@PhillipsRelic

Beachcomber. amicus Leo. This is not investment advice.

Terre du Lion
Joined October 2020
2026 distributors race at US #BoxOffice crosses 7.7B mark,now +10.2% ahead of 2023 & +20.2% ahead of 2025 at same point, thanks to #2 highest grossing final weekend of SEP EVER! Distributors Top 5 YTD #Universal 1.46B #Sony 1.31B #Disney 1.08B #AmazonMGM 557.3M #Lionsgate 518.6M
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The illusion has become real.
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The $WBD overhang was tough for Lionsgate $LION If the merger failed, the WBD assets would hold market primacy. If the deal required asset sales, that would funnel more supply into the market. Moreover, even an old warhorse responds to a trumpet, and Felt and Burns would likely be on the field as buyers. With clarity, Lionsgate now has more parties to sell to, at the project level and the studio level. Scale and IP matter more than ever. Being a bit undersized is a feature, not a bug, and it’s the reason why Lionsgate is the last great Library that can be acquired.
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Just adding to this. The initial distorted interpretation of the Comcast - Universal spin announcement also caused confusion and noise as the vast majority of analysts covering that news seem to have zero clue that the last thing Brian Roberts wants is a monumental tax bill. 🐒
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9/ Alexey: “For reference, a film typically needs to gross 2.5x its production budget at the worldwide box office to break even.” JFC. Let’s get to film finance. Lionsgate distributes a lot of movies but only very rarely would they underwrite a movie to gross 2.5x its production budget. That’s not their business. They often have co-financing partners, license foreign territory rights, and avail themselves of tax credits. Moreover, many of their mid-tier releases over-index on PVOD relative to big budget movies. But there is no typical Lionsgate movie. And we will get to that. Alexey observes that the 2024 film releases were not good business. He’s right. None of us were happy. I’ve already cited the pandemic, the strikes, the macro environment, the industry transformation, the SPAC, the PIPE, the spin, the re-fi. And Joe Drake walked the plank. Action was taken. Confidence was restored. Joe Drake did a lot of good things as Chair of the Motion Picture Group (and he sold a couple of businesses to the company over the years), but toward the end of his tenure he was too transactional, too much of a short-term economic actor; while the risk-mitigated model may have protected the studio, it was not always as kind to international territorial partners, to the talent, to exhibitors and frankly to the brand. So Adam Fogelson was installed. He has his detractors. Relic is not one of them. Fogelson’s father, Andrew, was a legendary film marketing professional and served as President of Marketing for Warner Bros. for many years. Adam spent 15 years at Universal, becoming President of Marketing & Distribution and eventually Chairman of Universal Pictures. He later broke off to start STX and had his Icarus moment. While that venture did not ultimately achieve its goals, we learn more in failure than success, and “struggle our way to wisdom” and I am wholly convinced that he’s a better studio executive and businessman for it. Yes, we’ve been under-achieving. I want and expect more from mid-tier releases going forward and I believe we will get more. And Lionsgate remains the largest supplier of independent movies to the international marketplace. Again, I was disappointed this year with Greenland 2, I Can Only Imagine 2, Strangers 3, Power Ballad, and Mutiny. (But not with Fall 2). So let’s start with Greenland 2. This was an STX property and its budget was fully-financed by a European financier. So right away, any analysis of box office performance as a multiple of the production budget is essentially meaningless to Lionsgate shareholders. Yes, Lionsgate had to offer consideration for domestic rights, and commit to a minimum screen release and P&A spend. But nobody outside the company has read the deal memo or has any idea of what the low, base, and high case content analysis suggests. Nobody knows the Pay-TV / SVOD rate card, the PVOD economics, or the contribution from the re-activation of the original Greenland in the library. Do I wish it had grossed $10M more? Sure. But they knew how much to press or not press the marketing spend going into the release and they knew the efficient frontier to recoup in first position, earn a fee and eventually get to the net / backend. Hits have a back-end. Losers pay a vigorish to the distributor. This is the loan shark business and Alexey has not the first clue about how Lionsgate Studios actually functions in different settings. And there’s only so much we’re gonna tell him. And his model is going to be wrong. As David Mamet writes in Speed-the-Plow: “Charlie, permit me to tell you: two things I’ve learned, 25 years in the entertainment industry. Two things which are always true. The first one: there is not net. And I forget the second one.” Film project accounting is notoriously and intentionally opaque and they can’t say it, but I can. So if Alexey cannot read the subtext or doesn’t understand the rules of the game, just don’t cover the stock. Back to Greenland 2 – it’s not our movie and the ending is awful, and