In fiscal 1997, Apple lost $1.05 billion. In fiscal 1998, it made $309 million, its first profitable year since 1995.
In between, Steve Jobs spent months killing projects that Apple’s own engineers loved. In the video below, he explains why he cut a technology called OpenDoc even though, as he admitted, it did things nothing else could.
“You’ve got to start with the customer experience and work backwards to the technology,” he said. “You can’t start with the technology and try to figure out where you’re going to try to sell it.”
Nobody bought a LaserWriter for the Canon engine inside it. They bought it for the page that came out.
Jobs knew how tempting the other way is. “I’ve made this mistake probably more than anybody else in this room,” he said. “And I’ve got the scar tissue to prove it.”
So OpenDoc went, even though a developer stood up in front of the room and told Jobs he didn’t know what he was talking about. “I’m sorry that OpenDoc’s a casualty along the way,” Jobs answered.
He applied the same thinking to the people. His engineers were getting calls offering three times as much money, and none were leaving. “Some mistakes will be made,” he said. “That’s good. Because at least some decisions are being made.”
Then he pointed to the first LaserWriter printout. Apple didn’t need to explain PostScript or AppleTalk. It held up the page and asked one question: “Do you want this?”
Technology is what’s inside the box. A sale is the page that comes out of it.
Are you selling what’s inside your box, or what comes out of it?
In the late 1980s, American companies spent heavily advertising “quality” and chasing quality awards. Ask people on the street which products had the best quality, and they named Japanese ones, from companies that barely used the word in their ads.
Steve Jobs, then running NeXT, had been learning from Joseph Juran, the engineer who taught quality to Japanese executives in 1954. In the video below, Jobs explains why all that American spending didn’t work.
“Customers don’t form their opinions on quality from marketing,” he said. “They form their opinions on quality from their own experience with the products.”
You can’t advertise your way out of a product that breaks.
“One can spend enormous amounts of money on quality, one can win every quality award there is,” Jobs said, “and yet if your products don’t live up to it, customers will not keep that opinion for long.”
So the work had to start with the product, not the marketing department. Treat everything as a repetitive process, measure it, take it apart and rebuild it. “No magic, no pep rallies.”
He applied the same thinking to the people. In most companies, the answer to “why is it done this way” is “that’s the way we do it here.” At NeXT, the people doing the work could fix their own processes without asking. Jobs called it “the permission to not have to ask permission.”
Then he pointed to Juran himself, still flying across the country in his 80s to teach a small startup, with nothing to gain. “His pocketbook is not what’s propelling him,” Jobs said.
An ad tells customers what to think. The product decides what they actually think.
When you pay extra for “quality,” are you paying for the product or for the ad?
In 1985, Steve Jobs left Apple and started a new computer company called NeXT. In 1997, Apple paid $427 million for it and brought him back.
Six months after NeXT began, Jobs gathered his team for a retreat. In the video below, he explains why he opened by telling them the honeymoon was over.
“The world doesn’t really care,” he said. “What the world cares about is what we produce.”
They had been a startup for six months, and they had been spending money like one.
In some areas they had a lot to show for it. In others, not much. “It would be a shame to have lost the war because we’ve won a few battles,” Jobs said.
So he named the war out loud: “not run out of money until we get our product on the market.” The logo, the bank accounts, the coffee maker were all just part of the work of getting there.
He applied the same thinking years later at Apple. “Focusing doesn’t mean saying yes, it means saying no,” he said. “We decide not to do a lot of things so we can focus on a few handfuls of things and do them well.”
Then he pointed to the founders who come to him wanting to start a company to make lots of money. His answer: “Forget it.” The ones he’d seen succeed had an idea they needed to get out into the world, and often started a company only because nobody else would listen.
Winning small battles feels like progress. Running out of money ends the war.
Are you winning small battles with your money, or making sure you never lose the war?
Thirty years after Kirk Douglas cut him off, Michael Douglas finally told his father where the tuition money came from.
