wadiʿi even required tribal guarantees for the institute's protection because of the opposition it faced. Academic research explicitly describe Dar al-Hadith's expansion as a threat to traditional Zaydi religious influence in Saʿdah. Shaykh Muqbil died in 2001, but Dar al-Hadith continued under his successors and students, and remained a major Salafi center. The growing conflict between the Houthis and the Salafis of Dammaj eventually became violent. Human Rights Watch admittedly records that Houthi forces placed Dar al-Hadith under siege in 2011 and reports that on 27 November 2011, Houthi rebels killed and wounded thousands of students in an attack on the Salafi institute. HRW also records that an 18 year old student was shot while playing football in the institute's courtyard earlier that month. The conflict intensified again in 2013. The Sanaʿa Center states that the Houthi military campaign in Dammaj specifically focused on Dar al-Hadith and its students, while the U.S. State Department reported that a Salafi mosque was bombed and that Houthi fighters besieged the institute. Months of fighting and blockade eventually forced the evacuation of non-local students and many Salafi residents from Dammaj in January 2014, effectively ending Dar al-Hadith's role as the international Salafi center that Muqbil al-Wadiʿi had established there. Hussein al-Houthi later entered into disagreement with some of the movement's earlier figures, and by approximately 2002 the organization divided between those following figures such as Muhammad ʿAzzan and those following Hussein. Hussein's faction increasingly used his own political-religious educational materials. When armed conflict erupted between Hussein's followers and the Yemeni government in 2004, the movement entered an entirely new phase. Hussein was killed in September 2004, but his death did not destroy the movement. Leadership eventually passed to his younger brother ʿAbd al-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and the organization developed into what is today officially known as Ansar Allah. The teachings above establish considerable religious and polemical hostility toward foundational Sunni historical beliefs, particularly Sunni reverence for Abu Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿUthman, ʿĀʾishah and the early generations. Badr al-Din himself wrote against "Wahhabi" and Salafi religious ideas. Hussein's lectures repeatedly attacked what he regarded as Sunni misrepresentation of early Islamic history and condemned Sunni religious attachment to the first caliphs. The broader Zaydi revival from which the movement emerged also developed partly as a reaction against expanding Salafi and Sunni influence in traditionally Zaydi areas. This ideological competition later intersected with armed conflict. There have been serious confrontations between the Houthi movement and Salafi communities in northern Yemen, most famously around Dammaj, where prominent Salafi institutes had operated in Saʿdah. The Saʿdah conflicts also contained political, tribal, territorial and state-related dimensions in addition to their religious component. 12. The hostility toward foundational Sunni beliefs did not end with Hussein al-Houthi. His brother Yaḥyā Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥūthī later publicly refused to invoke Allah’s pleasure upon Abū Bakr and ʿUmar, stating: “I do not invoke Allah’s pleasure upon them.” When challenged further, he responded: “What do you think about the one who wronged Fāṭimah?” [13] 13. Yaḥyā also portrayed “Wahhabism” and its religious institutions as a threat to Yemen, declaring in one interview that “we must struggle, wage jihād and fight until our country is in our hands.” [14] 14. Under ʿAbd al-Malik al-Ḥūthī, this rhetoric increasingly accompanied military expansion. The movement routinely labeled Sunni opponents “takfīrīs,” and in 2015 Houthi forces called supporters to jihād in predominantly Shāfiʿī-Sunni areas such as Taiz and Aden. ʿAbd al-Malik himself described the ongoing fighting as a “sacred jihād.” [15] Zaydism has never been monolithic. Among its historical currents was the Jarudiyya, named after Abu al-Jarud Ziyad ibn al-Mundhir. The Jarudi current took a much harsher position concerning succession after Prophet Muhammad peacebe upon him. More moderate Zaydi tendencies held that ʿAli ibn Abi Talib was more deserving of leadership while stopping short of declaring Abu Bakr, ʿUmar and ʿUthman unbelievers merely because they assumed the caliphate. The Jarudiyya went significantly further. This is precisely why the Jarudi background of the al-Houthi family matters. - Abu Islām al-Salafī al-Misrī ______ Footnotes: [1] Abu Jaʿfar al-Mabkhut interview with Badr al-Din al-Houthi, originally published on the Shiʿi website al-Maʿṣūmūn al-Arbaʿat ʿAshar, as well as Shiʿi forum YaHosein. More sources: ʿAli al-Sadiq, Mādhā Taʿrif ʿan Ḥizb Allāh? - ʿAbdullah al-Sanʿani's al-Ḥarb fī Ṣaʿdah min Awwal Sayhah ilā Ākhir Talqah, p. 19. - ʿAdil Muhammad ʿAbd al-Qadir ʿAli, al-Ḥarakah al-Ḥūthiyyah: al-Nashʾah, al-ʿAqīdah, al-Muwājahah — Annual Journal of the Faculty of Islamic Daʿwah in Cairo, Al-Azhar University, no. 28, part 1, 2015, p. 258. DOI: 10.21608/BFDC.2015.26825." [2] Tahrīr al-Afkār by Badr al-Din al-Houthi, p. 480 [3] Durūs min Hady al-Qurʾān, Sūrat al-Māʾidah, lesson one, p. 2. [4] Durūs min Hady al-Qurʾān, Sūrat al-Māʾidah, Lesson One, pp. 2–3 [5] Sūrat al-Māʾidah, lesson one, p. 16. [6] al-Wahdah al-Īmāniyyah, p. 11. [7] Sūrat al-Māʾidah, lesson three, pp. 25–26, [8] Sūrat Āl ʿImrān, lesson two, p. 44. [9] Maʿrifat Allāh — Waʿduhu wa-Waʿīduhu, lesson nine, p. 6. [10] Durūs min Hady al-Qurʾān, Sūrat Āl ʿImrān, p. 14. [11] Hussein's Yawm al-Quds al-ʿĀlamī 1, p. 17. [12] Durūs min Hady al-Qurʾān — Sūrat Āl ʿImrān, p. 7. 13] Yaḥyā Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥūthī on Abū Bakr and ʿUmar Nashwan News, “Transcript of Al-Mustaqillah Channel Episodes on the Houthis and Zaydism in Yemen (Episode Six, Part 2)”; the same episode is also cited in the Al-Azhar study. Nashwan News Nashwan News transcript [14] Yaḥyā al-Ḥūthī on “Wahhabism” and fighting Burhan Ahmed, “Houthi Propaganda Discourse in the Media: A Study in Ideological and Intellectual Warfare,” Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, June 10, 2024. Sana’a Center study [15] Later Houthi sectarian/jihād rhetoric under ʿAbd al-Malik Abdulkareem Ghanem, “Addressing Social Fragmentation in Yemen,” Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, March 1, 2019. The study states that the Houthi movement used “takfiri” as a derogatory term for Sunni Islamists and that in September 2015 Houthi forces called supporters to jihād in Taiz and Aden, framing the fighting as a holy war rather than a political battle. Sana’a Center study.