it was a missed opportunity. I Can Only Imagine 2 – again in partnership with Kingdom Story, we probably didn’t get hurt too badly, but the lesson here is you can’t franchise everything. Strangers 3 – we knew this was going to be tough after Strangers 2, but they essentially shot all three at once, I am sure they had financing partners, and they made money on these dogs. Couldn’t not release the third entry. Power Ballad. This was a festival or film market pick-up. It had a very limited release. I don’t know what they paid or how it was structured. For all I know the rights were exchanged just for a minimum screen commitment. I have no idea what the return was here, but they obviously built their release plan against the business case. Mutiny. I have no idea what they paid for the domestic rights, but the box office to budget metric is again useless without the deal memo. They did give this a real marketing campaign, but it was a late August release with balloons on rivers. I think we’re learning Statham’s demo doesn’t really show up to theaters too easily (Working Man and Bee Keeper aside) and the accidental leak on Amazon Prime before the release didn’t help. But here is Producer Basil Iwanyk on The Town Podcast on August 13, 2026: “And what I’ve learned from the economics of Gerry [Butler] and [Jason] Statham movies is you truly should ignore the domestic box office. You know I’m not a math genius and there are many times where I’m like, oh my God, we’re going to lose money on this movie. But then you realize, no, it’s actually so profitable in the afterlife that even if a movie makes, you know, $14M and the movies costs, you know, $55M, you know none of that makes sense, right? You kind of go, that’s going to be a pooch. It makes them money…these movies, these Gerry movies and these Statham movies, the model that they have are profitable on every single one of them. I’m not kidding you – every single one of them.” A minute on Fall 2: Deadpoint. A Capstone Pictures production (shout out Obsession). Widest release was 1,700 screens. It did $5M in domestic box office. The predecessor was made for VOD, but went theatrical on a lark and made $7M domestically. The theatrical release was the marketing campaign for home video consumption. Calling this “underperformance” is just weird. The marketing campaign included a fan screening where audiences watched the movie propped on a high ledge, in a harness. smh. Alexey wrote, “Fall 2 was released on September 2 and has grossed $8m at the time of writing, below the prior Fall, which grossed $18m on a $3m production budget.” Fall 2 had grossed $13M by the time his report was published. But none of it matters. Now am I saying that we should be happy with hitting low cases, or with not being too badly hurt on misses, or being a studio that isn’t competing for meaningful market-share on each release? Of course not! I’m saying we had to recapitalize the whole company, complete the spin, survive the meager downstream window from a terrible 2024 slate and essentially play injured. But this is a business of shots on goal, and I am sure more and higher quality shots are coming. But just to anchor us - in the end, it’s library, library, library, comrades. And another Hunger Games or John Wick, or Saw, or Housemaid will be born at some point. And I’d bet dollars to donuts that Naruto will be the biggest of them all. But look, Alexey doesn’t understand project level film economics, and he demonstrably doesn’t understand them at Lionsgate, so he shouldn’t be publishing on the topic. What I have been noticing recently, which is more salient, is that the other legacy studios are starting to mine and monetize their libraries more. Right now I see a lot of 20-film bundles being offered at a buck-a-movie. That concerns me more than anything Alexey wrote in his report. Because for years “Ça ne vaut pas la peine”. It wasn’t worth it for the majors to spend their time selling their library titles. I suspect with AI tools, even though they didn’t have a Jim Packer or a Ron Schwartz doing it for 20 years, now these other players have tools to pick up library margin that they may as well grab. But my initial concern quickly flipped – the majors are beginning to understand the value of our key asset and our long history of high-volume diversified slates. But back to Alexey’s counterfeit explanation on film profit economics: “Don’t talk about things you don’t understand.” – Logan Roy No Deal Memo. No Greenlight model. No DCF analysis. Look I don’t have a problem with directional observation that the studio has been in recovery on the motion picture segment, but be fair, consider context, and show humility. Yes the hits have been carrying us. It’s a business of hits. You have power law distributions at play, these are VC bets and like in VC, granularity is key. Risk mitigation is important and the hits have long tails. As Burns says, “singles and doubles, and every once in a while we get a frachise.” In the meantime, you have a library engine feeding this optionality cycle funded by…YES! PRODUCTION LOANS – CHEAP OPM THAT IS PROJECT LEVEL AND NON-RECOURSE. “We've got to stick to our model and put 40 - 50 movies a year into the library, continue to make television shows, probably invest somewhere between $1.2B and $1.5B of content, make money on almost every single piece of content, put it in the library and continue to ring the cash register.” – March 2024 (I think it was M.B.)
