Can we trust Kremlin sources? 🧵 Putin’s talks with Trump remain a bit of a black box—so leaks fill the gap. The latest: Putin supposedly wants peace but fears elites and the public would “kill him” if he conceded. 1/4

Key Russian political events of the week: Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin (record 3rd term) proposed KPIs for parliamentary committee chairs. Indicators would cover oversight of state programs. Underperformers could face disciplinary action or removal. 1/6

Check out @RiddleRussia series "Transformed by War: Russia’s Partners Since 2022", now with 17 articles: Turkey, Germany, Belarus, BRICS, Tajikistan, North Korea, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Transnistria, China, Iran, Venezuela, Africa, Israel, Armenia, Gulf states, Kyrgyzstan 1/2

Sber’s brand is valued at ₽2.35 trillion ($28.0 billion USD) by BrandLab—about 37% of the bank’s market cap and nearly four times higher than Brand Finance’s earlier estimate. What do these numbers actually show about Russia’s corporate landscape? And what can’t they tell us? #sanctions Thread 1/4

#China and Russia: The full-scale war accelerated Russia–China ties but did not turn them into a formal alliance. The relationship remains a flexible partnership without binding obligations. Thread 1/4

Putin’s personnel policy is on pause. Even after the Duma elections he stuck to an ultra-conservative approach: longevity for familiar faces, no real reshuffles, and carefully controlled “new elite” entry. New Pertsev on @RiddleRussia Thread 1/5

Before 2022, Moscow kept Pyongyang at arm’s length. After Ukraine, they are in the same boat: two sanctioned states with a treaty that promises military help if either is at war. Roman Chernikov in @RiddleRussia on how the war rewired the relationship. 1/4

After the Duma elections, will Russia launch another mobilization? @IrisovaOlga and I surveyed 26 specialists. 46% say the chance by end of 2026 is high. Most expect 200–300k, not half a million. And it may not even be called “mobilization.” 1/4

After the Duma vote, the Kremlin is more likely to grab assets and raise the squeeze than to put the economy on a real war footing. That is @Vladi_Moscou's read in the latest @RiddleRussia piece. 1/4

Kremlin knows which Russian figures Western analysts actually use. Common mistakes: treating official prices as market prices, ignoring decrees that change what the number means, and reading buffers as proof of stability. How to avoid them: @RiddleRussia ridl.io/seven-mistakes-in-an…

How did Moscow lose its old levers—and what instruments does it still have for promoting its narratives in #Germany public life? @RiddleRussia ridl.io/germany-and-russia-f…