THE ARCHIVE REMAINS OPEN. Over the coming weeks, I will continue adding: Table of Contents previews. Manuscript excerpts. Declassified records & cable snippets. Source trails. Updates.. All beneath this thread. Bookmark it. The next file opens soon. Don't forget to contribute or pre-order here, it HELPS a lot during these final phases of the book. launchgood.com/v4/campaign/s…

Eleven years of independent research. No institution commissioned this project. No organization funded it. And the publishers I approached rejected the manuscript because of its thesis, conclusions, and the language I refused to soften .. some labeling the work “anti-Semitic.” So I continued independently. Today, Operation Arab Spring: Divide & Conquer exceeds 1,000 pages with hundreds of documented images, and remains in its final stages of research, source verification, editing, design, and production. The scale of this project is the kind of work that would normally require an entire research team .. researchers, editors, fact-checkers, designers, and production staff. Instead, I have spent more than a decade building it largely on my own, with extremely limited resources and without institutional funding. The goal now is simple: Finish the work. Bring the investigation into print. Put the evidence in the hands of readers. If you believe this research is important and deserves to see the light of day, please consider supporting the project by pre-ordering the book or contributing directly through the LaunchGood campaign. launchgood.com/v4/campaign/s… Your support helps fund the final research, verification, editing, production, and publication of a project that has consumed more than eleven years of my life. Help me finish what I started. Help bring the investigation into print.

Every answer opened another historical layer. Colonialism. Intelligence. Psychological warfare. Political engineering. Ideological movements. NGOs. Media. Foreign-policy doctrine. Competing visions of a “New Middle East.” Eventually I stopped focusing only on: “What happened in 2011?” and began to extensively research and document: “What historical machinery made 2011 possible?”

Inside this book: How the Arab Spring spread across the region. Diplomatic cables and activist networks. Foreign funding. Regime change. Color revolutions. Political engineering. Media narratives. NGOs. Identity. Religion. Culture. And the wider struggle over the future of the Muslim world. Not merely what happened .. but what preceded it, shaped it, and followed it.

The investigation asks what was already being discussed, funded, organized and developed before 2011: Governments. Opposition networks. Foreign institutions. Activist training. Funding channels. Think tanks. Media. Geopolitical projects. The Arab Spring is the center of this book. But the story does not begin with the Arab Spring.

Then I started following the documentary trail. 08CAIRO2572_A .. a December 2008 U.S. Embassy Cairo cable - one of MANY - concerning April 6 activist’s U.S. visit and “regime change in Egypt.” Documents like this became part of the record behind the manuscript. Read all the documents in the book first. Then judge the argument.

Twenty-five countries. One cascading sequence. The uprisings did not occur in isolation. The book reconstructs the sequence across the region, and then asks a much larger question: What was already happening before the first crowds entered the streets?