It started at 21. One check, $10,000, and a short speech: “You’re on your own.” Michael pointed out he still had two years of college to pay for. The answer didn’t change.
Kirk loved telling that story. For decades he reminded the younger boys that their big brother never asked him for anything again.
What Kirk didn’t know was sitting in Michael’s closet. Two soft Italian leather suitcases, a Christmas gift from Dad. Michael had found out that each one held 22 kilos of marijuana.
Every holiday trip back east, “before dogs,” the bags went full and the product sold at a markup. In between, he pumped gas in Connecticut.
So “he never asked” was true. He just never told.
Most parents judge a kid’s independence by one signal: the requests stop. That signal is easy to fake. Silence can mean the kid has it handled. It can also mean a maxed-out credit card, a payday loan, or something worse.
A better test is three numbers, asked once a year without judgment. What comes in each month. What goes out. What’s owed. If those add up, the independence is real. If they don’t, or the kid won’t say, the safety net never disappeared. It moved somewhere you can’t see.
And if the numbers can’t add up with an honest job, the fix is to close that gap together before it gets closed some other way.
Kirk got 30 years of a great story. Michael got his degree. Only one of them knew what it really cost.
Steve Jobs described work-for-hire in one line: “You just get paid for the work once.” The dangerous part is that from the inside, it never feels like a trap. It feels like a good job.
Work-for-hire quietly caps what your effort can earn. Whatever happens to the thing you made after you hand it over, the upside belongs to someone else. And as more people compete for the same work, the price drops. “You work harder and harder to make the same amount of money,” Jobs said.
Jobs lived this. Before Toy Story, Pixar paid its bills making TV commercials and won almost every award in the business. If Listerine sold more Listerine because of a Pixar ad, Pixar didn’t make a cent more.
When he talked about it in the video below, his answer wasn’t to work harder or charge more. It was ownership. Pixar pulled 25 incredibly talented people off commercials and put them on films it owned a piece of.
The point isn’t that commercials are bad work. It’s that some work stops paying the day you deliver it, and some never stops. Disney re-released the 60-year-old Snow White on video and sold 28 million copies, making probably around a quarter billion dollars in profit.
The same thing happens with money. A salary is work-for-hire. Every dollar of it you spend pays once. Every dollar you invest is a small piece of something that can keep paying.
That’s why the numbers at the end matter. Jobs paid $10 million for Pixar in 1986. Disney paid $7.4 billion for it in 2006. The defense against work that pays once is owning something that doesn’t.
How much of what you earned this year will still be paying you in ten years?
In 1986, Steve Jobs paid George Lucas $10 million for a small computer graphics company. In 2006, Disney bought it for $7.4 billion in stock, and Jobs became Disney’s largest shareholder.
For years before Toy Story, that company paid its bills by making TV commercials. In the video below, Jobs explains why Pixar walked away from that business even though it was winning almost every award in it.
“It’s all work-for-hire,” he said. “You don’t share in any of the upside of what you create. You just get paid for the work once.”
If Listerine sold more Listerine because of a Pixar commercial, Pixar didn’t make a cent more.
More studios kept piling in, and the margins kept shrinking. “You work harder and harder to make the same amount of money,” Jobs said.
So Pixar pulled out, even though “we loved the commercials business.” It had 25 incredibly talented people doing work-for-hire while the studio had projects where it owned a piece of what it created.
He applied the same thinking to the people. Hollywood kept talent with contracts. Silicon Valley kept talent with stock. Pixar chose stock, so everyone shared the same goal and management had to keep earning their loyalty every day.
Then he pointed to Snow White. Disney re-released the 60-year-old film on video and sold 28 million copies, making probably around a quarter billion dollars in profit decades after the work was done.
A commercial pays once. A film you own can keep paying for 60 years.
Is your work paying you once, or do you own a piece of what you build?
In 1968, Arnold Schwarzenegger arrived in America at 21. By 30 he was a millionaire, before his Hollywood career took off. He never had a backup plan.
In the video below, he explains why he refused one: “If I start having a plan B, then all of a sudden I’m becoming in a way a naysayer to myself.”