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11/ Alexey: “While still a possibility, we believe the probability of a takeover in the next 12 months is low” Well, I think the probably of a takeover in the next 12 months is high, for whatever it’s worth. Moreover, I think the 2028 calendar year slate is going to be insane. Anyway, Alexey’s valuation methodology is as unsound as it looks: 20% probability of a sale, he assumes a sale is at $20.00 and 80% probability of no sale, with a DCF of $7.00. (20% x $20) + (80% x $7) = $9.60. I call this the “WAAA!?” Weighted Average Alexey Analysis. If it were me, I probably would’ve performed some kind of valuation on the company’s crown jewel (LIBRARY), and maybe added a little something for the management company, the production studios, the distribution infrastructure and some option value on the owned and controlled IP. You would be welcome to blend that with a DCF that does not sit on a throne of lies. But what do I know compared to a billboard reit analyst. I am being self-effacing – I’m probably a better REIT analyst than he is too.
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12/ To be fair, his report is 42 pages long. And there are sections on the company’s history and operations that look good. One has to imagine that the company helped to explain the business and present the opportunity, and that comes through in the writing. It’s when he performs his own analysis where the research piece becomes woeful. I can only imagine the cultural and communication mismatch that must have manifested while he was “learning”. The report reads like the author is eager to go against the grain, demonstrate a profile in courage and perform independent thinking. Fine, but don’t do it with my money. Alexey makes big fundamental decisions that materially impact the implied equity value of the business. And there are people in the world who believe if something is published by a JP Morgan sell-side analyst, it is credible, which is the scary part. The core asset of this company is the library and the IP. That’s what somebody is buying and valuing. Why would you discount that by production loans funding backlog? It’s not logical. It is a working capital adjustment in a purchase price at worst. While what Alexey believes may be consistent with his rules-based worldview, this requires veritable independent thinking – actually, just logic - and business judgment. Jimmy Barge: “But the backlog, is contractual future revenues and cash flows.” “As you will recall, backlog represents off-balance sheet contractual orders not yet delivered and is indicative of the visibility we have in future revenues and cash flow.” “You know we’re in 12–18 month production cycles of cash out before a theatrical release or episodic deliveries, which is generally when the cash starts to come in. So bridging that gap with a production loan is just ideal. It’s really working capital management…keep in mind you got an asset, by definition those assets being produced are worth a lot more than you spend on them. And what you’ve spent on them is really the production costs. So by definition on your balance sheet you’ve got an obligation that will be repaid – I don’t think of it as debt because it’s not a reduction of enterprise value – this is managing your working capital.” If you’re going to call it debt, you have to give us the asset. And you have to give us a levered return on it too. This is a really long report written by someone that does not understand the space or the company, who has encountered esoteric film finance dynamics, and is also engaging in investment banker cosplay. It’s a disgraceful, opportunistic initiation of coverage and I am very disappointed with the bank. Do your own due diligence. end.
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8/ Let’s get back to his DCF. It’s hard to imagine it’s right when he demonstrates a lack of understanding of the Lionsgate model. The company deficit finances TV shows across a diversified list of buyers (Netflix, Apple, MGM+, ABC, CBS, Hallmark, Starz, USA). As shows extend beyond a first season, they become more expensive and the upfront costs and debt burdens increase. But the financing costs are embedded in the production budgets and are made whole once the show has been delivered and exploited. And the IP becomes more valuable as the show ages and becomes more expensive to produce. And while the first run delivery is typically not super high-margin business, the underlying rights revert back to the studio and then its able to monetize the asset far out into the future. Yes, Lionsgate is a benevolent arms dealer, but it’s not simply a studio for hire. Let’s also examine, for Alexey, that this TV studio was built over the last 26 years, overseen by a corporate CEO who ran TV for Sony-Columbia-TriStar. This wasn’t an organic accident. This is the architecture of the longest tenured CEO in Hollywood. Does it trouble me that the TV market has been contracting and that it did not recover as expected coming out of the dual strikes (when the unions shot themselves in the foot)? Yes. But not as much as it troubles Lionsgate. But they will keep adapting as they have done over many years to make shows at a costs that the majors cannot replicate, because they are scrappy, they are entrepreneurial and they are well set up in New Jersey and in Georgia, availing themselves of helpful state incentives, AND BY THE WAY WE ARE ON THE DOORSTEP OF the Motion Picture, Television, and Entertainment Revitalization Act (H.R. 9691). One day, people will once again enjoy linear long form content in their living rooms, when the doom scrolling on their phones gets old, and when algo-driven pablum from dominant streamers is exposed for what it is and people want to discover quality programming again. So I don’t know what’s in his DCF, but I know early returns on a TV show can be a 15% ROI, but if they grow into multi-season series, that later return becomes pure margin ex participations. And by the way, the company is now mining its catalogue to adapt shows that have an established IP imprimatur in response to the competitive forces in the marketplace (Draft Day, John Wick, Twilight).