11 years of research. More than 1,000 pages. 100's of documentations: Leaked diplomatic cables. Foreign-funded opposition movements. Activist training. Color-revolution playbooks. Regime-change doctrine. CIA covert “democracy-promotion” NGO's. Zionist network. “Creative destruction.” Plans for a “New Middle East.” The fragmentation of the Arab world. Colonial warfare against Islamic governance. Secularization. Secret societies. Compromised religious figures. Sectarian infiltration. The weaponization of extremist movements. Intellectual invasion. The war for the Muslim mind, much more. The questions began with the Arab Spring in 2011. The documentary trail forced me centuries further back. OPERATION ARAB SPRING: DIVIDE & CONQUER The files are opening. 🧵

SALĀH AL-DĪN & THE SHĪʿĪ FATIMID ORDER: THE PRIMARY-SOURCE RECORD DANIEL HAQIQATJOU CAN’T ERASE Before getting into the history and exposing Daniel Haqiqatjou’s continuous lies and deceptions, I have to appreciate the spectacle here .. a male who repeatedly parades himself as a “Harvard-grad” intellectual, yet keeps outsourcing questions pertaining to Islam and its history to his Shaykh Grok. Forget Ibn al-Athīr, Abū Shāmah, al-Qādī al-Fādil, Ibn Kathīr, al-Dhahabī, al-Maqrīzī and the surviving chancery documents. We have apparently entered the age of Shaykh al-Islām Grok ibn Algorithm, Haqiqatjou’s new marjaʿ for Islam. Rejecting a meme quotation doesn't help you rewrite the documented history of Salāh al-Dīn and the Shīʿī Fatimid state. And the actual primary-source record is significantly stronger and harsher than the meme. Salāh al-Dīn was simultaneously fighting the Crusaders while fighting the Shīʿī Fatimid caliphate While fighting the Crusaders, he was simultaneously and deliberately dismantling the Fatimid-Ismāʿīlī political and religious order inside Egypt, replacing its institutions, strengthening Sunni madrasas and judges, terminating Fatimid sovereignty, and restoring the khutbah in the name of the Abbasid caliph. And now we come to the part you keep trying desperately to ignore and cover up. Salāh al-Dīn's own chancery: “WE ARE FIGHTING THE TWO ENEMIES”: KUFR, NIFĀQ, AND THE DISTORTION OF THE SHARĪʿAH FROM THE THE SHĪʿĪ FATIMID Unlike the viral quote Daniel shared, we actually possess surviving official material with extraordinarily stronger language from Salāh al-Dīn's own chancery, composed by his chief secretary al-Qādī al-Fādil describing the Shīʿī Fatimid doctrine al-Qalqashandī explicitly introduces one of the documents: “وهذه نسخة تذكرة أنشأها القاضي الفاضل عن السلطان صلاح الدين يوسف بن أيوب” “This is a copy of a memorandum composed by al-Qādī al-Fādil on behalf of Sultan Salāh al-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Ayyūb.” [3] This is not a meme, nor is this material your shaykh Grok will bring forward in its answers to you Daniel, this is a memorandum written on behalf of Salāh al-Dīn. The memorandum describes the religious order Salāh al-Dīn encountered in Egypt in extraordinarily severe and ex-communicational terms, the type of terms and “sectarianism” Daniel whines about: “تحريف للشريعة بالتأويل” “Distorting the Sharīʿah through interpretation.” [4] Then: “وكفر سمي بغير اسمه” “And unbelief—kufr—called by another name.” [4] The fuller passage condemns what it describes as the violation of prohibitions, abandonment of obligations, distortion of revelation through interpretation and a religious system concealing itself under another name. [4] Then comes perhaps the most devastating passage for your entire framing. Discussing the fighting surrounding Bilbays and Damietta while the Fatimid order was being dismantled internally, the memorandum states: “ونحن نقاتل العدوين: الباطن والظاهر” “We are fighting the two enemies: the inward and the outward.” [5] And immediately thereafter: “ونصابر الضدين: المنافق والكافر” “And we contend with the two adversaries: the hypocrite and the unbeliever.” [5] Ouch, Read it again deceptive Dan. “We are fighting the two enemies.” .. “The Munāfiqs and the Kuffār” The document itself had just described the internal Egyptian/Fatimid struggle and the intervention of the Franks at Bilbays and Damietta. It then contrasts al-bātin with al-zāhir, followed by al-munāfiq and al-kāfir. [5] So to Salāh al-Dīn and his government the Shīʿa Fatimids were munāfiqs .. "Indeed, the hypocrites will be in the lowest depths of the Fire, and never will you find for them a helper." (Qurʾān, Sūrah An-Nisā 4:145) That is far more historically significant than the internet meme you are triumphantly asking Shaykh Grok to debunk. It explicitly depicts Salāh al-Dīn's struggle as simultaneous with two enemies being confronted at the same time, and accusations of takfīr and distorting Islam and switching it. Not only that Taqqiyatjou .. the memorandum continues by describing the dismantling of the old Fatimid establishment until: “تفرقت شيعه، وتمزقت بدعه، وخفتت دعوته، وخفيت ضلالته” “Its factions were dispersed, its bidʿah (innovations) were torn apart, its daʿwah was silenced, and its misguidance disappeared.” [6] It then says that the public khutbah and Abbasid standard were established. [6] So much for pretending this was merely an ordinary dynastic transition with no religious dimension. Another official letter: The Shīʿa Fatimid’s “the partisans of misguidance” There is another chancery letter composed by al-Qādī al-Fādil and dispatched to Baghdad following the destruction of the Fatimid order. Imām Al-Dhahabī preserves it explicitly as: “ومن كتاب من إنشاء القاضي الفاضل إلى بغداد” “From a letter composed by al-Qādī al-Fādil to Baghdad.” [7] The letter declares: “والبدعة خاشعة، والجمعة جامعة، والمذلة في شيع الضلال شائعة” “Innovation has been humbled, the Friday congregation united, and humiliation has