Everyone else already was. “You would never make it to America,” people told him. “They don’t need you.” Becoming a world champion was impossible. Getting into movies was impossible.
So he aimed higher, not lower. Winning Mr. Austria takes as much work as winning Mr. Universe, he says, so why not go past Reg Park’s three Mr. Universe titles: “I want to actually become the greatest bodybuilder of all time.”
He says he was never disciplined. He just looked forward to it: two and a half hours in the gym from 7 a.m., then runs in the deep sand, then a construction site.
One summer it almost broke him. He was filming Pumping Iron, finishing Stay Hungry, preparing for a competition and buying real estate to become a millionaire. “I’m all over the place,” he told a friend on the beach.
The friend sent him to transcendental meditation. By the end of the summer, he had learned to take one problem at a time, like riding a bike through the Venice boardwalk crowd one person at a time.
Schwarzenegger says having no safety net kept him on the edge, so he never needed one. Most people keep a safety net because they can’t afford to find out.
Is having no plan B the reason he made it, or advice that only the winners get to give?
In July 2007, David Einhorn started betting against Lehman Brothers. In April 2008, he said so publicly. In September 2008, Lehman filed for bankruptcy.
Along the way, he questioned Lehman’s CFO on a private call and then publicly picked apart her answers. She was out of the job within weeks.
In the video below, the Greenlight Capital founder explains why being right about the crisis still cost his fund money. “We were short all of them, everybody knows this, but we still lost 18%.”
His fund also owned industrial and commodity companies. Einhorn says he never asked what a banking collapse would do to them: “Even though we made a ton on our shorts, we lost even more on our longs.”
He calls the result completely unacceptable for someone with such a front-row seat.
Two years before the crash, Stan Druckenmiller stood up at the Sohn conference and laid out what was coming in housing. Einhorn says every word made sense to him. He stayed long homebuilders anyway.
“I really should have listened to him,” he says now. “This is knowable. It’s like he wasn’t doing voodoo.”
Today he follows a rule most investors break. When a position falls 30%, he usually doesn’t buy more: “If we’ve lost 30% in something, we must be wrong about it.”
Einhorn was right about Lehman and wrong about what Lehman’s fall would do to everything else. The second mistake cost more than the first one earned.
Was 2008 bad luck for Einhorn, or the price of looking at only half the picture?
A Goldman Sachs partner proved why the people who look most likely to succeed usually don’t. It is not luck. It is not talent. It is what they quietly build in the first two or three years.
He started at Goldman in an associate class of 500 people. Within two months he had sized them all up. This one will be great, that one will be terrible.
Ten years later, he says, the ones he picked as stars were mostly gone from Goldman. Some of the people he had written off turned out to be the best.
Charisma and background on day one mattered far less than how competent people became over the next few years. He built his own competence by copying about 80% of a top banker’s system, with permission, and says starting from scratch would have cost him five years.
His name is Jim Donovan. He joined Goldman in 1993, made partner in 2000, and teaches at the University of Virginia’s law school.
Money works like that associate class. A big salary is the charisma on day one. What you keep each month is the competence that shows up years later. Take what came in last month, subtract what went out, divide by what came in. It takes 30 seconds.
His talk is free on UVA Law’s YouTube channel. Most people never reach the Q&A, where he tells the story about the 500.
They all started on the same day with the same offer. Ten years later, some of the ones he had written off were the best in the building.
The new boss of a company close to bankruptcy set his own salary at $1 a year. Four years later that company paid back its government-backed loans seven years early.
Lee Iacocca had just been fired by Ford after 32 years and the Mustang. Henry Ford II reportedly told him he simply didn’t like him.
The only real opening left in cars was Chrysler, and it was running out of cash. Iacocca went to Washington and borrowed $1.2 billion under federal loan guarantees.
Then he asked everyone to give something up, starting with himself. Chrysler let go of 20,000 white collar workers, and he later said he never forgot the people with mortgages and kids in college, some of whom lost their homes.