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$LION.US 1/ Alexey Philippov’s LION Report Analyst TipRanks Data: #4,644 out of 5,004 Wall Street analysts Alexey opens his report with: “May the Odds Be Ever in Your Favor”; Initiating at Underweight with a $9 PT He’s citing a famous Hunger Games line, known to be a loaded farewell to a mass of kids headed toward certain, violent doom. Is he chirping / shading on publication? Or really that tone deaf? And why now? We are at the mid-point between quarterly reports and after the stock has already fallen by $6.00 per share, he comes out with a sell rating as he initiates. All other analysts are constructive on the name and are offside relative to price action. Is Alexey trying to be the brave, divergent perspective by piling on?
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6/ Alexey: “Franchise portfolio is rather mature” He’s ragging on the age of Twilight, Hunger Games, John Wick, Saw, Now You See Me. Meanwhile, HBO is doing a new Harry Potter show. And The Devil (Still) Wears Prada. Elsewhere, the director of largest grossing domestic box office performer in history is currently casting Naruto for Lionsgate. Alexey also says, “Within the portfolio The Housemaid appears to offer the most attractive return potential.” Well, firstly, I disagree. Secondly, The Housemaid kind of snuck up on everyone, didn’t it? This is proof that it’s all about shots on goal. The Franchise portfolio will de-age.
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7/ Alexey: “Management’s view on the treatment of production loans. We agree that from the company's perspective, production loans can serve as a working-capital tool tied to the movie production cycle. LION defines adjusted Free Cash Flow by including net borrowings and repayments related to production loans and film related obligations to the standard FCF. For example, despite a strong F4Q26, the company reported $190m in adj. FCF versus our $265m estimate, defined as operating cash flow minus capex; the delta was driven by the repayment of production loans. We therefore believe that excluding production loans from debt requires offsetting adjustments to FCF in the DCF or to EBITDA in valuation multiples to reflect movements in film-related obligations. However, this approach requires explicit assumptions about production-loan schedules, including loans raised for unannounced movies that are not visible to us or investors; in our view, that is not practical.” Not visible to JP Morgan, or to investors, so it’s not practical? Do you want us to consult your JP Morgan team on the one-sheet too? What about the teaser trailer? His judgment here is patently absurd: we understand what the company is saying, but if we can’t see the greenlight models, we just can’t get comfort after these guys have been doing this for 26 years and never defaulted on a production loan. Ce n’est pas un gars de chez nous. This is a tourist analyzing a business he doesn’t know. Should JP Morgan send him for an internship to read scripts over the summer? Maybe they can send him to the mailroom at CAA. In any event, treating production loans as corporate debt while ignoring the asset on the other side is the entire story here and it’s the whole gong show of the report. And adding back capitalized interest to EBITDA as a consolation price (which equates to $300M at 15x under their model) isn’t judicious or intelligent. Alexey has encountered an anomaly of studio accounting, and because it doesn’t fit into his rules-based worldview, for valuation purposes he is treating film-related obligations as corporate debt, and not working capital, because it’s “financial debt”. So he’s grossing-up the asset value of the company by $200M - $300M to offset the $1.2B liability that is non-recourse, self-healing, short-dated and an indication that the business is growing. Unless you believe those loans are linked to projects that are being underwitten to a loss, this does not make business sense. This is a library, a library, a library. And there is a working capital facility using Other Peoples Money to fund future positive ROI productions that will eventually get added to make the library grow more. If you’re going to treat those as debt, you have to ascribe commensurate value to the IP they are funding.
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But I hear sounds in my mind Brand new sounds in my mind But honey I'll be seein' you 'ever I go But honey I'll be seein' you down every road I'm waiting for it, that green light, I want it - Lorde
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