spread among the partisans of misguidance.” [7] It then says: “اتخذوا عباد الله من دونه أولياء، وسموا أعداء الله أصفياء” “They took servants of Allah as patrons besides Him and called the enemies of Allah His chosen ones.” [7] And then comes the sentence that annihilates the attempt to construct an either/or between combating the Fatimid order and fighting the Crusaders: “وليس السيف عمن سواهم من كفار الفرنج بصائم” “Nor is the sword abstaining from the Frankish unbelievers besides them.” [8] Followed by: “ولا الليل عن السير إليهم بنائم” “Nor does the night sleep from marching against them.” [8] Imām Al-Dhahabī: Salāh al-Dīn “obliterated the state of al-Rafd” Al-Dhahabī's own summary is hardly ambiguous. Discussing the fall of al-ʿĀdid, he writes: “واستأصل شأفة بني عبيد، ومحق دولة الرفض” “He uprooted Banū ʿUbayd root and branch and obliterated the state of al-Rafd (Rāfidism).” [9] Al-Dhahabī places this immediately after mentioning Salāh al-Dīn's removal of al-ʿĀdid and restoration of the Abbasid khutbah. [9] The jurists sanctioned the deposition of al-ʿĀdid on religious grounds Al-Dhahabī also transmits Ibn Khallikān's account that when Salāh al-Dīn determined to depose the Fatimid ruler, he consulted the jurists: “استفتى الفقهاء، فأفتوا بجواز خلعه لما هو من انحلال العقيدة والاستهتار” “He sought the legal opinion of the jurists, and they ruled that his deposition was permissible because of the corruption/dissolution of his creed and his irreverence.” [10] Regarding Shaykh Najm al-Dīn al-Khubūshānī, the account continues: “فإنه عدد مساوئ هؤلاء، وسلب عنهم الإيمان” “He enumerated the evils of these people and denied them [the attribution of] faith.” [10] Again, this is evidence concerning the Shīʿī Fatimid ruling establishment and its people, and it absolutely destroys Daniel’s claims, and shows that the overthrow was not devoid of an explicit religious judgment. [10] Al-Maqrīzī: Salāh al-Dīn removed the Shīʿī judiciary Al-Maqrīzī gives an extraordinarily direct description of Salāh al-Dīn's restructuring of Egypt. He writes: “وصرف قضاة مصر الشيعة كلهم” “He dismissed all of Egypt's Shīʿī judges.” [11] He says that the judiciary was transferred to the Shāfiʿī Sadr al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Dirbās and continues: “فتظاهر الناس من حينئذ بمذهب مالك والشافعي، واختفى مذهب الشيعة والإسماعيلية والإمامية حتى فقد من أرض مصر كلها” “From that time the people openly followed the madhhabs of Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī, while the madhhab of the Shīʿa—the Ismāʿīliyya and the Imāmiyya—disappeared until it was no longer found throughout the land of Egypt.” [11] Notice what al-Maqrīzī actually names: الشيعة — the Shīʿa الإسماعيلية — the Ismāʿīliyya الإمامية — the Imāmiyya You do not get to rewrite that into a religiously neutral bureaucratic reshuffle. Al-Maqrīzī: “He abolished the Shīʿī madhhabs from the lands of Egypt” Elsewhere al-Maqrīzī states it even more plainly: “فلما انقرضت الدولة الفاطمية على يد السلطان صلاح الدين يوسف بن أيوب أبطل مذاهب الشيعة من ديار مصر، وأقام بها مذهب الإمام الشافعي، ومذهب الإمام مالك” “When the Fatimid state came to an end at the hands of Sultan Salāh al-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Ayyūb, he abolished the Shīʿī madhhabs from the lands of Egypt and established there the madhhab of Imām al-Shāfiʿī and the madhhab of Imām Mālik.” [12] Again: “أبطل مذاهب الشيعة” “He abolished the Shīʿī madhhabs.” But please Daniel, ask Shaykh al-ʿAllāmah Imām Grok another yes-or-no question. Perhaps the archive will disappear this time. And yes: al-Azhar's Fatimid-Ismāʿīlī function was dismantled Now to al-Azhar. The transformation was broader and more consequential. Al-Azhar had been founded under the Fatimids and developed into a major center associated with Ismāʿīlī doctrine and Fatimid religious authority. Following the abolition of the Fatimid caliphate, Salāh al-Dīn's government dismantled that official Ismāʿīlī function. And even al-Azhar's own official historical account says: “بادر بإزالة كل مظاهر التشيع” “He hastened to remove all manifestations of Shīʿīsm.” [13] The same official al-Azhar account states: “فصرف قضاة مصر الشيعة كلهم” “He dismissed all of Egypt's Shīʿī judges.” [13] And: “وأسس مدارس فقهية حتى يثبت مذهب أهل السنة في البلاد” “He established schools of jurisprudence in order to firmly establish the madhhab of Ahl al-Sunnah in the country.” [13] It further records that the khutbah and Friday prayer at al-Azhar were suspended because of its status as the official religious center of the Fatimid Shīʿī state. [13] Modern academic scholarship independently confirms the broader transition. Let’s bring some Western scholarship as well, since Daniel loves to simp for them so much .. Cambridge scholarship describes Salāh al-Dīn's post-1171 program as restoring Sunni dominion: the Fatimid imam's name disappeared from the khutbah, the Sunni adhān replaced the Shīʿī form, Ismāʿīlī ceremonial elements were removed, Ismāʿīlī judges were replaced, Ismāʿīlī daʿwah sessions ceased, and al-Azhar lost its function as an Ismāʿīlī missionary center. [14] Oxford's reference history summarizes the institutional result directly: al-Azhar, founded under the Fatimids, became a Sunni institution after Salāh al-Dīn's 1171 conquest, although its later rise to preeminence was gradual. [14] So if by “Salāh al-Dīn purified al-Azhar from Shīʿīsm” one means that he terminated its official Fatimid-Ismāʿīlī doctrinal role and incorporated Egypt into a Sunni political-religious order, then yes, there is very substantial historical evidence for exactly that process. Ibn Taymiyyah's assessment, Centuries later, Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyyah summarized the transformation of Egypt under Salāh al-Dīn: “فأزال عنها دعوة