He went on TV and sold the cars himself. “If you can find a better car, buy it.”
On July 13, 1983, five years to the day after Ford fired him, he told the National Press Club that Chrysler would pay off its last $800 million. “We borrowed money the old-fashioned way,” he said. “We pay it back.”
The $1 salary was a message to workers and lenders that the cuts started at the top.
Most households run the other way. The paycheck goes up, spending follows, and nothing gets paid back early. The share you keep is one subtraction and one division away.
Be honest. Would you work for $1 a year to save the company that just hired you?
Tony Robbins proved why most people’s money decisions happen on autopilot. It is not a lack of discipline. It is not bad math. It is conditioning.
He explained it in the middle of his own infomercial. Advertisers spend billions conditioning you, he said, and most people still finish “how do you spell relief” before they think.
Pepsi paid Michael Jackson to attach a feeling to a can, Robbins added, and Jackson didn’t even drink Pepsi.
Robbins calls this conditioning, linking a feeling to an action until the action happens on its own. He showed it with a handshake. Reach for someone’s hand and theirs comes up before they decide anything.
A few minutes later the ad did it to the viewers. “You might expect a program like this to cost $300 or more,” the narrator said, and the price landed at $179.95 with a guarantee that grew from 30 days to 60.
The infomercial was made by Guthy-Renker, the company that later sold Proactiv.
If you don’t have a plan for conditioning your own mind, Robbins said, you fall into somebody else’s. With money, that plan is one number. Take what came in last month, subtract what went out, divide by what came in. It takes 30 seconds.
The full infomercial is free on YouTube. Most people never reach the part where he explains the trick.
The $300 price never existed. It was there for one sentence, so $179.95 would feel like a deal.
Tony Robbins proved why smart, skeptical people still get talked into buying things. It is not greed. It is not bad math. It is the urge to prove someone wrong.
He learned it from a friend. While Robbins was speaking to Army officers, the friend stood up and objected to a point because it failed in one of the four cases Robbins had named.
The next day Robbins said something that held in 99.9% of cases. The same friend found the 0.1% and told him he couldn't call it true.
Robbins calls this a mismatcher, someone who learns by hunting for the exception. He tested a room with three rectangles, and while most people said what the shapes had in common, a few went straight to what was different.
You can't sell a mismatcher by telling him to buy. You say, "I don't know if you're the kind of person who would do this or not," and he answers the challenge by doing it.
Robbins has been teaching this since his first book, Unlimited Power, in 1986.
The urge to prove a point is expensive when a salesman is the one setting it up. Know your number before he does. Take what came in last month, subtract what went out, divide by what came in. It takes 30 seconds.
The seminar clip is free on YouTube. Most people never reach the part about the sentence.
A man who stops a speech over 0.1% will never fall for a discount. He falls for someone doubting he's the type.
You know your salary to the dollar. Ask what you spent last month and you'll guess, and a Goldman Sachs partner says that guess is exactly how people lose trust they never get back.
Jim Donovan joined Goldman in 1993, made partner in 2000, and teaches at the University of Virginia's law school. He tells every student to write everything down in every meeting, even with a photographic memory.
He explains it with a waiter. Six friends order dinner, the waiter writes nothing down and walks off, and everyone spends the next 30 minutes wondering whether the salad or the meatloaf is coming.
He might remember every order perfectly. The table still stops trusting him the moment he leaves without a notepad, and a young banker who skips notes gets judged the same way.
Donovan runs his own learning on that rule too. Three Wall Street Journal articles a day, about 15 minutes, and after a year he says you'll be amazed how much you know.
Your money works like that table. Spending you never write down feels handled until the month ends short. Take last month's income, subtract what you spent, divide by the income. With a pen it takes 30 seconds.
His full talk is free on YouTube. Most people never get past the interview tips at the start.
The waiter in his story hasn't gotten a single order wrong yet. He lost the table anyway, the second he walked off with nothing written down.
Every bank tells you to keep three to six months of expenses in cash. The man who turned a 71% loss on Hilton into $14 billion learned why the hard way.
