YES. And this is one of the most important things most people do not understand about account security. Changing your password invalidates future login attempts using the old password. It does not invalidate sessions that already exist. Here is how session management actually works. When you log into an account the server generates a session token, a long random string, and stores it in your browser as a cookie. Every subsequent request you make sends that token to prove you are authenticated. The server validates the token, not your password, for every request after the initial login. Your password is only checked at the moment of authentication. Once a session token exists the password becomes irrelevant to that session. An attacker who stole your session cookie before you changed your password still holds a valid token. They are authenticated. Your password change happened at the credential layer. Their access exists at the session layer. Those are two different things and most platforms treat them independently. This is why session hijacking is such a powerful attack. The attacker does not need your new password. They do not need to log in again. They are already inside with a token that the server considers perfectly valid. The attack scenario plays out like this. Attacker steals your session cookie through malicious browser extension, public WiFi interception, XSS vulnerability, or malware. They import that cookie into their browser. They are now authenticated as you. You notice something wrong and change your password immediately. The attacker's session continues uninterrupted because the server never invalidated the existing token. Some platforms invalidate all existing sessions when a password change occurs. Google does this by default. Many platforms do not. Banking apps tend to handle this correctly. Consumer web applications are inconsistent. OAuth tokens and remember me tokens are a separate category that persist independently of password changes entirely. Third party applications that were granted access to your account through OAuth maintain that access through tokens that have their own expiry, often 30, 60, or 90 days, regardless of what happens to your main password. The correct response to a suspected account compromise is not just changing your password. It is changing the password and explicitly revoking all active sessions, reviewing and removing OAuth application access, and checking for any forwarding rules, recovery email changes, or account settings modifications the attacker may have made while inside. Most platforms offer a sign out of all devices option specifically for this reason. That action invalidates all existing session tokens and forces every device to reauthenticate with the new password. Password change stops future logins. Session revocation stops current access. You need both.