العبيديين من القرامطة الباطنية وأظهر فيها شرائع الإسلام” “So he removed from it the daʿwah of the ʿUbaydids, from the Qarmatian-Bātinīs, and manifested therein the laws of Islam.” [15] Ibn Taymiyyah first discusses Nūr al-Dīn recovering territory from the Christians, then the dispatching of armies into Egypt with Salāh al-Dīn, and then the removal of the ʿUbaydid/Bātinī daʿwah. [15] Ibn Taymiyyah continues with an even more severe description of Fatimid-era al-Azhar: “وكان بالجامع الأزهر عدة مقاصير يلعن فيها الصحابة، بل يتكلم فيها بالكفر الصريح” “At al-Azhar Mosque there were several enclosed sections in which the Companions were cursed; indeed, explicit unbelief was spoken there.” [16] Al-Dhahabī and the Bātinī Fatimid establishment Al-Dhahabī also preserves an earlier historical account describing the destruction of the Fatimid regime: “وكانت هذه الفعلة من أشرف أفعاله، فلنعم ما فعل، فإن هؤلاء كانوا باطنية زنادقة” “This deed was among his most noble actions—how excellent was what he did—for these people were Bātinī heretics.” [17] The important qualification is that al-Dhahabī introduces this as material he found in an earlier historical account; therefore the precise judgment should be described as an earlier account preserved by al-Dhahabī. [17] Ibn Kathīr's assessment of the Fatimid state Ibn Kathīr's description is equally severe. Writing about the end of the dynasty, he states: “وكانوا من أغنى الخلفاء وأجبرهم وأظلمهم، وأنجس الملوك سيرة، وأخبثهم سريرة، ظهرت في دولتهم البدع والمنكرات” “They were among the wealthiest of rulers, the most tyrannical and oppressive of them, among the foulest of kings in conduct and the most corrupt inwardly; innovations and reprehensible practices appeared during their state.” [18] All these statements show that there can be no serious claim that the later Sunni historiographical tradition somehow viewed the Fatimid collapse as doctrinally insignificant. [18] Opposition to Ismāʿīlism did not simply disappear after 1171 And this is important. Opposition to the Fatimid-Ismāʿīlī order was not merely a temporary excuse that vanished the moment al-ʿĀdid died. In 577H/1181–82, roughly a decade after the fall of the Fatimid caliphate, Salāh al-Dīn wrote to the Abbasid caliph explaining his Syrian policy. In summary Salāh al-Dīn's own presentation was that he depicted himself as engaged in a struggle for Islam against a threefold enemy—the Frankish invader, the Ismāʿīlī Assassins, whom the letter characterized as heretical and murderous, and the Zengid rulers of Mosul, whom he accused of cooperation with the other two. [19] Again, this alone destroys the caricature that his hostility toward Bātinī-Ismāʿīlī political movements somehow ended with the Fatimid dynasty. A Fatimid restoration attempt seventeen years later Then in 584H/1188–89, Ibn Kathīr records a group in Egypt attempting to restore the Fatimid state. He writes: “خرجت طائفة بمصر من الرافضة ليعيدوا دولة الفاطميين” “A group of the Rāfida arose in Egypt seeking to restore the Fatimid state.” [20] They sent twelve men into the streets at night crying: “يا آل علي، يا آل علي” “O family of ʿAlī! O family of ʿAlī!” [20] Nobody joined them. When news reached Salāh al-Dīn: “ساءه ذلك واهتم له” “It distressed him, and he became concerned about it.” [20] Al-Qādī al-Fādil then reportedly reassured him that he should actually be pleased because none of his subjects had responded to the attempted mobilization. [20] That is seventeen years after the Fatimid caliphate ended. Imam Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s assessment And since you love Imām Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and are obsessed with him, let’s see what he stated commenting on the classical material of the Fatimid case: “ولكن من آخر ما جرى قصة بني عبيد ملوك مصر وطائفتهم، وهم يدعون أنهم من أهل البيت، ويصلون الجمعة والجماعة، ونصبوا القضاة والمفتين، أجمع العلماء على كفرهم وردتهم وقتالهم” “Among the later cases was that of Banū ʿUbayd, the rulers of Egypt and their faction. They claimed to belong to Ahl al-Bayt, performed Friday and congregational prayer, and appointed judges and muftis; [he states that] the scholars agreed upon their unbelief, apostasy and fighting them.” [21] That is the same exact theological judgment, as those before him So what does the historical record actually establish? It establishes something much more sophisticated and much stronger than the viral quotation Daniel is desperately using to cover up the reality of Salāh al-Dīn’s stance against the Shīʿa. Salāh al-Dīn was already fighting the Crusaders and at the same time, he was systematically dismantling the Fatimid-Ismāʿīlī political, judicial and religious establishment inside Egypt. His chancery described the Fatimid religious system using the language of kufr, nifāq, bidʿah, dalāl, and the internal enemy. The same chancery explicitly declared: “ونحن نقاتل العدوين: الباطن والظاهر” “We are fighting the two enemies: the inward and the outward.” [5] That is the documentary answer to your false binary. His government replaced Shīʿī judges with Sunni judges. Al-Maqrīzī explicitly says: “أبطل مذاهب الشيعة من ديار مصر” “He abolished the Shīʿī madhhabs from the lands of Egypt.” [12] Al-Azhar's own official history says: “بادر بإزالة كل مظاهر التشيع” “He hastened to remove all manifestations of Shīʿīsm.” [13] Al-Dhahabī says Salāh al-Dīn: “محق دولة الرفض” “Obliterated the state of al-Rafd.” [9] Ibn Taymiyyah says he: “أزال عنها دعوة العبيديين من القرامطة الباطنية” “Removed from Egypt the daʿwah of the ʿUbaydid Bātinīs.” [15] And Salāh al-Dīn's opposition to Ismāʿīlī political movements continued long after 1171. [19][20] So yes, Daniel: Cry all you want regarding the meme quotation. That will not magically erase the primary-source record. And the