In the fall of 2007, Blackstone bought Hilton for $26 billion, borrowed $20 billion of it, and paid a 40% premium to the stock price. Months later the financial crisis hit.
Hilton lost 20% of its revenue and 40% of its cash flow. Blackstone wrote its $5.6 billion stake down by 71%.
Blackstone didn't sell. It put in another $800 million to cut the debt and buy time, travel came back, and the deal ended with about $14 billion in profit.
The man who led it is Jon Gray, now president of Blackstone, a firm that manages over $1.2 trillion.
His lesson is about survival. A great asset compounds only if you reach the other side, and too much debt forces you to sell at the worst possible moment.
Your money runs on the same rule. Take what came in last month, subtract what went out, divide by what came in. It takes 30 seconds, and the share you keep is what builds the cushion that lets you wait out a bad year.
His interview is free on Morgan Stanley's Hard Lessons series. Most people never get past the $14 billion.
Hilton survived because Blackstone could still write an $800 million check in 2010. Six months of expenses is the same check, sized for one household.
The granddaughter of the second richest man in the world spent her afternoons giving other people's kids their baths. The San Francisco family she worked for was wealthy, and she suspected her own family was richer.
Her name is Nicole Buffett. Warren's son Peter adopted her when she was four.
She spent spring breaks at her grandfather's house in Omaha with her twin sister, just the two girls and him. Then she agreed to talk about money on camera.
The film was The One Percent, made by Jamie Johnson, an heir to the Johnson & Johnson fortune. Warren Buffett refused to be interviewed for it.
After the shoot, a letter arrived from Omaha. "I have not emotionally or legally adopted you as a grandchild," he wrote, "nor have the rest of my family adopted you as a niece or a cousin."
Around the same time, Buffett pledged 85% of his Berkshire stock to charity, about $37 billion, most of it headed to the Gates Foundation. The world applauded.
Nicole kept painting and kept the job. Freedom with money comes from the part you keep, one subtraction and one division, and on an artist's income she told the camera she had more than she needed.
The whole documentary is online. Most people only know the $37 billion headline.
She said the man the public celebrated and the grandfather she knew were two completely different people.
Bring $1,000 to a roulette table, bet $1 at a time on red, and walk out the second you're up $100. It sounds like the safest plan in the building. It almost never works.
More money doesn't save you either. Bring $1 million, or $100 trillion, and your odds of getting that $100 stay exactly where they were.
Tom Leighton heard about this plan from his mother-in-law. He co-founded Akamai and has run it as CEO, and she swore to him she almost always went home happy.
So he put it to his MIT class. How many think she loses $1 million before she wins $100? A bunch of hands went up, and those students were right.
Her real chance of leaving up $100 is less than 1 in 37,648.
A red bet wins 18 times out of 38, about 47%. Make the wheel perfectly fair and the same plan wins 10 nights out of 11. Two green slots turn 10 in 11 into 1 in 37,648.
Leighton called it drift against swings. Your lucky streaks wander up and down. The house takes about 5 cents of every dollar on every spin, and it never wanders. Sit down with $10 million and you're still twice as likely to lose it all as to get up $10.
Your paycheck has a drift too. What you keep from it comes down to one subtraction and one division, and that number decides whether the line climbs or sinks.
The full lecture is free on MIT OpenCourseWare. Most people never stay for the proof.
His mother-in-law saw it and still insists she goes home a winner.
Someone offers you $50,000 every year for the rest of your life, or $1 million today. Take the yearly checks and you just lost money.
Most people take the checks anyway. Forever sounds bigger than any number.
Tom Leighton put that exact choice to a hall of MIT students. He co-founded Akamai and has run it as CEO, and he still asked for a show of hands before writing a single equation.
Then he priced forever. At 6% interest, it comes to $883,333.
Every check you wait for shrinks, because a dollar in your hand can earn interest in the meantime. The check that lands in 40 years is worth under $5,000 today. The one in 80 years is worth about $470.