primary-source record is actually more damaging to your argument than the meme. What the sources actually document is this: Salāh al-Dīn fought the Crusaders while simultaneously dismantling and ultimately abolishing the Fatimid-Ismāʿīlī political-religious establishment, replacing its judiciary and institutions with Sunni ones, suppressing its official daʿwah, terminating its caliphate, removing its influence from al-Azhar, restoring Abbasid allegiance, and continuing to treat Bātinī-Ismāʿīlī political movements as enemies afterward. That is historically more precise. And the surviving language is far harsher and more explicit than the little meme you are obsessing over. So perhaps next time, before repeatedly summoning Shaykh al-Islām Grok ibn Algorithm to adjudicate medieval Islamic history, the Harvard “grad” might attempt something revolutionary: open the primary sources, did they not teach you that at Harvard @Haqiqatjou ? - Abu Islām al-Salafī al-Misrī ______ Footnotes: [1] Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah wa-l-Nihāyah, events of 565H, on the Frankish siege of Damietta. Ibn Kathīr records Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn requesting assistance from Nūr al-Dīn during the siege and al-ʿĀḍid providing financial support. See also Ibn al-Athīr's account of the siege. [2] ʿIzz al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh, events of 566H, “Dhikr Ghazwat Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Bilād al-Faranj wa-Fatḥ Aylah.” Ibn al-Athīr records Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's raids into the districts of Ascalon and Ramla, attack on Gaza, defeat of the Frankish force, and capture of Ayla. [3] Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā fī Ṣināʿat al-Inshāʾ, section preserving Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's chancery memorandum: “وهذه نسخة تذكرة أنشأها القاضي الفاضل عن السلطان صلاح الدين يوسف بن أيوب”. The text identifies al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil as composing the memorandum on behalf of Sultan Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn for delivery to the Abbasid court in Baghdad. [4] Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā, the same memorandum, containing: “تحريف للشريعة بالتأويل... وكفر سمي بغير اسمه” together with the fuller condemnation of the religious system encountered in Fatimid Egypt. [5] Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā, same memorandum: “ونحن نقاتل العدوين الباطن والظاهر، ونصابر الضدين المنافق والكافر.” The statement appears immediately after discussion of the internal Egyptian struggle and Frankish intervention at Bilbays and Damietta. [6] Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā, continuation of the same memorandum: “تفرقت شيعه، وتمزقت بدعه، وخفتت دعوته، وخفيت ضلالته”, followed by the establishment of the public khuṭbah and Abbasid political-religious symbols. [7] Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī, Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ, vol. 15, pp. 214–215, preserving “ومن كتاب من إنشاء القاضي الفاضل إلى بغداد” and the phrases “المذلة في شيع الضلال شائعة” and “اتخذوا عباد الله من دونه أولياء، وسموا أعداء الله أصفياء.” Al-Dhahabī's edition cites Abū Shāmah's al-Rawḍatayn, vol. 1, pp. 194–195, for the letter. [8] Al-Dhahabī, Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ, vol. 15, p. 215; cf. Abū Shāmah, al-Rawḍatayn, vol. 1, p. 195: “وليس السيف عمن سواهم من كفار الفرنج بصائم، ولا الليل عن السير إليهم بنائم.” [9] Al-Dhahabī, Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ, vol. 15, p. 212, biography of al-ʿĀḍid: “واستأصل شأفة بني عبيد، ومحق دولة الرفض.” [10] Ibn Khallikān's account, transmitted by al-Dhahabī in Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ, vol. 15, pp. 212–213: “استفتى الفقهاء، فأفتوا بجواز خلعه لما هو من انحلال العقيدة والاستهتار”, followed by the statement concerning Najm al-Dīn al-Khubūshānī: “فإنه عدد مساوئ هؤلاء، وسلب عنهم الإيمان.” [11] Taqī al-Dīn al-Maqrīzī, al-Mawāʿiẓ wa-l-Iʿtibār bi-Dhikr al-Khiṭaṭ wa-l-Āthār, Beirut edition, vol. 4, p. 166: “وصرف قضاة مصر الشيعة كلهم”, followed by “واختفى مذهب الشيعة والإسماعيلية والإمامية حتى فقد من أرض مصر كلها.” [12] Al-Maqrīzī, al-Khiṭaṭ, vol. 4, p. 200: “فلما انقرضت الدولة الفاطمية على يد السلطان صلاح الدين يوسف بن أيوب أبطل مذاهب الشيعة من ديار مصر، وأقام بها مذهب الإمام الشافعي، ومذهب الإمام مالك.” [13] Al-Azhar's official historical account of the Ayyubid transition states that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn “بادر بإزالة كل مظاهر التشيع”, suspended the khuṭbah and Jumuʿah at al-Azhar because of its Fatimid religious role, “صرف قضاة مصر الشيعة كلهم”, and established legal schools “حتى يثبت مذهب أهل السنة في البلاد.”"صوت الأزهر" تروى أسرار وحكايات أكثر من ألف عام أزهرية azhar.eg/details-multi-porta… [14] Daniella Talmon-Heller, Sacred Place and Sacred Time in the Medieval Islamic Middle East, Cambridge University Press, on the Ayyubid transformation following 567H/1171: restoration of Sunni rule, removal of Fatimid names and Ismāʿīlī symbols from official worship, replacement of Ismāʿīlī judges, discontinuation of Ismāʿīlī daʿwah sessions, and al-Azhar's loss of its role as an Ismāʿīlī missionary center. Oxford Bibliographies likewise states that al-Azhar became a Sunni institution after Saladin's 1171 conquest, while emphasizing that its later institutional prominence developed gradually. Cambridge University Press [15] Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, vol. 35, p. 138: “وتكرر دخول العسكر إليها مع صلاح الدين الذي فتح مصر، فأزال عنها دعوة العبيديين من القرامطة الباطنية وأظهر فيها شرائع الإسلام.” [16] Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, vol. 35, pp. 138–139, continuing his description of Fatimid Egypt: “وكان بالجامع الأزهر عدة مقاصير يلعن فيها الصحابة، بل يتكلم فيها بالكفر الصريح.” [17] Al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām wa-Wafayāt al-Mashāhīr wa-l-Aʿlām, vol. 40, p. 277, preserving an earlier historical account concerning the destruction of the Fatimid regime: “وكانت هذه الفعلة من أشرف أفعاله، فلنعم ما فعل، فإن هؤلاء كانوا باطنية زنادقة.” مكتبة صحراء النجف [18] Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah wa-l-Nihāyah, vol. 12, under the events of 567H and the death of al-ʿĀḍid. Ibn Kathīr describes the Fatimid rulers as oppressive and condemns the spread of innovations and reprehensible practices during their rule. [19] “Saladin and the Assassins,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 15, no. 2 (1953), pp. 239–245. It notes that in Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's 577H/1181–82 letter to the Abbasid caliph, he presents himself as struggling against a threefold enemy: the Frankish invader, the Ismāʿīlī Assassins, and the Zengids of Mosul. Lewis cites Abū Shāmah and related medieval witnesses. Cambridge University Press [20] Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah wa-l-Nihāyah, events of 584H: “خرجت طائفة بمصر من الرافضة ليعيدوا دولة الفاطميين”; the conspirators cried “يا آل علي، يا آل علي”, and when Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn heard of the attempted restoration “ساءه ذلك واهتم له.” [21] Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, later discussion of Banū ʿUbayd, preserved in his correspondence and subsequently collected in Najdī compilations including al-Durar al-Saniyyah, vol. 10, p. 68: “قصة بني عبيد ملوك مصر... أجمع العلماء على كفرهم وردتهم وقتالهم.”

ARABIC WRITING AND THE QUESTION OF SANCTITY IN ISLAMIC LAW: A Comprehensive Historical, Linguistic, Theological, and Jurisprudential Examination of Arabic Inscriptions on Footwear and the Athari Trademark Summary of study: The proposition that the Arabic language, every Arabic letter, or every word associated with Islamic scholarship possesses an intrinsic sanctity that prohibits its appearance on footwear is not established as a general rule of Islamic law. The available evidence supports several important distinctions: - Arabic is honored as the language of the Qur'an, but this does not automatically make every ordinary Arabic word a sacred inscription. - The word أَثَرِيّ (Atharī) was later recognized as a theological designation, but it originally possesses ordinary linguistic uses. - Classical Islamic literature records the practice of writing Arabic expressions directly on sandals, shoes, and leather boots. - Classical Arabic literature records poetry inscribed on sandals, leather footwear, and sandal straps as expressions of fashion, refinement, affection, and esteem. These include a sandal sent by Saʿīd ibn Humayd to a friend with verses honouring the recipient. Such accounts show that inscriptions on footwear were not invariably intended as degradation. - Early transmitted reports describe scholars writing notes or knowledge on their sandals. - An inscription's wording, intended meaning, placement, customary treatment, and potential for actual desecration are relevant to its legal assessment. - A classical discussion directly addresses stepping on carpets marked وقف (waqf). Ibn Hajar al-Haytamī describes the prohibition in that example as “weak, indeed anomalous”—ضعيف بل شاذ. Modern rulings also distinguish ordinary ground inscriptions and commercial labels from sacred writing. - Reports concerning a riding saddle and inscriptions on animal thighs provide further comparisons. Al-Bayhaqī records horses bearing an inscription containing Allah’s name during the time of ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, may Allah be pleased with him. Classical jurists also discuss inscriptions identifying zakāt livestock. These are distinct contexts whose relevance lies in the purpose and treatment of an inscription. - The majority position identified in comparative jurisprudence distinguishes Arabic letters from the content they convey: letters do not possess intrinsic sanctity merely because they are Arabic, whereas sacred wording requires protection. - The Shāfiʿī and Hanbalī positions summarized in the cited comparative fatwa permit cleansing with written material lacking protected content or beneficial knowledge. This provides direct evidence against treating every Arabic letter as intrinsically sacred, while preserving the minor disagreement of other jurists. - The supplied visual examples show Arabic trademarks and ordinary inscriptions on footwear and other commercial objects. They illustrate possible uses of writing, although individual image origins and claims about prevalence require documentation. - The supplied doormat examples include أهلاً وسهلاً and مرحباً (“Welcome”) and البيت بيتك (“Make yourself at home”). They illustrate ordinary Arabic greetings on surfaces intended for foot contact; the photographs alone do not establish a universal practice or scholarly consensus. - Further practical comparisons include Arabic parking instructions, floor directions, and restroom notices such as اغسل يديك (“Wash your hands”) and يرجى تشغيل السيفون بعد الاستعمال (“Please flush after use”). - The cited scholarly discussion identifies no authentic Qur’anic or Prophetic evidence establishing Arabic as the language of Paradise. The combined evidence supports the distinction between ordinary Arabic letters and content entitled to religious respect. On that basis, this study argues for the permissibility of using Arabic words, and using the word ATHARI as an ordinary commercial trademark on the visible upper surfaces of sneakers, subject to the actual wording and treatment of the design. One particularly significant