A student cracked it before the proof was done. Bank the million at 6%, pull out $60,000 a year, and the million never moves. You beat forever and still own the pile.
Then Leighton showed who uses this against you. A "$1 million" lottery prize paid as $50,000 a year for 20 years is worth $607,906, and the state still prints a million on the ticket.
Your paycheck hides the same kind of gap. What you keep from it comes down to one subtraction and one division, and almost nobody runs them.
The full lecture is free on MIT OpenCourseWare. Most people never reach the lottery part.
At 3% interest, the same forever deal jumps to $1.72 million and beats the cash. One number decides which side of the board you should be on.
If you get a windfall, keeping half of it untouched can matter more than anything you do with the rest.
Warren Buffett's son sold all $90,000 of his Berkshire stock at 19, and CNBC valued that stake at roughly $200 million by 2020. Half of it, left alone, would have been about $100 million.
The shares came from a farm. When Warren's father Howard died in 1964, he left farmland to his grandchildren, and Warren traded it for Berkshire stock before his kids knew what a share was.
Peter asked his father for money advice when he left Stanford to make music. Warren encouraged him to spend some of it, then told him what to keep and which expenses to watch.
In HBO's Becoming Warren Buffett, asked if he kept the stock, he said no, "which is maybe the dumbest thing I've ever done in my entire life."
He went on to win an Emmy and later told CNBC he doesn't regret it.
His parents never agreed on money. Susan called it choice and wanted it released to people who had none. Warren called it a scorecard, a running tally of A pluses.
The plan was for Susan to outlive him and pour the fortune into her foundation. She died in 2004.
Both started from the same math on a paycheck. One subtraction, one division, and the answer is how much stays behind to grow.
The documentary is from 2017. Most viewers only remember the ice cream for breakfast.
Peter sold at 19. Warren, who gave the advice, has held his Berkshire shares since 1962.
Bill Ackman has run Pershing Square for 22 years, lost roughly $3 billion on Valeant, and traces it to something harmless. He was spending too much time on the road asking people for money.
In a hedge fund, investors pull capital when you do well because you've grown too big for them. They pull it again after a bad year, so the manager raises money instead of thinking.
Ackman once asked Charlie Munger what the most underrated part of Berkshire's success was. Munger told him they were almost never forced to make decisions by circumstances.
Buffett ran a partnership that took 25% of profits above 6%. He shut it in 1969 and kept a big stake in a dying textile mill called Berkshire Hathaway, where nobody could ask for their money back.
Ackman rebuilt his firm the same way. Panicked investors now sell shares of his listed funds while the capital stays inside, which let him buy during the Covid crash while other managers were answering redemption calls.
A savings rate is one subtraction and one division, and it works the same way for a paycheck. It decides whether a layoff or a hospital bill forces your hand, or whether you get to wait.
His full conversation with Shane Parrish is free online. Almost nobody stays for the Munger story an hour in.
Ackman says that at his historic pace, Pershing will manage a trillion dollars in 20 years, and none of it can walk out the door.
Tell people their goal in a negotiation is to win, and they will close fewer deals, take far longer, and walk out hating each other, with no better money to show for it.
Joel Peterson ran this test on Stanford MBAs, and it should change how you walk into your next salary talk.
Peterson spent 18 years at Trammell Crow, chaired JetBlue for 12 and taught at Stanford for 33. In his real estate class he split students into buyers, sellers and lenders and told them to have fun.
They closed reasonable deals quickly and said they loved their classmates. Then he told them the goal was to win, results would be ranked and grades depended on it.
Fewer deals closed, and those that did were messier and harder to enforce. Students called it tougher than anything they had done at Stanford and said they would never do business with those turkeys again.
Most people define winning with money the same way, as a bigger salary. The number that decides when you can stop working is what you keep, and it takes one subtraction and one division.
His Stanford talk is free online. Almost nobody finishes the hour.
Peterson died last November at 78. He once sat across from six partners in a billion-dollar property swap, heard an unfair demand, calmly said it had been a pleasure and left for his plane. Three of them called before he reached the airport.