historical source is Abū al-Tayyib al-Washshāʾ (d. 325 AH), who devoted an entire section of his book al-Muwashshā to Arabic writing on sandals and leather footwear, including inscriptions executed in gold and silver. The central question is not whether Arabic possesses religious importance. It does. Rather, the question is whether that importance makes Arabic inscriptions or the ordinary word ATHARI, when used as a commercial trademark on footwear, inherently sacred or prohibited from appearing on such an object. This study arose from the controversy generated by a non-Arabic-speaking Iranian critic from a Shīʿite Rafidī background that resides in the United States of America, over the use of Arabic on footwear, including his inflammatory attacks on @MutahNapoleon, also known as Napoleon, a former member of Tupac Shakur’s Outlawz. The criticism targeted Beale’s collaboration with a brand called "Athari Wear" on the limited-edition Napoleon 33 sneakers, which bear the word “Athari” as a trademark on the side of the shoe, and what appears to be an abstract Arabic calligraphy mark on the back of the shoe, as documented in the study. Having examined the relevant evidence, this study finds no basis for the categorical claim that the mere presence of ordinary Arabic writing on footwear makes it prohibited. - Abu Islām al-Salafī al-Misrī

I've been facing continuous blatant takfīr for the past 15 years directed at me and the noble scholars whose knowledge I disseminate online, alongside outright declarations that our blood is permissible to spill. Yet I remind myself that such hostilities are among the ibtilāʾ one may encounter upon the path of daʿwah. And these are not merely hostilities or occasional insults from anonymous individuals online. I recall the immense pressure and threats I faced back in 2014, when the Zionist asset and US-propped Hamas .. a militant branch of the Muslim Brotherhood which was cultivated by British intelligence, issued an official bayān against me, signed by the anonymous coward Abū ʿUbaydah, whose true identity Allāh knows best, while facing takfīr and declarations that my blood was permissible to spill from the then platform of their ʿIzz al-Dīn al-Qassām Brigades. And that was only one chapter in a much longer history of trials, intimidation, threats, and persecution I have endured at the hands of various extremist Khārijī groups and individuals over the years. Whoever calls to the truth must expect opposition, slander, hatred, threats, and hardship. This is nothing new in the history of daʿwah, as witnessed in the lives of the Prophets and Messengers, and those who followed in their footsteps. Yet, subhān Allāh, what appears outwardly to be an affliction may, by the mercy of Allāh, conceal an immense blessing. I am nothing but a poor, sinful servant of Allāh, burdened with shortcomings, mistakes, and sins, both past and present. I make no claim to righteousness or purity, and I know better than anyone how desperately I need the forgiveness and mercy of my Lord. So perhaps these insults, accusations, slanders, unjust takfīr, threats, declarations that my blood is permissible to spill, and the many injustices I have endured will, by Allāh's permission, become a means of expiation for my sins, elevation of my rank, and an addition to my scale of good deeds on the Day when I will desperately need every single good deed I can find. And perhaps those who intended to harm me, humiliate me, silence me, or destroy my reputation have, without realizing it, become a means through which Allāh grants me something far greater than anything they could ever take away from me. Saʿd ibn Abī Waqqās (may Allah be pleased with him) narrated: I asked, "O Messenger of Allah, which people are subjected to the severest trials?" The Messenger of Allah peace be upon him replied: "The Prophets, then those nearest to them in righteousness, then those nearest to them. A man is tested according to the strength of his religion. If his religion is firm, his trials become more severe; and if there is weakness in his religion, he is tested according to the strength of his religion. Trials continue to afflict the servant until they leave him walking upon the earth without a single sin." I ask Allāh to grant me and my dear brothers from Ahl al-Sunnah sincerity, patience, steadfastness, and forgiveness; to purify our intentions; and to make whatever harm we endure a means of reward, expiation, forgiveness, and drawing nearer to Him. For what greater blessing could a sinful servant hope for than to meet Allāh with sins forgiven and a scale made heavier by His mercy? Alhamdulillāh ʿalā kulli hāl. O Allah, protect us from in front of us, from behind us, from our right, from our left, and from above us. And we seek refuge in Your greatness from being unexpectedly destroyed from beneath us. O Allah, conceal our faults and protect us while we are above the earth, beneath the earth, and on the Day when we are presented before You. - Abu Islām al-Salafī al-Misrī

@sneako Malcolm X, may Allāh have mercy on him and accept him from the martyr's, helped inspire your journey to Islam. But did you know he explicitly proclaimed himself a “true Sunni Muslim” in 1964, and received “orthodox” religious instruction from Salafi Scholar Shaykh Ahmad Hassoun rahimahuallāh? I documented the archival evidence here: academia.edu/179146129/MALCO…

Malcolm X’s pilgrimage transition is famous. But do you know who taught him Islam afterward and became his official mentor and religious advisor? Salafi Scholar Shaykh Ahmad Hassoun of Sudan. Malcolm wrote: “I am now striving to live the life of a true Sunni Muslim.” — Aug. 25, 1964 My newly published research: FBI files. Arabic sources. 69 references. academia.edu/179146129/MALCO…